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SEARCH-LIGHTS 
ON  THE  WAR 


BY 

DR.  BERNHARD  DERNBURG 

Former  Colonial  Secretary  of  the  German  Empire 


GERMANY  AND  ENGLAND— THE  REAL  ISSUE 
ENGLAND'S  SHARE  OF  GUILT 

A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  ENGLISH  "WHITE  BOOK" 

GERMANY  AND  THE  POWERS 

THE  TIES  THAT  BIND  AMERICA  AND  GERMANY 

GERMANY'S  FOOD  SUPPLY 

WHEN  GERMANY  WINS 


FROM    THE    PRESIDENT'S    OFFICE 
TO  THE  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 


SEARCH-LIGHTS 
ON  THE  WAR 


BY 

DR.  BERNHARD  DERNBURG 

Former  Colonial  Secretary  of  the  German  Empire 


GERMANY  AND  ENGLAND  — THE  REAL  ISSUE 

ENGLAND'S  SHARE  OF  GUILT 
A  CRITICAL  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  ENGLISH  "WHITE  BOOK" 

GERMANY  AND  THE  POWERS 

THE  TIES  THAT  BIND  AMERICA  AND  GERMANY 

GERMANY'S  FOOD  SUPPLY 

WHEN  GERMANY  WINS 


NEW     YORK 

THE  FATHERLAND  CORPORATION 

1123    BROADWAY 

1915 


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GERMANY  AND  ENGLAND— THE   REAL   ISSUE 

(From  "The  Saturday  Evening  Post") 

As  everybody  knows,  the  trouble  that  led  to  the  present  world- war 
started  in  a  little  corner  in  the  southeast  of  Europe,  and  it  is  remarkable  to 
see  how,  in  spite  of  this  common  knowledge,  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  the 
European  conflict  has  resolved  itself  into  a  question  between  Germany 
and  England  as  to  supremacy  in  Europe.  -Of  course  England  claims  that 
she  went  to  war  on  account  of  the  breach  of  Belgian  neutrality  and  that 
she  must  fight  to  destroy  the  spirit  of  militarism  that  has  led  to  such  a 
flagrant  disregard  of  solemn  treaties,  a  tendency  that  is  endangering  the 
peace  of  the  world  and  consequently  must  be  crushed  entirely.  While 
England  fosters  no  ill  feeling  whatsoever  and  no  antagonism  toward  the 
good  people  of  Germany,  unfortunately,  in  order  to  crush  militarism,  led 
by  the  Emperor  and  the  military  caste,  the  German  people  will  have  to 
be  destroyed  as  a  nation,  reducing  what  is  left  to  the  size  of  a  subordinate 
Power.  For  this  purpose  England  has  created  in  her  literary  arsenal  a 
special  docket  called  German  Militarism,  with  the  works  of  Von  Bernhardi, 
Treitschke,  and  Nietzsche  as  the  main  exhibits. 

How  Germany  Has  Kept  the  Peace 

It  is  interesting  to  note  the  number  of  copies  of  the  books  of  these  three 
men  that  were  sold  in  America  before  the  beginning  of  the  war.  I  dare  say 
there  were  not  twenty  of  the  works  of  any  one  of  them  in  the  hands  of 
Americans,  outside  of  clubs  and  public  libraries.  Von  Bernhardi  is  the 
chief  witness  for  the  prosecution.  He  is  a  retired  German  general  of  great 
learning,  independent  views,  and  strong  personality.  His  ~book  makes 
interesting  reading.  Yet  he  is  not  among  the  German  generals  in  the 
present  war,  having  been  retired  from  the  service  just  because  his  writings 
and  sayings  did  not  meet  with  the  approval  of  his  superiors  and  because  his 
teachings  were  considered  very  extravagant.  His  book  has  excited  some 
comment  also  in  Germany,  but  it  has  been  printed  in  only  two  editions, 
and  certainly  never  more  than  ten  thousand  copies  in  all  have  been  sold  in 
our  country.  The  book  appeared  in  1911,  a  little  over  two  and  a  half  years 
ago,  and  I  fail  to  see  how  it  can  have  created  the  feeling  of  militarism  that 
is  said  to  have  been  predominant  in  Germany  for  the  last  thirty  years.  I 
further  fail  to  see  how  a  book  that  is  obviously  written  to  warn  the  German 
people  against  existing  dangers;  to  rouse  in  them  a  warlike  spirit;  to  teach 

3 


4  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

them  the  ethics  of  var  and  the  lights  of  the  stronger,  can  be  used  tp  prove 
that  such  a  spirit  of  war  was  rampant  in  Germany.  If  it  already  existed, 
there  was  no  need  to  write  such  a  book! 

There  are  Von  Bernhardis  in  all  countries.  I  refrain  from  citing  Ameri- 
can examples,  because  I  have  made  it  a  rule  in  this  country  not  to.  fall 
back  on  them.  The  feeling  of  obligation  I  have  as  a  guest  of  the  United 
States  does  not  permit  me  to  become  personal.  But  what  about  Lord 
Charles  Beresford,  who,  together  with  Captain  Faber,  has  for  years  and 
years  been  egging  on  the  English  to  increase  the  British  Navy,  at  a  great 
sacrifice  to  the  country?  What  about  Lord  Roberts's  writings  and  sayings 
for  years  back  that  England  must  have  universal  conscription  and  a  com- 
pulsory service?  What  about  Senator  Humbert,  who  has  vigorously 
denounced  the  French  ministry  for  neglecting  the  defense  of  the  country? 
Did  they  teach  anything  different  from  Von  Bernhardi's  teachings?  I 
cannot  see  it. 

Then  about  Treitschke.  He  was  a  professor  of  history  and  the  historian 
of  the  Prussian  Government.  His  ideas  were  formed  from  a  lifelong  study 
of  this  history.  He  hated  England  sincerely  and  thoroughly  for  the  way 
in  which  she  had  conquered  her  Empire,  by  using  might  versus  right;  but 
his  conferences  were  mainly  attended  on  account  of  his  refined  rhetoric, 
for  he  was  indeed  an  orator  of  the  first  order.  But  from  being  an  orator 
to  having  an  influence  on  the  German  people  as  a  whole  is  a  very  far  cry, 
and  Treitschke's  preachings  of  twenty  years  ago  have  not  even  formed 
a  school.  You  might  just  as  well  say  that  it  can  be  proven 'that  America 
is  a  warlike  nation  because  a  celebrated  Harvard  professor  at  a  later  day 
impressed  upon  his  women  audience  to  go  into  war  and  help  the  Allies. 
If  that  were  presented  to  the  wrorld  as  a  proof  of  the  American,  spirit  there 
would  be  a  very  energetic  protest. 

And  now  I  come  to  Nietzsche:  He  was  one  of  the  finest  of  poetical 
philosophers,  or  perhaps  rather  a  philosophizing  poet.  His  teaching  of 
the  right  of  the  individual  as  the  basis  of  all  right  is  in  direct  contradiction 
to  Von  Bernhardi's  teaching  that  the  right  of  the  collectivity — that  is,  of 
the  State — is  paramount  to  the  right  of  the  citizen  as  an  individual.  How, 
therefore,  can  it  be  said  that  Von  Bernhardi  is  a  disciple  of  Nietzsche? 

The  expression  "superman"  is  universally  attributed  to  Nietzsche. 
This  is  just  as  incorrect  as  it  is  to  cite  the  German  song  "Deutschland, 
Deutschland  Ueber  Alles"  as  a  proof  of  the  world-wide  aspirations  of  my 
people.  Superman,  in  German  Uebermensch,  is  a  word  coined  by  Goethe 
and  used  repeatedly  in  his  "Faust,"  and  so  one  might  just  as  well  lay  the 
present  war  to  the  door  of  Goethe. 

The  absurdity  of  the  thing  is  patent,  and  those  who  cite  "  Deutschlana, 
Deutschland  Ueber  Alles"  in  proof  of  German  aspirations  do  not  know  even 
the  first  lines  of  this  song  so  dear  to  the  Germans.  It  is  a  song  of  modesty 
and  shows  better  the  tendencies  of  the  German  nation  than  anything  else 
could : 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR  5 

Germany,  Germany  above  everything,  above  everything  in  the  world. 
May  her  sons  ever  stand  united  for  defense  and  protection 

From  the  Maas  unto  the  Memel, 

From  the  Etsch  unto  the  Belt, 
Germany,  Germany  above  everything,  above  everything  in  the  world. 

Now  the  Maas  is  part  of  the  western  frontier  of  my  home  country  and 
the  Memel  part  of  the  eastern  frontier,  and  so  are  the  Etsch  in  the  south 
and  the  Belt  in  the  north.  Could  a  patriotic  song  be  more  modest?  You 
may  compare  it  with  your  own  saying  that  the  United  States  is  the  finest 
country  in  the  world.  The  meaning  is  the  same.  Everybody  praises  his 
country  and  loves  it  best.  And  is  "Rule  Britannia"  without  aspiration, 
without  pretensions? 

And  just  as  our  national  anthem  is  cited,  so  is  our  militarism.  It  has 
been  created  as  a  dire  necessity  for  the  defense  of  our  four  frontiers  and  has 
never  been  used  beyond  them.  If  every  country  could  stand  on  so  good  a 
record  as  Germany  there  would  not  be  so  much  cant  about  the  reasons  for 
the  present  war.  It  has  been  stated  that  militarism  in  general  is  a  threat 
to  the  peace  of  the  world.  Yet  German  militarism  has  kept  the  peace  for 
forty-four  years.  While  Russia  went  to  war  with  Turkey  and  China,  and, 
after  having  promoted  The  Hague  Conference,  battled  with  Japan,  and 
''protected"  Persia,  conquering  territory  double  the  size  of  the  United 
States  on  the  might-is-right  principle;  while  England,  the  defender  of  the 
rights  of  the  small  States,  smashed  the  Boer  Republics,  took  Egypt, Cyprus, 
and  south  Persia;  while  the  French  Republic  conquered  the  Sudan,  Tunis, 
Madagascar,  Indo-China,  and  Morocco;  while  Italy  possessed  itself  of 
Tripoli  and  the  islands  in  the  ^Egean  Sea;  while  Japan  fought  China,  took 
Formosa,  Korea,  and  southern  Manchuria,  and  has  now  with  the  aid  of  her 
allies  invaded  China,  a  neutral  country — there  is  not  one  annexation  or 
increase  of  territory  to  the  charge  of  Germany.  She  has  waged  no  war  of 
any  kind,  has  never  acquired  a  territory  in  all  her  existence  except  by  treaty 
and  with  the  consent  of  the  rest  of  the  \vorld. 

The  Battle -Ground  of  All  Europe 

But  why,  then,  did  she  keep  up  such  a  tremendous  army?  Certainly 
not  for  aggressive  purposes.  She  never  was  aggressive  toward  anybody. 
She  needed  this  army  because  her  exposed  situation  in  the  middle  of  Europe, 
without  natural  boundaries,  between  unsettled  neighbors,  has  made  her  for 
ages  and  centuries  the  cockpit  and  the  battle-ground  of  all  Europe.  Her 
soil  was  drenched  with  blood  and  her  population  nearly  exterminated  in 
the  Thirty  Years'  War;  Louis  XIV.  in  the  Palatinate  left  hardly  one  stone 
on  the  other,  destroyed  old  Heidelberg  and  took  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  then 
a  German-speaking  dukedom;  the  devastations  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
the  battles  and  six  years'  occupation  of  the  Napoleonic  times,  all  taught 
Germany  bitter  lessons.  Her  soil  has  been  the  rendezvous  of  Swedes, 
Danes,  Russians,  Croats,  Poles,  Italians,  French,  and  Spaniards  for  cen- 


6  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

turies  past.  Impotent  and  not  able  to  ward  them  off,  she  has  been  con- 
tinually destroyed,  until  the  genius  of  Bismarck  welded  her  twenty-six 
States  together  into  one  unit,  and  Germany  made  the  vow  that  she  would 
never  again  give  any  one  such  chances.  That  is  why  we  kept  our  army, 
and  if  a  people  have  an  army  at  all,  it  is  a  waste  not  to  make  it  strong 
enough  for  any  emergency.  That  it  is  not  too  strong  may  be  judged  from 
the  fact  that  Germany  is  now  attacked  by  seven  nations. 

You  hear  people  say  that  the  large  standing  establishment,  the  enormous 
cost  of  it,  and  the  time  wasted,  is  a  sin  against  culture,  advancement,  and 
scientific  progress.  The  Germany  of  to-day  proves  the  contrary.  While 
we  have  been  keeping  up  a  big  army — which,  by  the  way,  is  the  cheapest 
of  the  European  armies  so  far  as  the  taxpayer  is  concerned — we  have 
increased  our  population,  we  have  enormously  increased  our  wealth,  we 
have  built  up  a  gigantic  oversea  trade,  we  have  constructed  the  second 
largest  merchant  marine  in  the  world.  More,  we  have  been  able  to  spend 
as  much  as  $250,0x30,0x30  a  year  to  take  care  of  our  workmen,  giving  them  a 
compulsory  insurance  against  sickness  and  invalidism,  accident,  and  old 
age,  pensioning  widows  and  providing  for  orphans.  Every  German  em- 
ployee earning  less  than  5,000  marks  a  year  can  with  a  degree  of  security 
look  forward  to  a  comfortable  provision  for  himself  and  for  the  people  dear 
to  him  when  his  owrn  forces  fail.  We  pay  yearly  more  for  this  social  work 
than  we  ever  paid  for  our  army. 

And  our  productive  and  inventive  genius  has  not  suffered.  I  do  not 
say  that  Germany's  civilization  is  superior  to  that  of  England  and  France; 
it  certainly  is  superior  to  the  civilization  of  any  of  the  other  warring  nations. 
We  have  been  able  to  give  our  people  a  primary  and  technical  education 
of  the  first  order,  and  that  in  turn  has  led  to  the  perfection  of  scientific 
work  and  to  inventions  that  are  a  comfort  to  all  the  world.  Germany 
stands  in  the  first  rank  in  applied  science,  be  it  in  chemistry,  or  electricity,  or 
in  the  perfection  of  medicines.  With  just  pride  the  Germans  provide  a 
great  many  absolute  necessities  of  life  to  a  very  large  part  of  the  world. 
Whib  the  population  has  increased  50  per  cent.,  the  wealth  of  the  nation 
is  now  three  times  what  it  was  before,  and  thanks  to  our  democratic  gov- 
ernment the  repartition  of  this  wealth  is  such  that  we  have  a  well-to-do 
middle  class  and  few  colossal  fortunes ;  and  the  number  of  really  poor  people 
in  Germany  is  infinitely  small  in  comparison  with  other  countries. 

This  is  the  story  of  German  militarism,  unaggressive  and  certainly  not 
unproductive,  based  on  actual  facts.  Those  antagonistic  to  our  nation 
say  it  has  created  a  warlike  spirit,  and  that  such  a  spirit  by  itself  is  a  danger. 
This  warlike  spirit  is  generally  shown  by  people  going  to  war;  and  yet  of 
all  the  European  peoples  Germany  alone  did  not  do  that. 

The  case  of  Belgium  is  frequently  cited  as  proving  Germany's  reckless 
warlike  spirit.  It  is  said  we  have  broken  wantonly  most  solemn  treaties, 
and  therefore  we  ought  to  be  punished  for  it.  The  question  as  to  the  right — 
so  far  as  obligations  under  treaties  go — has  been  decided  by  nearly  all 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR  7 

nations  in  the  same  spirit — namely,  that  no  nation  can  bind  itself  by  a  treaty 
to  its  own  destruction,  just  as  no  individual  can  so  bind  himself  by  contract ; 
that  the  national  interest  supersedes  the  international  interest,  and  that 
treaties  are  closed  on  the  basis  of  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  they 
are  made,  and  that  therefore  they  are  not  binding  when  those  circumstances 
change. 

Treaties  That  Are  Not  Binding 

England,  who  claims  to  have  gone  to  war  on  account  of  the  breach  of 
Belgium's  neutrality,  has  never  hesitated  to  break  her  obligations  whenever 
she  considered  doing  so  of  paramount  interest.  She  has  done  so  in  this  war 
any  number  of  times.  There  is  a  treaty  of  peace  and  amity  between 
Germany  and  Portugal  which  is  to  be  broken  on  England's  bidding.  There 
is  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  is  to  be  severed  at  English  solicitation.  Egypt 
is  a  sovereign  State,  where  the  rights  of  the  foreigner  are  guaranteed  by 
solemn  pledges,  yet  the  Khedive  had  to  banish  the  German  Minister  and 
even  the  judges  of  the  mixed  tribunal  at  England's  command.  China  is 
a  neutral  country  and  bound  to  the  open-door  policy  by  international 
treaties;  she  has  been  invaded  by  the  Allies  in  breach  of  these  treaties. 
Morocco  has  pacts  binding  England' as  well  as  Germany,  regulating  the 
rights  of  the  foreigners;  yet  the  German  diplomatic  representative  has 
been  chased  out  of  the  country. 

When  Sir  Edward  Grey  expounded  the  European  situation  before  the 
English  Parliament  he  cited  Gladstone  in  regard  to  Belgium — Gladstone, 
who  said  that  the  maintenance  of  the  obligations  of  a  treaty  without  regard 
to  changed  circumstances  was  an  impracticable,  stringent  proposition  to 
which  he  could  not  adhere;  and  when  England  seized  two  Turkish  dread- 
noughts on  the  Tyne  on  August  8,  she  proclaimed  the  fact  with  the  fol- 
lowing words:  "In  accordance  with  the  recognized  principle  of  the  right 
and  supreme  duty  to  assure  national  safety  in  times  of  war."  France  has 
been  doing  the  same  in  Morocco;  and  Japan,  when  she  sent  to  the  German 
Consul  in  Mukden — a  Chinese  city  in  Manchuria — his  passports,  acted  on 
the  same  principle,  leaving  aside  all  her  other  infractions  on  Chinese  treaties 
and  rights. 

This  is  sad  and  does  not  portend  well  for  the  permanent  peace  by  ar- 
rangement of  international  affairs  through  treaties;  yet  it  seems  that  it  can 
not  be  helped.  The  United  States  Supreme  Court  says  in  a  judgment 
rendered  in  1889,  written  by  Judge  Field,  expressing  the  unanimous  con- 
viction of  the  whole  court:  "Circumstances  may  arise  which  would  not 
only  justify  the  Government  in  disregarding  their  treaty  stipulations,  but 
demand  in  the  interest  of  the  country  that  it  should  do  so.  There  can  be 
no  question  that  unexpected  events  may  call  for  a  change  of  the  policy 
of  the  country."  This  judgment  was  handed  down  when  the  Chinese  were 
excluded  from  the  United  States  in  violation  of  a  previous  treaty  which 
had  assured  them  the  same  rights  as  United  States  citizens;  and  the  United 
States  has  acted  on  the  quoted  decision  ever  since. 


8  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

The  Case  of  Belgium 

It  is,  therefore,  universally  recognized  that  the  vital  interests  of  a 
country  supersede  its  treaty  obligations.  But  though  this  is  the  theo- 
retic side  of  the  question,  there  is  a  practical  one  as  regards  Belgium: 
When  the  war  broke  out  there  was  no  enforceable  treaty  in  existence  to 
which  Germany  was  a  party.  Originally,  in  1839,  a  treaty  was  concluded 
providing  for  such  neutrality.  In  1866,  France  demanded  of  Prussia  the 
right  to  take  possession  of  Belgium,  and  the  written  French  offer  was  made 
known  by  Bismarck  in  July,  1870.  Then  England  demanded  and  obtained 
separate  treaties  with  France  and  writh  the  North- German  Federation  to 
the  effect  that  they  should  respect  Belgium's  neutrality,  and  such  treaties 
were  signed  on  the  gth  and  26th  of  August,  1870,  respectively.  According 
to  them  both  countries  guaranteed  Belgium's  neutrality  for  the  duration 
of  the  war  and  for  one  year  thereafter.  The  war  came  to  an  end  with  the 
Frankfurt  Peace  in  1871,  and  the  treaty  between  Belgium  and  the  North- 
German  Federation  expired  in  May,  1872. 

Why  the  new  treaties,  if  the  old  one  held  good?  The  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor has  been  continuously  misrepresented  as  admitting  that  in  the  case 
of  Belgium  a  treaty  obligation  was  broken.  What  he  said  was  that  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  could  not  be  respected  and  that  we  were  sincerely 
sorry  that  Belgium,  a  country  that  in  fact  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
question  at  issue  and  might  wish  to  stay  neutral,  had  to  be  overrun.  But 
it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  the  offer  of  indemnity  to  Belgium  and  the 
full  maintenance  of  her  sovereignty  had  been  made  not  only  once  but  even 
a  second  time  after  the  fall  of  Liege,  and  that  it  would  have  been  entirely 
possible  for  Belgium  to  avoid  all  the  devastation  under  which  she  is  now 
suffering. 

England  takes  the  position  that  in  case  France  had  used  Belgium  as  a 
stepping-stone,  England  would  have  gone  to  war  against  France  for  breaking 
the  Belgian  neutrality.  This  is  a  remarkable  proposition.  On  July  30, 
the  Belgian  charge  d'affaires  at  St.  Petersburg  wrote  to  his  Government — 
and  the  authenticity  of  this  letter  can  not  be  impeached — that  the  Russian 
war-party  got  the  upper  hand  upon  England's  assurance  that  she  would 
stand  in  with  France.  This  was  written  before  the  Belgian  question  ever 
came  up;  and  before  Sir  Edward  Grey  expounded  in  Parliament  the 
Belgian  question,  he  insisted  that  England  was  obliged  to  protect  the 
French  coast  against  Germany  because  of  the  amity  and  friendship  existing 
between  the  two  nations.  He  then  read  the  correspondence  of  1912  be- 
tween himself  and  the  French  Minister  of  War,  where  the  arrangement  is 
alluded  to  that  the  French  fleet  should  protect  the  Mediterranean  Sea 
and  the  English  fleet  the  northern  coast  of  France.  So  in  consequence  of 
this,  Sir  Edward  Grey  insisted  to  Count  Lichnowsky  that  the  maintenance  of 
Belgium's  neutrality  alone  would  not  keep  England  from  going  to  war, 
but  that,  if  France  should  be  attacked,  England  would  aid  her. 

I  wish  an  intelligent  American  reader  to  picture  to  himself  a  situation 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  9 

where  England  protects  the  French  coast  against  Germany  and  goes  to 
war  against  France  for  breach  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

But  Belgium  was  not  neutral  at  all  any  more,  and  with  her  circum- 
stances had  greatly  changed.  Even  since  1906  she  had  been  in  correspon- 
dence with  England,  elaborating  plans  for  a  common  defense,  providing  for 
the  landing  of  a  hundred  thousand  English  at  Antwerp.  She  had  been  in 
correspondence  with  France,  building  fortresses  all  along  the  German 
frontier,  which  form  a  continuous  chain  with  the  French  fortresses  along 
that  same  frontier.  She  had  been  changing  her  military  system  to  a 
system  of  compulsory  conscription,  establishing  an  army  of  more  than 
three  hundred  thousand  men,  creating — on  English  instigation — a  spy 
system  on  her  eastern  frontier,  acquiring  enormous  oversea  possessions  of 
nine  hundred  thousand  square  miles,  an  area  three  times  as  great  as  Germany 
and  populated  by  nine  million  inhabitants.  This  acquisition,  by  the  way, 
was  also  obtained  by  breach  of  treaty. 

Belgian  population  at  home  is  bigger  by  one-half  than  that  of  Portugal. 
Though  Belgium  left  her  frontiers  toward  France  entirely  unprotected  and 
open,  she  was  actively  preparing  to  make  a  stand  against  Germany.  This 
is  not  the  "poor  little  country"  that  is  being  pictured  to  the  Americans. 
I  think  the  Belgian  fighting,  which  she  has  had  to  do  almost  quite  alone 
against  a  large  part  of  the  German  forces,  should  fully  prove  that. 

But  she  did  more.  The  Imperial  Chancellor  said  that  he  had  proofs 
that  the  French  were  to  invade  Germany  by  way  of  Belgium.  Proof  there 
is.  French  soldiers  and  French  guns,  in  spite  of  all  the  denials  made  by  the 
French  Ambassador  at  Washington,  were  in  Liege  and  Namur  before  the 
3oth  of  July.  Certainly  this  proof  is  only  in  private  letters,  but  it  comes 
from  absolutely  unimpeachable  people.  Of  course  it  is  not  in  the  White 
Books,  such  as  are  held  up  as  evidence  of  the  purest  water. 

But  do  Americans  believe  all  the  "official  news"  that  the  Russians  are 
sending  continuously  from  the  seat  of  war  as  to  their  enormous  successes, 
the  routing  of  the  Austrians,  the  destruction  of  their  whole  army,  the  march 
on  Vienna  and  Berlin,  and  so  forth?  I  do  not  think  they  do;  but  why  then 
place  an  implicit  faith  on  so-called  White  Books,  written  by  identically 
the  same  people?  Such  books  are  written  for  the  purpose  of  making  out  a 
nation's  case,  and  they  are  the  diplomatic  war  weapons  used  in  the  war  of 
diplomatists  that  always  precedes  the  war  at  arms. 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  talk  of  crushing  Germany,  and  the  necessity  for 
it,  because  of  her  military  spirit.  I  confess  we  are  a  manly  people,  and  want 
to  be  strong  and  want  to  be  secure.  We  want  to  live  and  to  thrive,  and  are 
ready  to  pay  for  our  civic  liberty  and  national  independence  with  our  blood. 
And  we  should  despise  a  nation  that  did  not  feel  the  same  way. 

Safety  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

The  case  of  England  is  different.  Though  she  wants  to  be  free  and 
independent,  she  has  always  managed  to  have  her  fighting  done  for  her  by 


ID  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

others,  from  the  time  she  trafficked  in  Hessians,  and  that  is  why  she  has  not 
had  a  standing  army  such  as  Lord  Roberts  and  his  friends  have  always 
demanded.  Though  there  is  a  fighting  spirit  in  the  English  Army,  it  is 
mostly  Irish,  and  so  are  the  leaders — Lord  Roberts,  Lord  Beresford,  Sir 
John  French,  Admiral  Jellicoe,  and  Lord  Kitchenjer  of  Khartum.  The  way 
in  which  she  cares  for  the  little  nations  whose  interests  she  has  so  much 
at  heart  is  to  allow  her  fighting  to  be  done  by  the  Belgians,  of  whom  Sir 
Edward  Grey  said  that  he  expected  them  to  fight  to  the  last  man  for  the 
independence  of  the  country.  And  so  she  called  in  the  Canadians,  wrho 
should  have  much  better  things  to  do;  and  she  made  a  treaty  with  Portugal 
to  help  her — the  Portuguese,  who  do  not  know  what  the  conflict  is  about. 
She  brings  over  ambitious  Indian  princes  and  poor  ignorant  Indian  soldiers 
to  fight  against  the  white  men;  she  relies  on  Japan  and  she  gets  the  Boers 
to  attack  the  German  possessions;  she  tries  to  persuade  Italy  to  do  some 
fighting  for  her.  Most  of  these  are  "poor  little  States,"  who  now  are  ex- 
pected to  fight  for  the  sovereignty  and  independence  of  Great  Britain.  In 
this  way  she  has  time  left  to  talk  at  home  and  to  force  the  unemployed  into 
a  new  army  that  is  going  to  be  created.  That  she  too  must  become  mili- 
taristic she  now  finds  out  to  her  surprise  and  grief. 

The  fact  that  Canada  has  taken  part  in  this  struggle  has  opened  up  a 
new  prospective  to  Americans.  It  is  a  wilful  breach  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
for  an  American  self-governing  dominion  to  go  to  war,  thereby  exposing 
the  American  Continent  to  a  counter-attack  from  Europe  and  risking  to 
disarrange  the  present  equilibrium.  But  I  think  America  can  set  her  mind 
at  rest  on  that  point.  I  at  least  would  most  emphatically  say  that  no 
matter  what  happens  the  Monroe  Doctrine  will  not  be  violated  by  Germany 
either  in  North  America  or  in  South  America.  When  she  is  victorious  there 
will  be  enough  property  of  her  antagonists  lying  about  over  the  four  parts 
of  the  globe  to  keep  Germany  from  the  necessity  of  looking  any  farther, 
and  causing  trouble  where  she  seeks  friendship  and  sympathy. 

While  England  in  the  Venezuelan  case  of  1895  most  coolly  challenged 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  was  Germany  in  1904,  in  a  similar  case,  also  with 
Venezuela,  who  submitted  her  claim  in  Washington  and  got  the  consent 
of  the  United  States  Government  to  prosecute  the  collection.  Moreover, 
I  am  in  the  position  to  state  here  that  immediately  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  war,  by  one  of  the  first  mails  that  reached  the  United  States,  the  German 
Government  sent  of  its  own  free  initiative  a  solemn  declaration  to  the 
Department  of  State  that  whatever  happened  she  would  fully  respect  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  Dangers  of  Navyism 

I  wish  also  to  make  clear  to  the  American  people  that  Germany  neither 
wanted  nor  started  this  war,  which  had  its  origin  in  Russia's  pretensions  to 
mix  in  Austrian  affairs,  and  that  got  its  size  from  the  fact  that  England  and 
France  joined  the  conflict,  the  latter  from  treaty  obligations,  the  former 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE  WAR  n 

from  self-interest,  and  that  we  have  no  ambitions  of  enlargement  in  Europe 
or  in  America.  Modern  democracies,  and  especially  the  German  one, 
which  is  directed  by  the  most  liberal  ballot  law  that  exists,  even  more 
liberal  than  the  one  in  use  in  the  United  States,  rest  at  least  in  Europe  on  a 
national  basis. 

We  do  not  believe  in  incorporating  in  our  Empire  any  parts  of  nations 
that  are  not  of  our  own  language  and  race.  The  history  of  Europe  has 
shown  us  the  danger  of  such  a  thing.  The  difficulties  between  France  and 
Germany  are  over  the  French-speaking  population  in  Lorraine;  the  small 
internal  differences  in  Germany  came  because  of  some  millions  of  Poles 
and  thirty  thousand  Danes;  the  trouble  between  Austria  and  Italy  is  be- 
cause of  a  few  hundred  thousand  Italian-speaking  people  under  Austrian 
government.  England  had  what  nearly  amounted  to  a  civil  war  because 
of  Ireland.  The  trouble  in  Russia  is  on  account  of  the  Poles,  Finns,  and 
Baltic  Germans;  and  Austria,  the  country  of  many  nations,  is  not  very 
strong  just  for  this  very  reason.  And  as  to  oversea  possessions,  as  I  said 
before,  there  are  enough  to  be  had  without  borrowing  trouble;  especially 
in  Africa,  where  considerable  parts  of  land  lend  themselves  to  colonization 
by  the  white  man. 

Even  there  our  ambitions  do  not  go  very  far  and  we  are  quite  content 
with  what  we  have,  and  with  our  spheres  of  influence  in  Mesopotamia,  and 
some  countries  such  as  Morocco,  that  a  civilized  nation  with  great  resources 
and  inventive  genius  might  open  to  the  world's  culture.  All  assertions 
that  our  ambition  goes  beyond  this  are  untrue,  and  simply  invented  for 
the  purpose  of  rousing  distrust  between  the  United  States  and  a  country 
that  has  for  generations  been  the  friend  of  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  and  that 
has  never  gone  to  war  with  you  as  England  has  done. 

I  have  read  in  your  papers  statements  to  the  effect  that  probably  the 
next  thing  Germany  would  do  after  the  close  of  the  present  war  would  be 
to  invade  the  United  States  or  take  Brazil.  Why  not  say  the  same  of 
England?  She  has  always  had  a  navy  twice  the  size  of  that  of  any  other 
nation;  she  is  now  creating  a  big  army;  she  has  always  been  aggressive;  she 
has  conquered  half  the  world;  she  has  shown  utter  disregard  of  treaties;  she 
has  coaling  stations  all  along  the  American  coast,  which  form  a  fighting 
basis  from  Halifax  down  to  the  Falklands  and  from  Chile  up  to  British 
Columbia;  she  controls  the  entrance  to  the  Panama  Canal;  she  is  even  now 
dictating  to  Uncle  Sam  her  own  rights  and  laws  in  regard  to  contraband, 
seizing  American  petroleum,  seizing  American  ships  flying  the  Stars  and 
Stripes,  harassing  American  citizens,  cutting  cables,  using  wireless  stations 
as  she  pleases,  maiming  the  trade  of  America,  locking  up  the  Mediterranean, 
the  North  Sea,  the  Red  Sea,  and  the  Persian  Gulf. 

Why  not  consider  navyism  under  the  same  light  that  we  do  militarism? 
I  ask,  who  is  bulldozing  the  rest  of  the  world,  including  America,  at  this 
present  moment?  England  wants  to  rule  the  seas.  There  lies  her  power; 
thence  comes  her  commerce  and  therefore  her  riches.  Whenever  a  nation 


12  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

that  is  but  human — as  I  think  the  English  are — poses  as  being  on  a  higher 
level  than  any  other  nation,  doing  everything  for  the  benefit  of  the  under- 
dog, because  of  altruism  and  a  recognition  of  the  sacredness  of  her  given 
word,  disclaiming  emphatically  any  self-interest,  while  at  the  same  time 
advertising  through  her  writers  the  loftiness  of  her  intentions,  I  cannot 
help  feeling  suspicious,  and  everybody  else  should,  it  seems  to  me,  feel  the 
same  way. 

Americans  have  been  hearing  a  great  deal  about  the  English  angel 
without  wings  standing  with  a  sword  drawn  for  the  protection  of  liberty, 
freedom,  and  humanity  and  just  causes,  using  as  watchwords  the  fight 
against  militarism,  the  principle  that  might  is  right,  the  infringement  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  so  on.  She  has  sent  a  host  of  English  authors  of  a 
very  special  type  to  defend  her  case.  I  read  articles  by  G.  K.  Chesterton, 
Hall  Caine,  H.  G.  Wells,  Sir  Arthur  Conan  Doyle,  and  other  writers  of 
fiction.  They  consider  the  American  people  a  sentimental  people,  preferring 
humane  stories  to  the  cold  truth,  fiction  to  facts,  and  unused  to  doing  their 
own  thinking.  Well,  fiction  is  what  these  men  are  writing;  that  is  their 
business,  and  the  gentleman  who  detailed  the  English  case  in  the  issue 
of  The  Saturday  Evening  Post  of  October  iyth,  Mr.  Arnold  Bennett,  is  an 
artist  of  no  common  attainments. 

But  I  shall  make  free  to  dig  somewhat  deeper  into  what  I  see  to  be  the 
reason  for  the  English  attitude.  England  has  created  a  large  shipping 
trade  and  acquired  enormous  possessions  oversea,  and  she  felt  secure  in 
her  supremacy.  She  was  uneasy  only  on  account  of  the  United  States, 
which — until  Germany  loomed  up  on  the  horizon  as  a  big  Power — she  tried 
to  treat  as  she  was  treating  Germany  before  the  war.  But  now  she  feels 
that  her  absolute  sway  is  in  danger.  Even  in  her  own  domain  she  does  a 
very  large  share  only  by  foreign  help.  Most  of  the  big  bankers,  from 
Rothschild  down,  are  of  German  descent;  the  whole  English  credit  would 
have  broken  down  if  the  English  authorities  had  not  within  four  hours 
forced  Baron  Schroeder  to  become  a  British  citizen;  the  diamond  and  gold 
business  is  in  the  hands  of  Anglicized  Germans;  theirs  is  a  large  share  in  the 
produce  business.  The  English  cannot  do  without  German  clerks. 

A  Commercial  Quarrel 

I  remember  a  speech  by  the  chairman  of  the  London  Chamber  of  Com- 
merce, Lord  Southwark,  not  longer  ago  than  last  June,  in  wrhich  he  said: 
"You  Germans  are  getting  ahead  of  us  because  you  are  working  16  per 
cent  longer  than  we  and  because  you  do  not  consider  Saturday  a  holiday." 
That  state  of  things  was  not  felt  much  so  long  as  it  was  going  on  within 
British  confines  and  for  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  alone — that  is,  until 
about  1880;  but  then  the  German  nation  commenced  to  assert  itself.  Ger- 
mans learn  all  the  languages,  whereas  the  English  very  seldom  do.  If  an 
Englishman  wants  a  stenographer  to  write  Portuguese  letters  to  Brazil  he 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  13 

must  take  a  German  clerk.  German  dominion  in  trade  all  over  the  world 
has  been  established  through  the  fact  that  the  German  talks  to  the  people 
in  their  own  language,  respects  their  national  feeling,  finds  out  their  national 
wants,  and  delivers  to  them  exactly  what  they  wish  to  get.  He  never  says, 
"We  can  not  do  this"  or  "You  have  to  take  our  standard,"  but  carefully 
carries  out  their  orders  according  to  the  best  scientific  methods,  and  there- 
fore at  the  best  price.  The  German  iron  industry  has,  because  of  its 
improved  methods,  obtained  a  great  part  of  England's  trade.  German 
machinery,  except  in  the  textile  business,  is  more  efficient  than  English 
machinery.  The  field  of  electricity  has  been  entirely  abandoned  by  England 
to  America  and  Germany.  DyestufTs  are  now  even  shipped  by  way  of 
America  and  Canada  back  to  England.  German  proprietary  medicines 
have  conquered  the  world  market  and  the  German  competition  is  felt 
everywhere. 

Then,  too,  there  is  the  enormous  increase  of  German  shipping,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  practically  all  the  English  companies  doing  passenger 
service  are  half  broke.  While  the  International  Mercantile  Marine  Com- 
pany has  suspended  payment  and  the  big  liners  of  the  Cunard  Line  can  live 
only  by  subsidies,  Germany  has  been  building  up  a  most  magnificent 
merchant  marine,  with  ships  that  exceed  in  comfort  and  size  anything 
launched  from  England's  shipyards.  Even  in  the  tramp-steamer  business, 
the  backbone  of  English  shipping,  the  Germans  have  made  big  inroads. 
So  while  the  trade  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  since  1870  has  risen  from 
two  billion  dollars  to  five  and  a  half  billions,  that  of  Germany  has  risen  from 
one  billion  to  five  billions — in  other  words,  while  Germany's  trade  is  now 
five  times  what  it  was  in  1870,  English  trade  is  only  two  and  a  half  times  its 
former  amount.  For  a  commercial  nation  such  as  England,  this  condition 
is  very  serious.  It  goes  to  the  very  core  of  the  nation's  existence.  There- 
fore, Great  Britain  faced  the  alternative  of  getting  better  habits  of  work, 
improved  machinery,  better  education,  better  knowledge  of  foreign  languages 
—that  is,  being  more  industrious,  less  luxurious,  and  more  painstaking — 
or  of  fighting.  But  England  was  not  accustomed  to  doing  her  own  fight- 
ing, save  with  her  fleet.  The  other  fellows,  whose  welfare  she  has  so  much 
at  heart,  could  fight  for  her,  so  it  wras  not  very  difficult  for  her  to  make  her 
choice. 

This  is  the  real  explanation  of  the  present  war.  The  correctness  of 
this  view  is  proved  by  the  constant  invitations  sent  out  from  England  to 
America  to  help  her  get  away  with  the  German  trade,  an  idea  that  is  justly 
repulsive  to  the  American  mind.  So  it  was  not  Germany's  militarism  that 
England  feared,  but  German  trade  and  commerce,  which  she  could  not 
destroy  because  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  behind  them. 

Germany  is  now  attacked  by  seven  nations.  She  is  fighting  morally 
for  her  freedom  and  for  her  existence.  She  has  no  special  grudge  against 
anybody.  She  is  modest  in  her  aspirations,  and  merely  wants  to  maintain 
her  place  under  the  sun.  She  wants  equal  opportunity,  open-door  politics, 


i4  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR 

and  open  commerce  throughout  the  world.  Nor  is  she  either  Hunnic  or 
barbarian,  as  Americans  will  have  learned  from  the  twenty-five  million 
German  or  German- American  people  who  live  in  their  midst.  She  is  out 
for  conquest  on  a  peaceful  line,  the  line  where  the  higher  culture  wins, 
where  the  more  industrious  and  laborious  are  sure  to  prevail.  This  is  to 
the  interest  of  all  the  world.  Germany  has  to  her  record  forty-four  years 
of  peace,  and  she  has  never  coveted  her  neighbors'  possessions.  So,  as 
far  as  the  moral  issue  goes,  she  has  much  the  best  showing  to  make  of  all 
the  nations  now  at  war,  and  it  is  within  eternal  justice  that  she  should  and 
will  prevail. 


ENGLAND'S  SHARE  OF  GUILT  IN  THE  WAR 

A  Review  of  the  Official  Publications,  Especially  of  the  English  Docu- 
ments, Vouched  for  by  Dr.  Dernburg 

[The  following  is  presented  as  a  complete  defense  of  the  German  position  in  the 
present  war,  and  is  based  upon  examination  of  the  German  and  English  "  White  Papers." 
It  was  prepared  in  Germany  and  forwarded  to  Dr.  Bernhard  Dernburg,  who  had  it 
translated  for  the  New  York  ' '  Times. "  Dr.  Dernbu  rg  gives  this  statement  his  full  approval 
and  accepts  complete  responsibility  for  it.] 

Two  of  the  five  great  European  Powers  that  are  at  present  engaged  in 
war,  Austria-Hungary  and  Russia,  whose  differences  for  years  have  been 
constantly  increasing  in  sharpness,  and  after  the  tragedy  in  Sarajevo  became 
impossible  to  be  bridged  by  diplomacy,  conjured  up  the  frightful  struggle. 

With  these  two,  two  other  Powers  are  so  closely  united  by  alliances 
that  their  participation  in  the  war  also  was  unavoidable ;  they  are  Germany 
and  France. 

There  are  two  other  great  European  Powers  whose  relations  to  the  two 
aforesaid  groups  before  the  war  were  very  much  alike  in  the  essential  points. 
Just  as  Italy  was  politically  tied  by  alliance  to  the  Central  Powers,  so 
England  was  with  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance.  Hence  it  was  uncertain 
how  these  countries,  each  geographically  removed  from  the  main  body  of 
the  Continent,  would  act  in  a  war,  and  it  seemed  quite  possible  that  both 
would  decide  to  remain  neutral. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Italian  Government  came  to  the  view  that  such 
a  stand  would  be  for  the  best  interests  of  its  country. 

This  decision  might  have  made  it  considerably  more  easy  for  England 
also  to  maintain  her  neutrality,  which  from  political,  economical,  and 
ethical  reasons  would  have  been  advantageous  and  natural  for  the  Island 
Empire.  To  the  surprise  and  indignation  of  all  those  Germans  who  for 
years  had  been  working  toward  an  adjustment  of  the  conflicting  interests 
of  both  countries — among  these  ought  to  be  mentioned,  above  all,  the 
Kaiser  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor — the  Liberal  British  Ministry  imme- 
diately declared  war  on  Germany,  and  did  not  confine  itself  to  a  naval  war, 
but,  in  keeping  with  agreements  reached  years  ago  between  the  English 
and  the  French  General  Staffs,  as  is  now  admitted,  equipped  an  expedi- 
tionary army,  thus  considerably  strengthening  the  French  forces. 

The  question  arises,  "What  reasons  led  British  politics  to  this  monstrous 
step?" 

Much  has  been  written  during  the  last  weeks  from  the  German  side, 
criticizing  most  sharply  and  with  great  justification  the  motive  of  the 
London  Cabinet.  In  the  following  discussion  we  will  confine  ourselves  to  an 

15 


16  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE  WAR 

impartial  review  of  the  documents  published  by  the  English  Government 
itself  in  its  own  defense. 

The  essential  part  of  this  justification  is  contained  in  the  "  Correspon- 
dence Concerning  the  European  Crisis"  placed  before  the  British  Parliament 
shortly  after  the  start  of  the  war,  which  is  known  as  the  British  "White 
Paper."  In  amplification  are  to  be  considered  the  "White  Book"  placed 
by  the  German  Government  before  the  Reichstag,  and  the  "Orange  Book" 
published  by  Russia. 


I. 
THE  RUSSIAN  MOBILIZATION 

In  a  public  speech,  delivered  September  19,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  Mr.  Lloyd-George,  according  to  the  report  of  the  Westminster 
Gazette,  which  may  be  considered  as.  his  organ,  characterized  the  quarrel 
between  Germany  and  Russia  in  the  picturesque  manner  which  this  states- 
man prefers,  as  follows: 

GERMANY — I  insist  that  you  stand  aside  with  crossed  arms  while  Austria 
strangles  your  little  brother  Servia. 

RUSSIA — Just  you  touch  this  little  fellow  and  I  will  tear  your  ramshackle 
Empire  limb  from  limb. 

We  will  not  waste  words  in  considering  the  flippant  form  here  used  in 
a  discussion  of  an  unspeakably  bloody  and  world-historic  conflict.  But  this 
expression  in  very  pregnant  form  makes  Russia  appear  in  the  light  in 
which  the  London  powers-that-be  desire  to  show  the  Empire  of  the  Czar 
to  the  British  people,  viz.,  in  the  role  of  the  noble-hearted  protector  of 
persecuted  innocence,  while  Germany,  supporting  and  egging  on  Austria- 
Hungary,  is  shown  as  morally  responsible  for  the  war. 

Cites  English  Documents 

This,  also,  is  the  chain  of  thought  in  the  speech  of  the  British  Prime 
Minister  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  4.  Translations  of  this 
speech  have  been  spread  by  the  British  Government  in  neutral  countries 
in  hundreds  of  thousands  of  copies  under  the  title,  "The  Power  Responsible 
for  War  Is  Germany." 

Now,  we  claim  that  the  British  "White  Paper"  itself  furnishes  irrefut- 
able proof  that  not  Germany,  which  up  to  the  last  moment  offered  the  hand 
of  mediation,  but  Russia  is  responsible  for  the  war,  and  that  the  Foreign 
Office  at  London  was  fully  cognizant  of  this  fact. 

Furthermore,  the  "White  Paper"  shows  that  England's  claim  that  she 
entered  this  war  solely  as  a  protector  of  the  small  nations  is  a  fable. 

The  documents  reproduced  in  the  "White  Paper"  do  not  begin  until 
July  20,  and  only  a  few  introductory  dispatches  before  the  24th  are  given. 
The  first  of  the  very  important  reports  of  the  British  Ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  to  Secretary  of  State  Grey  is  dated 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  17 

on  that  day;  on  the  same  day  the  note  addressed  by  Austria-Hungary  to 
the  Servian  Government  had  been  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  European 
Cabinets,  and  the  British  Ambassador  conferred  with  the  Russian  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs,  M.  Sasanow,  over  this  matter.  The  French  Minister 
also  took  part  in  this  conference.  When  the  latter  and  M.  Sasanow  in  the 
most  insistent  way  tried  to  prove  to  Buchanan  that  England,  together  with 
Russia  and  France,  must  assume  a  threatening  attitude  toward  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany,  the  British  Ambassador  replied: 

I  said  that  I  would  telegraph  a  full  report  to  you  of  what  their  Excellencies  had 
just  said  to  me.  I  could  not,  of  course,  speak  in  the  name  of  his  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, but  personally  I  saw  no  reason  to  expect  any  declaration  of  solidarity  from 
his  Majesty's  Government  that  would  entail  an  unconditional  engagement  on  their 
part  to  support  Russia  and  France  by  force  of  arms.  Direct  British  interests  in 
Servia  were  nil,  and  a  war  on  behalf  of  that  country  would  never  be  sanctioned  by 
British  public  opinion. — British  ''White  Paper"  No.  6. 

The  British  Ambassador  thereupon  asked  the  question  whether  Russia 
was  thinking  of  eventually  declaring  war  on  Austria.  The  following  was 
the  answer: 

M.  Sasanow  said  that  he  himself  thought  that  Russian  mobilization  would  at 
any  rate  have  to  be  carried  out;  but  a  council  of  Ministers  was  being  held  this  after- 
noon to  consider  the  whole  question • 

The  dispatch  continues: 

French  Ambassador  and  M.  Sasanow  both  continue  to  press  me  for  a  declaration 
of  complete  solidarity  of  his  Majesty's  Government  with  French  and  Russian 
Governments.  .  .  . — British  "White  Paper"  No.  6. 

This  shows  plainly  that  the  Russian  mobilization  must  have  been 
planned  even  before  July  24,  for  otherwise  M.  Sasanow  could  not  have 
spoken  of  the  necessity  of  carrying  it  through. 

It  is  furthermore  very  remarkable  that  the  Russian  Minister  on  this 
early  day  spoke  of  the  mobilization  in  general  and  not  of  the  partial  mobili- 
zation against  Austria-Hungary. 

Finally,  we  find  that  the  British  Government  was  fully  informed  at  the 
very  latest  on  July  24 — it  may  have  had  before  it  previous  documents, 
but  they  are  not  contained  in  the  "White  Paper" — concerning  Russian 
mobilization,  and  thereby  the  development  of  Russian  and  French  politics 
that  had  to  be  anticipated. 

Russian  Aggression 

Had  there  been  any  doubts  concerning  these  matters  on  the  part  of  the 
British  Government,  the  continual  urging  of  Russian  and  French  diplo- 
matists must  have  made  things  plain.  Russia's  aggressive  policy,  and  not 
the  Austrian  declaration  of  war  on  Servia,  which  did  not  come  until  five 
days  later,  led  to  the  European  War.  Servia  meant  so  little  to  England, 
although  England  traditionally  poses  as  a  protector  of  small  nations,  that 
the  British  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  was  able  to  describe  England's 


1 8  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

interest  in  the  kingdom  on  the  Save  as  nil.  Only  later,  after  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war,  England  warmed  up  to  Servia,  and  in  the  aforementioned 
speech  Mr.  Lloyd-George  found  the  most  hearty  tones  in  speaking  of  the 
heroic  fight  of  this  "  little  nation,"  although  he  was  obliged  to  admit  simul- 
taneously that  its  history  is  not  untainted. 

On  the  day  following  that  conversation,  on  July  25,  the  British 
Ambassador  had  another  talk  with  M.  Sasanow,  during  the  course  of  which 
he  felt  obliged  to  express  to  the  Russian  Government  a  serious  warning 
concerning  its  mobilization. 

On  my  expressing  the  earnest  hope  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war  by 
mobilizing  until  you  had  had  time  to  use  your  influence  in  favor  of  peace,  his 
Excellency  assured  me  that  Russia  had  no  aggressive  intentions  and  she  would  take 
no  action  until  it  was  forced  on  her.  Austria's  action  was  in  reality  directed  against 
Russia.  She  aimed  at  overthrowing  the  present  status^  quo  in  the  Balkans  and 
establishing  her  own  hegemony  there.  He  did  not  believe  that  Germany  really 
wanted  war,  but  her  attitude  was  decided  by  ours.  If  we  took  our  stand  firmly 
with  France  and  Russia  there  would  be  no  war.  If  we  failed  them  now,  rivers  of 
blood  would  flow  and  we  would  in  the  end  be  dragged  into  war 

I  said  all  I  could  to  impress  prudence  on  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  and 
warned  him  that  if  Russia  mobilized  Germany  would  not  be  content  with  mere 
mobilization  or  give  Russia  time  to  carry  out  hers,  but  would  probably  declare 
war  at  once!  His  Excellency  replied  that  Russia  could  not  allow  Austria  to  crush 
Servia  and  become  the  predominant  Power  in  the  Balkans,  and,  if  she  feels  secure 
of  the  support  of  France,  she  will  face  all  the  risks  of  war.  He  assured  me  once 
more  that  he  did  not  wish  to  precipitate  a  conflict,  but  that  unless  Germany  could 
restrain  Austria  I  could  regard  the  situation  as  desperate. — British  "  White  Paper" 
No.  17. 

A  more  convincing  contradiction  of  the  claim  that  Germany  fell  upon 
unexpectant  Russia  can  hardly  be  imagined.  Sasanow's  conversation 
with  the  British  Ambassador  shows  that  Russia  had  decided  from  the 
beginning  to  bring  about  the  war,  unless  Austria  would  subject  itself  to 
Russia's  dictation. 

Now,  Russia  was  not  alone  concerned  about  Servia,  but  from  its  view- 
point Austria-Hungary  must  not  maintain  the  preponderant  position  in 

the  Balkans. 

Buchanan  Warned  Russia 

Sure  of  French  help,  Russia  was  determined  to  work  against  this.  The 
reports  of  the  British  representative  do  not  suggest  with  a  word  that  Ger- 
many was  responsible  for  the  war;  on  the  contrary,  Sir  Buchanan  again,  on 
his  own  account,  warned  the  Russian  Government  to  keep  aloof  from 
military  measures,  in  his  conversation  with  M.  Sasanow  on  July  27, 
although  the  "White  Paper"  does  not  show  that  he  had  received  any 
instructions  by  Sir  Edward  Grey. 

His  Excellency  must  not,  if  our  efforts  were  to  be  successful,  do  anything  to 
precipitate  a  conflict.  In  these  circumstances  I  trusted  that  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment would  defer  the  mobilization  ukase  for  as  long  as  possible,  and  that  troops 
would  not  be  allowed  to  cross  the  frontier  even  when  it  was  issued. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  44. 

Just  as  its  own  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  pointed  out  to  the  British 
Government  the  dangers  of  Russian  mobilization,  England  did  not  lack 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR  19 

German  warnings.  On  July  28  the  British  Ambassador  in  Berlin,  Sir 
E.  Goschen,  reported  as  follows  by  wire  concerning  a  conversation  with 
the  Imperial  Chancellor: 

.  .  .  but  if  the  news  were  true  which  he  had  just  read  in  the  papers,  that  Russia 
had  mobilized  fourteen  army  corps  in  the  south,  he  thought  the  situation  was  very 
serious,  and  he  himself  would  be  in  a  very  difficult  position,  as  in  these  circum- 
stances it  would  be  out  of  his  power  to  continue  to  preach  moderation  at  Vienna. 
He  added  that  Austria,  who  as  yet  was  only  partially  mobilizing,  would  have  to 
take  similar  measures,  and  if  war  were  to  result  Russia  would  be  entirely  responsible. 
— British  "  White  Paper"  No.  71. 

In  a  telegram  of  Mr.  Goschen's  of  July  30,  reporting  a  conversation 
with  the  Secretary  of  State  Von  Jagow,  it  is  stated: 

He  begged  me  to  impress  on  you  the  difficulty  of  Germany's  position  in  view  of 
Russian  mobilization  and  military  measures  which  he  hears  are  being  taken  in 
France. — British  "White  Paper"  No.  98. 

The  British  Government  has  added  a  few  further  publications  to  its 
"White  Paper."  Among  these  is  a  report  of  the  hitherto  British  Ambassa- 
dor in  Vienna,  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen.  The  document  is  dated  September  i ; 
that  is,  a  full  month  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  The  tendency  of 
this  publication  is  not  only  to  unburden  Russia  and  England  from  all 
blame  and  to  put  it  upon  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  politics,  but  it 
attempts  to  make  Germany  responsible  for  the  war  to  a  greater  extent  than 
Austria-Hungary,  in  trying  to  sow  dissension  between  the  two  allies. 

Bunsen's  Misrepresentation 

Ambassador  de  Bunsen  represents  matters  as  if  Germany,  through 
its  ultimatum  to  Russia  on  July  31,  had  roughly  interrupted  negotiations 
promising  success  then  going  on  between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  In  this 
report  it  is  stated: 

(Retranslated) — M.  Schebeko  [the  Russian  Ambassador  at  Vienna)  on  July  28 
attempted  to  induce  the  Austrian  Government  to  authorize  Count  Scapary  to  con- 
tinue negotiations  which  he  had  been  carrying  on  with  M.  Sasanow,  and  which 
appeared  very  promising.  Count  Berchtold  on  this  day  declined,  but  two  days 
later,  July  30,  although  Russia  then  had  already  started  partial  mobilization 
against  Austria,  he  received  M.  Schebeko  again  in  the  most  courteous  manner  and 
gave  his  consent  to  continuation  of  the  pourparleurs.  .  .  .  On  August  I,  M.  Sche- 
beko informed  me  that  Austria  was  ready  to  submit  to  mediation  those  parts  of  its 
note  to  Servia  which  appeared  to  be  irreconcilable  to  the  independence  of  Servia. 
.  .  .  Unfortunately  these  pourparleurs  in  St.  Petersburg  and  Vienna  were  suddenly 
broken  off  by  the  quarrel  being  removed  to  the  more  dangerous  territory  of 
a  direct  conflict  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Germany,  on  July  31,  stepped 
between  the  two  with  its  double  ultimatum  addressed  to  St.  Petersburg  and  Paris. 
...  A  delay  of  a  few  days  in  all  probability  would  have  spared  Europe  one  of  the 
greatest  wars  in  history. 

On  the  other  hand,  be  it  remembered  that  the  fact  that  any  negotiations 
between  Austria  and  Russia  were  carried  on  up  to  the  last  hour  was  solely 
the  result  of  the  uninterrupted  German  efforts  to  maintain  peace,  which 
fact  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen  very  wisely  buries  in  silence.  These  negotia- 
tions, by  the  way,  hardly  were  as  promising  of  success  as  is  made  to  appear. 


20  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR 

The  Austrian  version  of  it  is  found  in  the  Vienna  Fremdenblatt  of  September 
25,  1914.  There  the  most  important  spots  of  Bunsen's  report,  that  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  ready  to  moderate  several  points  of  its  note  to  Servia, 
are  mentioned  as  follows: 

As  we  are  told  by  a  well-informed  source,  these  assertions  do  not  at  all  corre- 
spond to  the  facts;  furthermore,  from  the  very  nature  of  the  steps  undertaken  by 
the  dual  Monarchy  in  Belgrade,  this  would  have  been  entirely  inconceivable. 

A  glance  at  the  date  shows  that  the  Bunsen  report  is  misleading,  for  he 
himself  tells  that  Count  Berchtold,  on  July  30,  had  expressed  his  consent 
to  a  continuation  of  the  exchange  of  thought  in  St.  Petersburg;  the  latter, 
therefore,  could  not  begin  before  the  3ist,  while  in  the  night  from  July  30 
to  3 1 ,  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  Russian  Army  against  Germany  was 
ordered  in  St.  Petersburg,  finally  making  impossible  the  continuation  of  the 
last  German  attempt  at  mediation  in  Vienna. 

The  truth  is,  in  spite  of  Russian  and  English  twistings,  that  without 
the  interval  caused  by  Germany's  efforts  in  Vienna,  which  interval  England 
allowed  to  pass  unused  in  St.  Petersburg,  the  war  would  have  broken  out 
a  few  days  sooner. 

Let  us  consider  how  the  fact  of  the  Russian  mobilization,  the  dimensions 
and  tendency  of  which  were  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  London  Cabinet 
at  the  very  latest  on  July  24,  must  affect  Germany. 

On  July  24,  the  Russian  Government  declared,  in  an  official  communique, 
it  would  be  impossible  for  it  to  remain  indifferent  in  an  Austro-Servian 
conflict. 

Germany's  Hand  Forced 

This  declaration  was  followed  immediately  by  military  measures  which 
represented  the  beginning  of  Russian  mobilization  long  planned.  But  even 
on  July  27  the  Russian  Minister  of  War,  Suchomlinof,  assured  the  German 
Military  Attach!  upon  word  of  honor  (Annex  n  of  the  German  "White 
Paper")  that  no  order  for  mobilization  had  been  given  and  no  reservists 
had  been  drawn  and  no  horse  had  been  commandeered. 

Although  in  this  conversation  there  had  been  left  no  doubt  to  the 
Russian  Minister  of  War  concerning  the  fact  that  measures  of  mobilization 
against  Austria  must  be  considered  by  Germany  also  as  very  threatening 
toward  itself,  during  the  next  days  news  of  the  Russian  mobilization  arrived 
in  quick  succession. 

On  the  29th,  mobilization  of  Southern  and  Southwestern  Russia  was 
ordered,  which  was  extended  on  the  3oth  to  twenty-three  provinces. 

On  the  night  of  the  3oth  to  the  3ist,  while  the  efforts  of  the  Kaiser  to 
maintain  peace  were  continuing  and  were  receiving  friendly  attention  in 
Vienna,  in  St.  Petersburg  the  mobilization  of  the  entire  Russian  Army 
was  ordered.  Even  as  late  as  2  P.M.  on  the  3ist,  however  (German  "White 
Paper,"  page  18,  of  New  York  Times  reprint),  the  Czar  telegraphed  the 
Kaiser  that  the  military  measures  now  being  taken  were  meant  for  defensive 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE    WAR  21 

purposes  against  Austria's  preparations,  and  he  gave  his  pledge  as  far 
away  from  desiring  war. 

In  the  face  of  such  evident  duplicity  of  Russian  politics,  a  further  delay 
such  as  was  desired  by  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen  would  have  be'en  for  every 
German  statesman  a  crime  against  the  security  of  his  own  country. 

On  the  other  hand,  upon  what  German  measures  did  the  Russian 
Government  base  its  order  for  mobilization?  The  British  " White  Paper" 
proves  how  frivolously  steps  leading  to  the  most  serious  results  were  ordered 
in  St.  Petersburg.  On  July  30,  Sir  George  Buchanan  telegraphed: 

M.  Sasanow  told  us  that  absolute  proof  was  in  possession  of  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment that  Germany  was  making  military  and  naval  preparations  against  Russia, 
more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  the  Gulf  of  Finland. — British  "White  Paper" 
No.  97. 

Proofs  Lacking 

On  the  other  hand,  Buchanan's  telegram  of  July  31  (British  "Wrhite 
Paper"  No.  113)  states: 

Russia  has  also  reason  to  believe  that  Germany  is  making  active  military  prepara- 
tions, and  she  cannot  afford  to  let  her  get  a  start. — British  "  White  Paper'1  No.  nj. 

So,  from  one  day  to  the  next  the  "absolute  proof"  changed  to  a  reason 
for  the  assumption.  In  reality,  both  were  assertions  that  lack  all  proof. 

The  finishing  part  of  a  telegram  sent  by  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Berlin  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  July  31  deserves  special  mention: 

He  [the  German  Secretary  of  State]  again  assured  me  that  both  the  Emperor 
William,  at  the  request  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  and  the  German  Foreign  Office, 
had  even  up  till  last  night  been  urging  Austria  to  show  willingness  to  continue 
discussion — and  telephonic  communications  from  Vienna  had  been  of  a  promising 
nature — but  Russia's  mobilization  had  spoiled  everything. — British  "White  Paper" 
No.  121. 

Therefore,  the  German  Chancellor,  in  his  memorandum  placed  before 
the  Reichstag,  stated  with  full  justification: 

The  Russian  Government  has  smashed  the  laborious  attempts  at  mediation  on 
the  part  of  the  European  State  Chancelleries,  on  the  eve  of  success,  by  the  mobiliza- 
tion, endangering  the  safety  of  the  Empire.  The  measures  for  a  mobilization,  about 
whose  seriousness  the  Russian  Government  was  fully  acquainted  from  the  beginning, 
in  connection  with  their  constant  denial,  show  clearly  that  Russia  wanted  war. 

To  this  is  to  be  added  that  the  English  Government  also  was  made  fully  cognizant 
of  the  intentions  of  the  Russian  mobilization,  by  a  witness  that  could  not  be  sus- 
pected, namely,  its  own  representative  in  St.  Petersburg,  and  therefore  must  bear 
full  responsibility. 


II. 
GREY'S  OMISSIONS  AND  ERRORS 


We  have  seen  from  the  "Blue  Book"  that  the  Secretary  of  State  in 
London  was  informed  at  the  very  latest  on  July  24,  by  his  Ambassador 
in  St.  Petersburg,  of  the  plan  of  the  Russian  mobilization,  and  consequently 
of  the  tremendous  seriousness  of  the  European  situation.  Yet  eight  to 


22  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR 

nine  days  had  to  elapse  before  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Let  us  see  whether 
Sir  Edward  Grey  used  this  time  to  preserve  peace,  according  to  his  own 
documents. 

From  this  testimony  it  appears  that  even  at  the  beginning  of  the  last 
and  decisive  part  of  the  European  crisis,  which  began  on  June  28,  1914, 
with  the  assassination  of  the  Austrian  heir  to  the  throne,  Sir  Edward  Grey 
refrained  from  considering  a  direct  participation  of  his  country  in  the 
possible  world-war.  At  least,  this  must  be  the  impression  gained  from 
his  remarks  to  the  representatives  of  the  two  Powers  with  whom  England 
is  to-day  at  war.  Thus,  he  said  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Ambassador, 
Count  Mensdorff,  on  July  23: 

The  possible  consequences  of  the  present  situation  were  terrible.  If  as  many 
as  four  great  Powers  of  Europe — let  us  say  Austria,  France,  Russia,  and  Germany — 
were  engaged  in  war,  it  seemed  to  me  that  it  must  involve  the  expenditure  of  so  vast 
a  sum  of  money  and  such  an  interference  with  trade  that  a  war  would  be  accompanied 
or  followed  .by  a  complete  collapse  of  European  credit  and  industry. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  3. 

Here  Grey  speaks  only  of  four  of  the  big  Powers  at  most  that  may  go  to 
war,  without  even  hinting  at  the  fifth,  namely,  England.  On  July  24,  he 
had  another  conversation  with  the  Austrian  Ambassador,  the  theme  of 
which  was  the  note — meanwhile  presented  to  Servia.  It  caused  appre- 
hensions on  his  part,  but  he  declared  again: 

The  merits  of  the  dispute  between  Austria  and  Servia  were  not  the  concern 
of  his  Majesty's  Government 

I  [Grey]  ended  by  saying  that  doubtless  we  should  enter  into  an  exchange  of 
views  with  other  Powers,  and  that  I  must  await  their  views  as  to  what  could  be  done 
to  mitigate  the  difficulties  of  the  situation. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  5. 

We  are  already  striking  the  fateful  peculiarity  of  Grey's  policy  to  hesitate 
where  prompt  action,  or  at  least  a  clear  and  open  conduct  would  have 
been  his  duty.  This  weakness  of  his  nature  has  been  used  with  great  art 
by  French  and  Russian  diplomacy.  This  is  illustrated  by  the  conversation 
of  July  24  between  him  and  the  French  Ambassador,  Cambon,  in  London : 

M.  Cambon  said  that,  if  there  was  a  chance  of  mediation  by  the  four  Powers 
he  had  no  doubt  that  his  Government  would  be  glad  to  join  in  it;  but  he  pointed 
out  that  we  could  not  say  anything  in  St.  Petersburg  till  Russia  had  expressed  some 
opinion  or  taken  some  action.  But,  when  two  days  were  over,  Austria  would  march 
into  Servia,  for  the  Servians  could  not  possibly  accept  the  Austrian  demand.  Russia 
would  be  compelled  by  her  public  opinion  to  take  action  as  soon  as  Austria  attacked 
Servia,  and,  therefore,  once  the  Austrians  had  attacked  Servia  it  would  be  too  late 
for  any  mediation. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  10. 

The  Situation  on  July  24 

Thus:  England  must  not  give  any  advice  to  Russia  before  it  knows 
Russia's  intent  and  even  its  measures.  But  inasmuch  as  Austria  will  have 
proceeded  against  Servia  by  that  time,  Russia  must  make  war,  and  the  con- 
clusion is  that  even  on  July  24  the  catastrophe  is  considered  unavoidable. 
Grey  shows  himself  more  and  more  hypnotized  by  the  fatalistic  view  that 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  23 

it  is  too  late.     Hence  he  reports  also  on  July  24  a  conversation  of  the 
German  Ambassador,  Prince  Lichnowsky : 

I  reminded  the  German  Ambassador  that  some  days  ago  he  had  expressed  a 
personal  hope  that,  if  need  arose,  I  would  endeavor  to  exercise  moderating  influence 
at  St.  Petersburg,  but  now  I  said  that,  in  view  of  the  extraordinarily  stiff  character 
of  the  Austrian  note,  the  shortness  of  the  time  allowed,  and  the  wide  scope  of  the 
demands  upon  Servia,  I  felt  quite  helpless  as  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  and  I  did 
not  believe  any  Power  could  exercise  influence  alone. — British  "  White  Paper11  No.  n. 

From  a  conversation  of  Grey  with  Prince  Lichnowsky,  the  German 
Ambassador,  on  July  25: 

Alone,  we  could  do  nothing.  The  French  Government  were  traveling  [this  refers 
to  the  visit  at  St.  Petersburg  by  Messrs.  Poincare  and  Viviani]  at  the  moment,  and 
I  had  had  no  time  to  consult  them,  and  could  not,  therefore,  be  sure  of  their  views. — 
British  "  White  Paper"  No.  25. 

If  Sir  Edward  Grey  sincerely  desired  the  maintenance  of  peace,  he  must 
have  had  to  use  his  entire  influence  at  St.  Petersburg  to  bring  about  the 
stopping  of  the  threatening  military  measures  taken  by  Russia,  whereas 
he  was  waiting  for  the  opinion  of  the  French  Government.  He  was  bound 
to  do  this,  so  much  the  more  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  demanded  from 
Germany  that  it  should  exert  its  influence  with  Austria. 

That  this  request  of  Grey's  was  complied  \vith  by  Germany  in  so  far 
as  it  was  in  any  way  in  accord  with  the  alliance  with  Austria-Hungary, 
and  that  in  Vienna  every  effort  was  made  to  conciliate  matters,  is  shown 
by  the  assurance  of  the  Chancellor.  He  declares: 

In  spite  of  this  [the  Austro-Hungaria"n  Government  having  remarked  with  full 
appreciation  of  our  action  that  it  had  come  too  late,  we  continued  our  mediatory 
efforts  to  the  utmost  and  advised  Vienna  to  make  any  possible  compromise  con- 
sistent with  the  dignity  of  the  Monarchy. — German  "  White  Paper,"  page  //,  of  New 
York  "Times"  reprint. 

Grey  well  knew  that  Germany  was  doing  all  it  could  to  mediate  in 
Vienna.  He  expressed  his  recognition  and  his  joy  over  it  on  July  28  ("  Blue 
Book,"  page  67): 

It  is  very  satisfactory  to  hear  from  the  German  Ambassador  here  that  the 
German  Government  have  taken  action  at  Vienna  in  the  sense  of  the  conversation 
recorded  in  my  telegram  of  yesterday  to  you. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  67.* 

"  No  diplomatic  pressure  whatever  was  exerted  [by  Germany]  on  Vienna,  which, 
under  the  protection  of  Berlin,  was  permitted  to  do  with  Servia  as  she  liked." 

Grey's  own  Words  contradict  this  assertion. 

Neither  has  Grey  been  left  in  the  dark  by  the  German  side  concerning 
the  difficulties,  which  by  the  Russian  mobilization  made  every  attempt  to 

*  Recently  a  book  entitled  "Why  We  Make  War,"  in  defence  of  Great  Britain, 
appeared  at  Oxford,  as  the  authors  of  which  "Members  of  the  Faculty  for  Modern 
History  in  Oxford"  are  mentioned.  This  work  undertakes,  on  the  ground  of  the 
official  publications,  to  whitewash  Grey's  policy,  and,  of  course,  incidentally  the 
Russian  policy.  Altogether  this  publication,  parading  in  the  gown  of  science,  is 
contradicted  by  our  own  presentation  of  the  facts;  it  may  be  mentioned  also  that 
this  work  contains  in  part  positive  untruths.  Thus  it  states  on  page  70  (retransla- 
tion) : 


24  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

mediate  in  Vienna  abortive.     Even  on  July  31,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Berlin  telegraphed: 

The  Chancellor  informs  me  that  his  efforts  to  preach  peace  and  moderation 
at  Vienna  have  been  seriously  handicapped  by  the  Russian  mobilization  against 
Austria.  He  has  done  everything  possible  to  obtain  his  object  at  Vienna,  perhaps 
even  rather  more  than  was  altogether  palatable  at  the  Ballplatz. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  108. 

England  and  Russia 

How,  on  the  other  hand,  about  Grey's  action  with  Russia?  From  the 
very  beginning  one  should  have  had  a  right  to  expect  that,  as  German}' 
acted  in  Vienna,  thus  France,  if  it  was  active  in  Grey's  spirit,  would  be 
working  in  St.  Petersburg  for  peace.  Of  this  no  trace  whatsoever  can  be 
found.  The  French  Government  thus  far  had  not  published  any  series  of 
documents  concerning  its  activity  during  the  crisis,  and  neither  in  the 
Russian  " Orange  Book"  nor  in  the  English  "Blue  Book"  is  anything 
mentioned  of  the  mediating  activity  on  the  part  of  France. 

On  the  contrary,  the  latter  Power,  wherever  she  puts  in  an  appearance — 
as,  for  instance,  in  the  conversation  of  the  English  Ambassador  in  St.  Peters- 
burg with  his  French  colleague  and  M.  Sasanow,  as  mentioned  above — ap- 
pears as  fully  identical  with  Russia.  It  is  also  stated  on  July  24: 

The  French  Ambassador  gave  me  to  understand  that  France  would  fulfill  all 
the  obligations  entailed  by  her  alliance  with  Russia  if  necessity  arose,  besides  sup- 
porting Russia  strongly  in  all  diplomatic  negotiations.  ...  It  seems  to  me  from  the 
language  held  by  the  French  Ambassador  that  even  if  we  decline  to  join  them,  France 
and  Russia  are  determined  to  make  a  strong  stand. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  6. 

One  should  think  that  Grey,  who  in  view  of  this  could  not  possibly 
expect  an  influence  for  peace  being  brought  to  bear  by  France,  but  only  a 
strengthening  of  the  Russian  desire 'for  aggression,  now  would  have  acted 
in  the  most  energetic  manner  in  St.  Petersburg  for  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

In  reality,  however,  during  the  days  that  still  remained,  aside  from  a 
weak,  and  in  St.  Petersburg  absolutely  ineffective,  advice  to  postponj 
mobilization,  he  did  nothing  whatsoever,  and  later  placed  himself  in  a  manner 
constantly  more  recognizable  on  the  side  of  Russia. 

The  claim  that  the  time  limit  given  by  the  Austrian  note  to  Servia  was 
the  cause  of  the  war,  that  Grey's  mediation  had  only  miscarried  owing  to 
the  haste  of  Germany,  is  disproved  by  the  British  documents  themselves. 
De  Bunsen,  on  July  26,  telegraphed  to  Grey  from  Vienna: 

Russian  Ambassador  just  returned  from  leave,  thinks  that  Austro- Hungarian 
Government  are  determined  on  war,  and  that  it  is  impossible  for  Russia  to  remain 
indifferent.  He  does  not  propose  to  press  for  more  time  in  the  sense  of  your  telegram 
of  the  25th  inst. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  40. 

Therefore  Russia  has  paid  little  attention  to  the  very  shy  and  timid 
efforts  to  maintain  peace  by  the  British  Secretary  of  State,  even  where 
these  were  concerned  in  the  attempt  to  change  the  position  taken  by  Austria. 

Another  proof:  Sasanow  on  July  27  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Russian 
Ambassador  in  London  which  the  latter  transmitted  to  Grey,  and  which 


SEARCHLIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  25 

concerns  itself  with  the  much-mentioned  proposition  of  the  latter  to  have 
the  conflict  investigated  by  a  conference  of  the  four  great  Powers  not 
immediately  concerned. 

Russian  Sincerity  Questioned 

The  conference  plan  was  declined  without  much  hesitation  and  openly 
by  Germany,  because  it  was  compelled  to  see  therein  an  attempt  to  place 
Austria  before  a  European  court  of  arbitration,  and  because  it  knew  the 
serious  determination  of  its  ally  in  this  matter.  But  did  Russia  really 
want  the  conference?  Minister  Sasanow  declares: 

I  replied  to  the  [British]  Ambassador  that  I  have  begun  conversations  with  the 
Austro- Hungarian  Ambassador  under  conditions  which  I  hope  may  be  favorable. 
I  have  not,  however,  received  as  yet  any  reply  to  the  proposal  made  by  me  for 
revising  the  note  between  the  two  Cabinets. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  5J. 

Here  it  is  shown  plainly  how  little  the  conference  plan  was  after  the 
heart  of  the  Russians.  Had  they  accepted  it  it  would  have  had  to  be 
done  immediately.  As  soon  as  the  situation  had  grown  very  much  more 
serious  by  the  failure  of  the  negotiations  with  Austria-Hungary  there 
would  have  been  no  more  time  for  this.* 

A  telegram  of  the  English  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg,  dated  July  27 
(British  "White  Paper"  No.  55),  shows  how  this  conference  was  expected 
to  be  conducted  in  St.  Petersburg: 

His  Excellency  [Sasanow]  said  he  was  perfectly  ready  to  stand  aside  if  the  Powers 
accepted  the  proposal  for  a  conference,  but  he  trusted  that  you  would  keep  in  touch 
with  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  the  event  of  its  taking  place. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  55. 

Russian  shrewdness  evidently  expected  to  control  the  conference  by 
keeping  in  touch  with  Grey,  who,  of  course,  would  have  been  the  Chairman. 

*  In  the  aforementioned  book  of  the  Oxford  historians  there  is  stated  on  page  69 
(retranslation) : 

This  mediation  [namely,  Grey's  mediation  proposition]  had  already  been  accepted 
by  Russia  on  July  25. 

We  have  shown  in  the  foregoing  that  the  Russian  Government  did  in  no  manner 
subscribe  to  the  conference  plan  in  binding  terms.  As  an  additional  proof,  a  part 
of  Buchanan's  dispatch  of  the  25th  may  be  mentioned: 

He  [Sasanow]  would  like  to  see  the  question  placed  on  an  international  footing. 
...  If  Servia  should  appeal  to  the  Powers,  Russia  would  be  quite  ready  to  stand 
aside  and  leave  the  question  in  the  hands  of  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy. 
It  would  be  possible  in  his  opinion  that  Servia  might  propose  to  submit  the  question 
to  arbitration. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  77. 

Hence,  not  if  England,  but  only  if  Servia  would  propose  arbitration  by  the 
Powers,  Mr.  Sasanow  was  willing!  The  most  amusing  part  of  this  is  that  the  Russian 
Minister  himself  considers  such  a  proposition  on  the  part  of  Servia  merely  as 
"possible";  evidently  it  would  have  appeared  as  a  great  condescension  on  the  part 
of  the  Government  at  Belgrade  if  it,  standing  on  the  same  basis  as  Austria-Hungary, 
would  appear  before  a  European  tribunal!  For  us  there  is  no  additional  proof 
necessary  that  a  mediation  conference,  which  for  Austria  was  not  acceptable  even 
when  proposed  by  England,  would  be  unthinkable  if  the  move  for  such  came  from 
Servia.  In  expressing  such  an  idea,  Mr.  Sasanow  proved  that  it  was  his  intention 
to  bring  war  about. 


26  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE  WAR 

The  dispatches  of  his  own  Ambassadors  lying  before  him  should  have 
enabled  the  Secretary  of  State  to  see  the  perfidy  of  the  Russian  policy. 
Buchanan  wrote  on  the  28th  from  St.  Petersburg: 

.  .  .  and  asked  him  whether  he  would  be  satisfied  with  the  assurance  which  the 
Austrian  Ambassador  had,  I  understood,  been  instructed  to  give  in  respect  to  Servia's 
integrity  and  independence.  ...  In  reply,  his  Excellency  stated  that  if  Servia 
were  attacked  Russia  would  not  be  satisfied  with  any  engagement  which  Austria 
might  take  on  these  two  points.  .  .  .  — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  72. 

Entirely  in  contrast  herewith  is  one  report  of  the  British  representative  in 
Vienna,  dated  August  i,  and  speaking  of  a  conversation  with  the  Russian 
Ambassador  there: 

Russia  would,  according  to  the  Russian  Ambassador,  be  satisfied  even  now  with 
assurance  respecting  Servian  integrity  and  independence.  He  said  that  Russia  had 
no  intention  to  attack  Austria. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  141. 

What,  then,  may  one  ask,  was  the  opinion  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
formed  concerning  Russia's  real  intentions?  He  learns  from  Russian 
sources  and  notes  faithfully  that  Russia  will  accept  Austrian  guarantees 
for  independence  of  Servia,  and  also  that  it  will  not  accept  such  guarantees.' 
It  is  the  same  duplicity  which  Russia,  when  its  own  mobilization  was 
concerned,  showed  toward  Germany.  Did  Sir  Edward  not  notice  this 
duplicity,  or  did  he  not  wish  to  notice  it?  If  the  documents  of  the  English 
Government  have  not  been  selected  with  the  purpose  to  confuse,  then  in 
London  the  decision  to  take  part  in  the  war  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
a  certainty  at  the  beginning.  We  have  seen  that  Ambassador  Buchanan, 
in  St.  Petersburg,  on  July  24,  gave  the  Russian  Minister  to  understand  that 
England  was  not  of  a  mind  to  go  to  war  on  account  of  Servia.  This  posi- 
tion, taken  by  the  Ambassador,  was  approved  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the 
following  day  in  the  following  words: 

I  entirely  approve  what  you  said  .  .  .  and  I  cannot  promise  more  on  behalf  of 
the  Government. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  24. 

Germany  Not  To  Be  Intimidated 

Based  upon  these  instructions,  Sir  George  Buchanan,  even  on  July  27, 
stated  to  M.  Sasanow,  who  continued  to  urge  England  to  join  Russia  and 
France  unconditionally : 

I  added  that  you  [Grey]  could  not  promise  to  do  anything  more,  and  that  his 
Excellency  was  mistaken  if  he  believed  that  the  cause  of  peace  could  be  promoted 
by  our  telling  the  German  Government  that  they  would  have  to  deal  with  us  as 
well  as  with  Russia  and  France  if  she  supported  Austria  by  force  of  arms.  Their 
[the  German]  attitude  would  merely  be  stiffened  by  such  a  menace. — British  "  White 
Paper1'  No.  44. 

But  on  this  same  2yth  day  of  July,  Grey,  submitting  to  the  intrigues  of 
Russian  and  French  diplomacy,  had  committed  one  very  fateful  step 
(telegram  to  Buchanan,  July  27): 

I  have  been  told  by  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  in  German  and  Austrian 
circles  impression  prevails  that  in  any  event  we  would  stand  aside.  His  Excellency 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  27 

deplored  the  effect  that  such  an  impression  must  produce.  This  impression  ought, 
as  I  have  pointed  out,  to  be  dispelled  by  the  orders  we  have  given  to  the  first  fleet 
which  is  concentrated,  as  it  happens,  at  Portland  not  to  disperse  for  manoeuvre 
leave.  But  I  explained  to  the  Russian  Ambassador  that  my  reference  to  it  must 
not  be  taken  to  mean  that  anything  more  than  diplomatic  action  was  promised. — 
British  "  White  Paper"  No.  47. 

For  Russia  this  order  to  the  fleet  meant  very  much  more  than  a  dip- 
lomatic action.  Sasanow  saw  that  the  wind  in  London  was  turning  in  his 
favor  and  he  made  use  of  it.  Among  themselves  the  Russian  diplomatists 
seem  to  have  for  a  long  time  been  clear  and  open  in  their  discussion  of 
their  real  object.  You  find  among  the  documents  of  the  Russian  "  Orange 
Book  "  the  following  telegram  of  Sasanow  of  July  25  to  the  Russian  Ambassa- 
dor in  London: 

In  case  of  a  new  aggravation  of  the  situation,  possibly  provoking  on  the  part  of 
the  great  Powers  united  action  [des  actions  conformes],  we  count  that  England  will 
not  delay  placing  herself  clearly  on  the  side  of  Russia  and  France,  with  the  view 
to  maintaining  the  equilibrium  of  Europe,  in  favor  of  which  she  has  constantly 
intervened  in  the  past,  and  which  would  without  doubt  be  compromised  in  the 
case  of  the  triumph  of  Austria. — Russian  "Orange  Paper"  No.  17. 

There  is  no  mention  of  Servia  here,  but  Austria  should  not  triumph. 
Russia's  real  intention,  of  course,  was  not  placed  so  nakedly  before  the 
British  Secretary  of  State,  hence  to  him  the  appearance  was  maintained 
that  the  little  State  of  the  Save  was  the  only  consideration,  although  the 
Russian  army  was  already  being  mobilized  with  all  energy. 

On  the  28th  he  wires  to  the  Russian  Ambassador,  Count  Bencken- 
dorff,  to  London  to  inform  the  British  Government: 

It  seems  to  me  that  England  is  in  a  better  position  than  any  other  Power  to 
make  another  attempt  at  Berlin  to  induce  the  German  Government  to  take  the 
necessary  action.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  key  of  the  situation  is  to  be  found 
at  Berlin. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  54. 

The  opinion  subtly  suggested  upon  him  by  Paris  and  St.  Petersburg 
diplomacy,  namely,  that  he  should  not  use  any  pressure  upon  Russia, 
but  upon  Germany,  now  takes  hold  of  Grey  more  and  more.  On  July  29 
he  writes  to  the  German  Ambassador  as  follows: 

In  fact,  mediation  was  ready  to  come  into  operation  by  any  method  that  Germany 
thought  possible  if  only  Germany  would  "press  the  button  in  the  interests  of  peace." 
—British  "  White  Paper"  No.  84. 

St.  Petersburg,  now  assured  of  the  support  of  Grey,  becomes  more  and 
more  outspoken  for  war.  On  the  28th,  Grey  again  expressed  one  of  his 
soft-hearted  propositions  for  peace.  Mr.  Sasanow  hardly  .made  the  effort 
to  hide  his  contempt.  Buchanan  telegraphs  on  the  2pth  as  follows: 

The  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  said  that  proposal  referred  to  in  your  telegram 
of  the  28th  inst.  was  one  of  secondary  importance.  Under  altered  circumstances  of 
situation  he  did  not  attach  weight  to  it.  ...  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  given 
me  to  understand  that  Russia  would  not  precipitate  war  by  crossing  frontier  im- 
mediately, and  a  week  or  more  would  in  any  case  elapse  before  mobilization  was 
completed.  In  order  to  find  an  issue  out  of  a  dangerous  situation,  it  was  necessary 
that  we  should  in  the  meanwhile  all  work  together.—  British  "  White  Paper"  No.  78. 


28  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR 

Naivete  or  Cynicism? 

Here  it  really  becomes  impossible  to  judge  where  the  naivete  of  the 
British  Secretary  of  State  ends  and  cynicism  begins,  for  Sasanow  could  not 
have  told  to  him  more  plainly  than  in  these  lines  that  all  Russia's  ostensible 
readiness  for  peace  served  no  other  purpose  than  to  win  time  to  complete 
the  strategical  location  of  the  Russian  troops. 

This  point  is  emphaszied  by  one  document  coming  from  a  writer  pre- 
sumably unbiased,  but  presumably  distrustful  of  Germany,  wherein  the 
confirmation  is  found  that  England  and  Russia  had  come  to  a  full  agreement 
during  these  days. 

On  July  30,  Belgian  Charge  d'Affaires  de  PEscaille  in  St.  Petersburg 
reported  to  the  Belgian  Government  upon  the  European  crisis.  Owing  to 
the  fast-developing  events  of  a  warlike  nature,  this  letter  did  not  reach 
its  address  by  mail,  and  it  was  published  later  on.  The  Belgian  diplomatist 
writes: 

It  is -undeniable  that  Germany  tried  hard  here  [that  is,  in  St.  Petersburg],  and 
in  Vienna  to  find  any  means  whatsoever  in  order  to  forestall  a  general  conflict 

And  after  M.  de  1'Escaille  has  told  that  Russia — what  the  Czar  and  his 
War  Minister  with  their  highest  assurances  toward  Germany  had  denied 
—was  mobilizing  its  own  army,  he  continues: 

To-day  at  St.  Petersburg  one  is  absolutely  convinced — yes,  they  have  even  received 
assurances  in  that  direction — that  England  and  France  will  stay  by  them.  This 
assistance  is  of  decisive  importance  and  has  contributed  much  to  the  victory  of  the 
[Russian]  war  party. 

This  settles  Grey's  pretended  " attempts  at  mediation."  The  truth  is 
that  British  politics,  decided  to  prevent  a  diplomatic  success  of  Germany  and 
Austria,  now  worked  openly  toward  the  Russian  aim.  "The  exertion  of 
pressure  upon  Berlin"  included  already  a  certain  threat,  mingled  with 
good  advice. 

On  July  23,  Grey  had  only  spoken  of  four  possible  Powers  in  war; 
hence  when  on  the  German  side  some  hope  of  England  maintaining  neu- 
trality was  indulged  in,  this  impression  rested  upon  Grey's  own  explana- 
tions. On  July  29,  however,  after  a  political  conversation  with  Prince 
Lichnowsky,  German  Ambassador  in  London,  he  adds  an  important  per- 
sonal bit  of  information.  He  wires  concerning  it  to  Berlin,  to  Goschen: 

After  speaking  to  the  German  Ambassador  this  afternoon  about  the  European 
situation,  I  said  that  I  wished  to  say  to  him,  in  a  quite  private  and  friendly  way, 

something  that  was  on  my  mind.    The  situation  was  very  grave But  if 

we  failed  in  our  efforts  to  keep  the  peace  and  if  the  issue  spread  so  that  it  involved 
every  European  interest,  I  did  not  wish  to  be  open  to  any  reproach  from  him,  that 
the  friendly  tone  of  all  our  conversations  had  misled  him  or  his  Government  into 

supposing  that  we  should  not  take  action But  we  knew  very  well  that 

if  the  issue  did  become  such  that  we  thought  that  British  interests  required  us  to 
intervene,  we  must  intervene  at  once  and  the  decision  would  have  to  be  very  rapid. — 
British  "  White  Paper"  No.  89. 

But  what  is  especially  wrong  is  that  Grey  brought  this  warning,  which 
only  could  have  any  effect  if  it  remained  an  absolute,  confidential  secret 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  29 

In-tween  the  English  and  German  Governments,  also  to  the  French  Am- 
bassador, so  that  the  entire  Entente  could  mischievously  look  on  and  see 
whether  Germany  really  would  give  in  to  British  pressure.  Of  course,  in 
his  manner  of  swaying  to  and  fro,  he  did  not  wish  either  that  Cambon 
should  not  accept  this  information  to  the  German  Ambassador  as  a  decided 
taking  of  a  position  on  the  part  of  England: 

I  thought  it  necessary  [speaking  to  M.  Cambon]  to  say  that  because  as  he  knew 
we  were  taking  all  precautions  with  regard  to  our  fleet  and  I  was  about  to  warn 
Prince  Lichnowsky  not  to  count  on  our  standing  aside,  that  it  would  not  be  fair  that 

I  should  let  M.  Cambon  be  misled  into  supposing  that  we  had  decided  what  to  do 
in  a  contingency  that  I  still  hoped  might  not  arise.  .  .  .  — British  "  White  Paper" 
No.  87. 

Stirring  Up  Trouble 

On  the  German  side,  Grey's  open  threat,  which  was  presented,  how- 
ever, with  smooth  and  friendly  sounding  words,  was  received  with  quiet 
politeness.  Goschen  telegraphed  on  the  3oth  concerning  a  talk  with  State 
Secretary  von  Jagow: 

His  Excellency  added  that  the  telegram  received  from  Prince  Lichnowsky  last  night 
contains  matter  which  he  had  heard  with  regret,  but  not  exactly  with  surprise,  and, 
at  all  events,  he  thoroughly  appreciated  the  frankness  and  loyalty  with  which  you 
had  spoken. — British  "White  Paper"  No.  98. 

Now  the  work  of  stirring  up  trouble  is  continued  unceasingly.  On 
July  30,  the  British  Ambassador  in  Paris,  Sir  F.  Bertie,  concerning  a  con- 
versation with  the  President  of  the  Republic,  reports : 

He  [Poincare]  is  convinced  that  peace  between  the  Powers  is  in  the  hands  of 
Great  Britain.  If  his  Majesty's  Government  announced  that  England  would  come 

to  the  aid  of  France  in  the  event  of -a  conflict  between  F  ranee  and  Germany 

there  would  be  no  war,  for  Germany  would  at  once  modify  her  attitude. — British 

II  White  Paper"  No.  99. 

Did  Grey  really  think  for  one  moment  that  the  German  Empire  would 
change  its  position  immediately — in  other  words,  would  suddenly  leave  its 
ally  in  need — or  is  all  this  only  a  mass  of  diplomatic  blandishments? 

On  the  same  day  Grey  steps  from  the  personal  warning  which  he  had 
given  to  the  German  Ambassador  to  the  sharpest  official  threat.  In  a 
telegram  to  the  Ambassador  in  Berlin  upon  the  question  placed  before  him 
by  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire  on  the  day  prior  (British  "White  Paper" 
No.  85),  whether  England  would  remain  neutral  if  Germany  would  bind 
itself,  after  possible  war,  to  claim  no  French  territory  in  Europe  whatever, 
while  in  lieu  of  the  French  colonies  a  like  guarantee  could  not  be  accepted, 
Grey  answers  with  thundering  words: 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment  entertain  the  Chancellor's 
proposal  that  they  should  bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms.  What  he 
asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand  by  while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  France 
is  beaten,  so  long  as  Germany  does  not  take  French  territory  as  distinct  from  the 
colonies.  From  a  material  point  of  view  such  a  proposal  is  unacceptable,  for  France 
without  further  territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from  her  could  be  so  crushed  as  to 
lose  her  position  as  a  great  Power  and  become  subordinate  to  ( icniian  |x>Iicy.  Alto- 


3o  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE  WAR 

gether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace  for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with 
Germany  at  the  expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good  name  of  this 
country  could  never  recover. — British  "White  Paper"  No.  101. 

With  this  telegram,  the  war  on  Germany  was  practically  declared,  for 
as  a  price  of  British  neutrality  an  open  humiliation  of  Germany  was  de- 
manded. If  France — the  question  of  French  colonies  is  of  very  minor  im- 
portance in  this  connection — must  not  be  defeated  by  Germany,  then  Eng- 
land forbade  the  German  Government  to  make  war.  It  was  furthermore 
stated  that  Germany  was  absolutely  compelled  to  accept  Russian-French 
dictates,  and  would  have  to  leave  Austria  to  its  own  resources.  This  would 
have  meant  Germany's  retirement  from  the  position  of  a  great  Power,  even 
if  she  had  backed  down  before  such  a  challenge. 


III. 
THE  AGREEMENT  WITH  FRANCE 

Only  in  the  light  of  the  developments  concerning  England's  relation 
to  France,  given  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  Grey's  policy,  swaying  between 
indecision  and  precipitate  action,  becomes  apparent. 

In  all  the  explanations  which  the  British  Government  in  the  course  of 
eight  years  had  presented  to  the  British  Parliament  concerning  the  relations 
to  other  large  Powers,  the  assurance  had  been  repeated  that  no  binding 
agreements  with  the  two  partners  of  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  had  been 
made,  above  all,  that  no  agreement  with  France  existed.  Only  in  his  speech 
in  the  House  of  Commons  on  August  3,  1914,  which  meant  the  war  with 
Germany,  Grey  gave  to  the  representatives  of  the  people  news  of  certain 
agreements  which  made  it  a  duty  for  Great  Britain  to  work  together  with 
France  in  any  European  crisis. 

The  fateful  document,  which  in  the  form  of  an  apparently  private  letter 
to  the  French  Ambassador,  dealt  with  one  of  the  most  important  compacts 
of  modern  history,  was  written  toward  the  end  of  the  year  1912,  and  is 
published  in  the  British  "White  Paper"  No.  105,  Annex  i: 

LONDON,  FOREIGN  OFFICE,  November  22,  1912. 
MY  DEAR  AMBASSADOR: 

From  time  to  time  in  recent  years,  the  French  and  British  naval  and  military 
experts  have  consulted  together.  It  has  always  been  understood  that  such  consulta- 
tion does  not  restrict  the  freedom  of  either  Government  to  decide  at  any  future 
time  whether  or  not  to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force.  We  have  agreed  that  con- 
sultation between  experts  is  not,  and  ought  not  to  be  regarded  as,  an  engagement 
that  commits  either  Government  to  action  in  a  contingency  that  has  not  arisen 
and  may  never  arise.  The  disposition,  for  instance,  of  the  French  and  British  fleets 
respectively  at  the  present  moment  is  not  based  upon  an  engagement  to  co-operate 
in  war. 

You  have,  however,  pointed  out  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason 
to  expect  an  unprovoked  attack  by  a  third  Power,  it  might  become  essential  to  know 
whether  it  could  in  that  event  depend  upon  the  armed  assistance  of  the  other. 

I  agree  that,  if  either  Government  had  grave  reason  to  expect  an  unprovoked 
attack  by  a  third  Power,  or  something  that  threatened  the  general  peace,  it  should 
immediately  discuss  with  the  other  whether  both  Governments  should  act  together 
to  prevent  aggression  and  to  preserve  peace,  and,  if  so,  what  measures  they  would 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  31 

be  prepared  to  take  in  common.  If  these  measures  involved  action,  the  plans  of  the 
General  Staffs  would  at  once  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  the  Governments 
would  then  decide  what  effect  should  be  given  to  them. 

Yours  etc., 

E.  GREY. 
Parliament  Deceived 

A  few  members  of  the  English  Parliament  who,  on  August  3,  dared  to 
protest  gingerly  against  the  war,  may  have  had  reason  to  complain  about 
the  hiding  of  facts  from  the  House  of  Commons.  When  such  understandings 
can  be  made  without  any  one  having  an  idea  of  their  existence,  then — so 
far  as  England  is  concerned — the  supervision  of  the  Government,  theo- 
retically being  exercised  by  a  Parliament,  becomes  a  fiction. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Grey  does  not  desire  to  have  accepted  as  political 
obligations  the  conversations  of  the  French  and  English  Army  and  Navy 
General  Staffs  concerning  the  future  plans  of  campaign  which  took  place 
from  time  to  time  in  times  of  peace.  However,  the  true  tendency  of  this 
agreement,  for  such  it  is,  gives  itself  away  in  the  promise  to  enter  imme- 
diately with  France  into  a  political  and  military  exchange  of  opinions  in 
every  critical  situation;  it  means  in  reality  nothing  less  than  a  veiled  de- 
fensive alliance  wrhich,  by  clever  diplomatic  manipulations,  can  be  changed 
without  any  difficulty  to  an  offensive  one,  for  inasmuch  as  the  English 
Government  promises  to  consult  and  work  together  with  France,  and  conse- 
quently also  with  its  ally,  Russia,  in  every  crisis,  before  a. serious  investiga- 
tion of  the  moments  of  danger,  it  waives  all  right  of  taking  an  independent 
position. 

How  would  England  ever  have  been  able  to  enter  a  war  against  France 
without  throwing  upon  itself  the  accusation  of  faithlessness  against  one 
with  whose  plans  for  war  it  had  become  acquainted  through  negotiations 
lasting  through  years? 

Here  a  deviation  may  be  permissible,  which  leaves  for  a  moment  the 
basis  of  documentary  proof. 

If  one  considers  how  this  agreement  of  such  immeasurable  consequences 
was  not  only  hidden  from  the  British  Parliament  by  the  Cabinet,  but  how 
to  the  very  edge  of  conscious  deceit  its  existence  was  denied — in  the  year 
1913  Premier  Asquith  answered  a  query  of  a  member  of  the  House  of 
Commons  that  there  were  no  unpublished  agreements  in  existence,  which, 
in  a  case  of  war  between  European  Powers,  would  interfere  with  or  limit 
free  decision  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  or  Parliament  as  to 
whether  or  not  Britain  should  take  part  in  a  war — then  certain  reports 
making  their  appearance  with  great  persistency  in  June,  1914,  concerning 
an  Anglo-Russian  naval  agreement  are  seen  in  a  different  light. 

Persons  who  were  acquainted  with  the  happenings  in  diplomacy  then 
stated  that  the  Russian  Ambassador  in  Paris,  M.  Iswolski,  during  the  visit 
which  the  King  of  England  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  were  paying  to  Paris, 
had  succeeded  in  winning  the  English  statesmen  for  the  plan  of  such  an 
agreement.  A  formal  alliance,  it  was  said,  was  not  being  demanded  by 


32  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR 

Russia  immediately,  for  good  reasons.     M.  Iswolski  was  attempting  to  go 
nearer  to  his  goal,  carefully,  step  by  step. 

It  had  been  preliminarily  agreed  that  negotiations  should  be  started 
between  the  British  Admiralty  and  the  Russian  Naval  Attache  in  London, 
Capt.  Wolkow.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Wolkow,  during  June  went  to  St. 
Petersburg  for  a  few  days  to,  as  was  assumed,  obtain  instructions  and  then 
return  to  London. 

Grey's  "  Twisty  "  Answer 

These  happenings  aroused  so  much  attention  in  England  that  questions 
were  raised  in  Parliament  concerning  them.  It  was  noted  how  twisty 
Grey's  answer  was.  He  referred  to  the  answer  of  the  Premier,  already 
mentioned,  stated  that  the  situation  is  unchanged,  and  said  then  that  no 
negotiations  were  under  \vay  concerning  a  naval  agreement  writh  any  foreign 
nation.  "As  far  as  he  was  able  to  judge  the  matter,"  no  such  negotiations 
would  be  entered  into  later  on. 

The  big  Liberal  newspaper,  The  Manchester  Guardian,  was  not  at  all 
satisfied  with  this  explanation;  it  assumed  that  certain  conditional  pre- 
liminary agreements  might  not  be  excluded. 

This  Russian  plan,  which  was  later  worked  out  in  St.  Petersburg,  went 
into  oblivion  on  account  of  the  rapidly  following  European  War.  In  the 
light  of  the  following  revelation  of  Grey's  agreement  with  France,  the  news 
of  the  naval  agreement  desired  by  Iswolski  assumed  another  aspect. 

Let  us  return  to  the  Anglo-French  agreement.  The  following  remarks 
by  the  French  Ambassador  in  London,  reported  by  Grey,  proves  that,  on 
the  ground  of  this  agreement,  France,  with  very  little  trouble,  would  be 
able  to  make  out  of  a  diplomatic  entanglement  a  case  for  the  Allies' 
interest  as  far  as  England  is  concerned. 

A  German  "Attack" 

He  [Cambon]  anticipated  that  the  [German]  aggression  would  take  the  form 
of  either  a  demand  to  cease  her  preparations  or  a  demand  that  she  should  engage 
to  remain  neutral  if  there  was  war  between  Germany  and  Russia.  Neither  of  these 
things  would  France  admit. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  105. 

Therefore,  even  the  demand  addressed  to  France  not  to,  jointly  with 
Russia,  attack  Germany,  became  a  German  "attack,"  which  obliged  Eng- 
land to  come  to  the  aid! 

In  spite  of  this,  even  on  July  27,  in  a  conversation  with  Cambon,  Grey 
gave  himself  the  appearance  as  if  his  hands  were  free.  He  told  the  French- 
man: 

If  Germany  became  involved  and  France  became  involved  we  had  not  made 
up  our  minds  what  we  should  do;  it  was  a  case  that  we  should  have  to  consider.  .  .  . 
We  were  free  from  engagements  and  we  should  have  to  decide  what  British  interests 
required  us  to  do. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  87. 

M.  Cambon  remarked  in  reply  that  the  Secretary  of  State  had  clearly 
pictured  the  situation,  but  on  the  very  following  day  the  French  Ambassador 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  33 

took  the  liberty  to  remind  Grey  of  the  letter  written  in  1912  (British  "White 
Paper"  No.  105). 

Grey  did  not  deny  the  claim  implied  in  this  reminder,  but  even  as  late 
as  July  31  he  reports  as  follows  concerning  the  conversation  with  Cambon: 

Up  to  the  present  moment  we  did  not  feel,  and  public  opinion  did  not  feel,  that 
any  treaties  or  obligations  of  this  country  were  involved.  .  .  .  M.  Cambon  repeated 
his  question  whether  we  would  help  France  if  Germany  made  an  attack  on  her. 
I  said  I  could  only  adhere  to  the  answer  that,  as  far  as  things  had  gone  at  present, 
we  could  not  take  any  engagement.  ...  I  said  that  the  Cabinet  would  certainly 
be  summoned  as  soon  as  there  was  some  new  development;  that  at  the  present 
moment  the  only  answer  I  could  give  was  that  we  could  not  undertake  any  definite 
engagement. — British  "White  Paper"  No.  ng. 

Now,  if  we  remember  that  even  on  the  day  before  Grey  had  informed 
the  German  Imperial  Chancellor  it  would  be  a  shame  for  England  to 
remain  neutral  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed,  we  here  find  a  new  proof 
of  the  unreliability  of  his  conduct.  If  he  has  been  gullible,  the  declaration 
of  1912,  the  dangerous  character  of  which  is  increased  by  its  apparently 
undefined  tenor,  has  enmeshed  him  more  and  more.  Also  the  military  and 
naval  circles,  whose  consultations  with  the  representatives  of  the  French 
Army  and  Navy  certainly  have  been  continued  diligently  since  the  beginning 
of  the  Servian  crisis,  were  forcing  toward  a  decision. 

At  all  events  it  became  more  impossible  with  every  hour  for  Germany 
to  keep  England  out  of  the  war  by  any  offers  whatsoever.  This  is  proved 
by  Grey's  conversation  of  August  i  with  the  German  Ambassador: 

He  asked  me  whether  if  Germany  gave  a  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neu- 
trality we  would  engage  to  remain  neutral.  I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that; 
our  hands  were  still  free,  and  we  were  considering  what  our  attitude  should  be.  .  .  . 
The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could  not  formulate  conditions  on  which 
we  would  remain  neutral.  I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise. 
.  .  .  — British  "White  Paper"  No.  123. 

Belgium  Not  the  Cause 

Hence,  only  if  Germany  would  permit  herself  to  be  humiliated,  war  with 
England  could  be  avoided.  The  violation  of  Belgium's  neutrality  was  in  no 
way  the  cause  of  England  joining  Germany's  enemies,  for  while  German 
troops  did  not  enter  Belgium  until  the  night  from  August  3  to  4,  Grey  gave 
on  August  2  the  following  memorandum  to  the  French  Ambassador  after 
a  session  of  the  Cabinet  in  London: 

I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that  if  the  German  fleet  comes  into  the 
Channel  or  through  the  North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against  French 
coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give  all  the  protection  in  its  power. — British 
"White  Paper"  No.  148. 

As  the  aim  of  this  decision,  of  which  M.  Cambon  was  informed  verbally, 
was  to  give  France  an  assurance  that  it  would  be  placed  in  a  position  "to 
settle  the  disposition  of  its  own  Mediterranean  fleet,"  Grey  would  not 
accept  the  version  of  Cambon  that  England  would  take  part  in  a  war  with 
Germany.  This  is  a  case  of  splitting  hairs  in  order  to  put  the  blame  of 
starting  the  war  on  Germany,  for  while  England  promised  to  protect  the 
French  coast  and  to  make  it  possible  for  the  French  fleet  to  stay  in  the 


34  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

Mediterranean,  she  almost  immediately  proceeded  to  a  warlike  action 
against  Germany,  especially  as  the  English  Minister  simultaneously  refused 
to  bind  himself  to  maintain  even  this  peculiar  neutrality. 


IV. 
BELGIAN  NEUTRALITY 

The  highest  representatives  of  the  German  Empire,  with  emphatic 
seriousness,  declared  that  it  was  with  a  heavy  heart  and  only  following  the 
law  of  self-preservation  that  they  decided  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  the 
Kingdom  of  Belgium,  guaranteed  by  the  great  Powers  in  the  Treaties  of 
1831  and  1839. 

The  German  Secretary  of  State,  on  August  4,  informed  the  English 
Government,  through  the  embassy  in  London,  that  Germany  intended  to 
retain  no  Belgian  territory,  and  added: 

Please  impress  upon  Sir  E.  Grey  that  the  German  Army  could  not  be  exposed  to 
French  attack  across  Belgium,  which  was  planned,  according  to  absolutely  unim- 
peachable information.  Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard  Belgian  neutrality, 
it  being  with  her  a  question  of  life  or  death  to  prevent  French  advance. — British 
"White  Paper"  No.  157. 

In  answer,  Grey  caused  the  English  Ambassador  in  Berlin  to  demand  his 
passports  and  to  tell  the  German  Government  that  England  would  take 
all  steps  for  defence  of  Belgian  neutrality. 

This,  therefore,  represents,  in  the  view  which  very  cleverly  has  been 
spread  broadcast  by  British  publicity,  the  real  reason  for  the  war.  But  in 
spite  of  the  moral  indignation  that  is  apparent  against  Germany,  the  con- 
sideration for  Belgium,  up  until  very  late,  does  not  seem  in  any  way  to 
have  been  in  the  foreground.  We  find,  on  July  3 1 ,  Grey  stated  to  Cambon : 

The  preservation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  might  be,  I  would  not  say  a 
decisive,  but  an  important,  factor  in  determining  our  attitude. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  119. 

Here,  therefore,  there  was  no  talk  about  England  grasping  the  sword  on 
account  of  Belgium.  Now  no  one  will  claim  that  the  assumption  that  the 
German  troops  could  march  through  Belgium  would  be  new  or  unheard  of. 
For  years  this  possibility  had  been  discussed  in  military  literature.* 

A  Sudden  Decision 

It  must  also  be  assumed  that  the  Belgian  Government  knew  toward  the 
end  of  July  at  the  latest  that  the  war  between  Germany  and  France  was 
probable  and  the  march  of  Germans  through  Belgium  very  possible. 

*  The  book,  which  appeared  at  Oxford,  "Why  We  Are  at  War,"  mentioned 
previously,  states  on  page  27  (retranslation) : 

That  such  a  plan  [the  marching  through  Luxemburg  and  Belgium]  had  been 
taken  into  consideration  by  the  Germans,  has  been  known  in  England  generally 
for  several  years;  and  it  has  also  been  generally  accepted  that  the  attempt  to  carry 
out  this  plan  would  bring  about  the  active  resistance  of  the  British  armed  forces; 
one  assumed  that  these  would  be  given  the  task  of  assisting  the  left  wing  of  the 
French,  which  would  have  to  resist  German  advance  from  Belgian  territory. 

This  expression  on  the  part  of  the  historical  Faculty  is  very  interesting.     It  shows 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR  35 

If  England  had  not  taken  part  in  the  war  against  Germany,  it  may  be 
assumed  that  it  would  have  given  Belgium  the  advice  to  permit  the  marching 
through  of  the  German  Army,  somewhat  in  the  same  manner  as  the  Grand 
Duchy  of  Luxemburg  did,  with  a  protest.  In  doing  so  the  Belgian  people 
would  have  been  spared  a  great  deal  of  misery  and  loss  of  blood.  On 
August  3,  the  Belgian  Government  replied  to  an  offer  of  military  help 
by  France  as  follows: 

We  are  sincerely  grateful  to  the  French  Government  for  offering  eventual  sup- 
port. In  the  actual  circumstances,  however,  we  do  not  propose  to  appeal  to  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers.  Belgian  Government  will  decide  later  on  the  action  which 
they  may  think  necessary  to  take. — British  "  White  Paper"  No.  151. 

One  day  later  London  decided  to  make  Belgian  neutrality  the  cause  of 
the  war  against  Germany  before  the  eyes  of  the  world.  The  Ambassador 
in  Brussels  received  the  following  orders: 

You  should  inform  Belgian  Government  that  if  pressure  is  applied  to  them 
by  Germany  to  induce  them  to  depart  from  neutrality,  his  Majesty's  Government 
expect  that  they  will  resist  by  any  means  in  their  power,  and  that  his  Majesty's 
Government  will  support  them  in  offering  such  resistance,  and  that  his  Majesty's 
Government  in  this  event  are  prepared  to  join  Russia  and  France. — British  "  White 
Paper"  No.  155. 

Not  until  England  thus  stirred  Belgium  up,  holding  out  the  deceptive 
hope  of  effective  French  and  English  help,  did  Belgian  fanaticism  break 
loose  against  Germany.  Without  the  intervention  of  England  in  Brussels 
the  events  in  Belgium,  one  may  safely  assert,  would  have  taken  an  entirely 
different  course,  which  would  have  been  far  more  favorable  to  Belgium. 

But,  of  course,  England  had  thus  found  a  very  useful  reason  for  war 
against  Germany.  Even  on  the  3ist  of  July,  Grey  had  spoken  of  the  viola- 
tion of  Belgian  neutrality  as  not  a  decisive  factor.  On  August  i ,  he  declined 
to  promise  Prince  Lichnowsky  England's  neutrality,  even  if  Germany  would 
not  violate  Belgium's  neutrality.  On  August  4,  however,  the  Belgian 
question  was  the  cause  that  suddenly  drove  England  to  maintain  the  moral 
fabric  of  the  world  and  to  draw  the  sword. 

This  suddenly  became  the  new  development,  which  was  still  lacking  for 
Grey  in  order  to  justify  this  war  before  public  opinion  in  England. 

Another  English  Advantage 

And  something  else  was  secured  by  the  drawing  of  Belgium  into  the  war 
by  the  British  Government,  which  had  decided  to  make  war  on  Germany  for 
entirely  different  reasons:  the  thankful  part  of  the  protector  of  the  weak 
and  the  oppressed. 

As  an  English  diplomat,  when  Russia  was  mobilizing,  openly  stated,  the 
interests  of  his  country  in  Servia  were  nil,  so  for  Grey  even  Belgium,  imme- 
diately before  the  break  with  Germany,  was  not  decisive.  However, 
when  England  had  irrevocably  decided  to  enter  the  war,  it  stepped  out  before 
the  limelight  of  the  world  as  the  champion  of — the  small  nations. 

that  a  plan  of  campaign  between  the  English  and  French  had  long  been  considered,  and 
that  the  Belgian  entry  into  the  alliance  against  Germany  was  a  matter  agreed  upon. 


GERMANY  AND  THE  POWERS 

(From  "The  North  American  Review,"  December,  1914) 

When,  like  a  stroke  of  lightning  from  a  serene  blue  heaven,  the  world 
war  broke  out  in  Europe,  Americans  stood  dumfounded,  amazed,  and 
horrified.  All  the  attainments  of  twentieth-century  civilization  seemed  to 
crumble  under  their  very  feet.  All  the  endeavors  that  had  been  made  to 
settle  international  dufficulties  by  treaties  or  arbitration  seemed  to  be 
absolutely  futile.  All  the  protestations  that  the  various  peoples  of  Europe 
had  been  making  continuously  for  peace  and  good- will  were  discredited. 
It  was  not  so  much  the  resentment  against  the  disturbance  of  trade,  the 
stopping  of  exports,  and  inconvenience  of  unbalanced  financial  relations, 
the  anxiety  for  a  host  of  relatives  and  friends  who  had  been  entrapped 
in  the  warring  countries,  that  roused  this  American  feeling;  the  public 
on  this  side  was  deeply  hurt  in  its  ethical  feeling,  in  its  moral  attitude, 
toward  solemn  obligations,  in.  its  sympathies  for  smaller  nations.  What 
was  all  that  civilization  that  the  world  had  been  boasting  of  so  much? 
What  did  the  word  "culture"  mean  if  from  one  day  to  the  next  Europe 
could  become  the  field  of  brutality,  burning,  and  sacking?  Was  not  the 
world  thrown  back  for  a  century  or  more,  and  were  not  all  the  sincere  en- 
deavors to  bring  about  a  more  human  state  of  things  by  international 
treaties  permanently  in  danger  by  this  spectacle  of  treaties  being  dis- 
regarded and  torn  to  shreds?  What  would  all  this  mean  for  the  United 
States?  Had  she  not  let  herself  be  inveigled  into  a  spirit  of  security,  into 
an  optimism  without  foundation,  into  the  hope  for  a  better  and  more 
peaceful  world? 

The  breaking  out  of  the  war  was  considered  here  as  a  crime  against 
humanity,  and  it  cannot  be  wondered  at  that  the  next  question  was,  Who 
was  the  author  of  that  crime?  Who  permitted  it,  by  act  of  tolerance,  to  be 
perpetrated?  The  answer  seemed  to  come  quickly  on  irrefutable  evidence. 
The  brutality  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum;  the  failure  of  Germany  to  repress 
her  ally;  the  Russian  feeling  for  the  small  boundary  states;  the  French 
resentment  of  the  annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine;  the  English  attitude 
toward  guaranteed  treaties — all  seemed  to  be  a  chain  of  evidence  that  laid 
the  blame  to  the  door  of  Germany,  and  Germany  did  not  defend  herself 
because  she  could  not — being  deprived  of  direct  communication  in  con- 
sequence of  the  cutting  of  cables  and  the  stringent  British  rules  against  the 
printing  of  uncensored  news. 

So  the  judgment  was  quickly  formed.  It  could  only  be  formed  on  the 

36 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  37 

evidence  presented,  one-sided  though  it  was.  And,  in  the  absence  of 
facts,  Americans  had  to  rely  on  sentiment  which  strongly  favored  the  Allies. 

The  greater  the  American  nation  has  become  the  more  it  has  built  up  a 
civilization  of  its  own.  The  more  intense  national  life  has  grown,  the  less 
Americans  have  had  reason  to  busy  themselves  with  the  happenings  in  far- 
away countries,  and  as  little  as  it  can  be  expected  that  the  men  in  the 
interior  of  Russia  should  know  anything  of  American  institutions  and 
statecraft,  as  little  can  it  be  fairly  demanded  that  Americans  should  be 
intimately  acquainted  with  the  intricacies  of  European  politics. 

Therefore  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  try  to  sketch  the  state  of  things  in 
Europe  as  it  has  been,  the  various  peoples  involved,  their  aims,  ambitions, 
and  necessities,  the  driving  forces  behind  them,  and  the  historical  develop- 
ment that  resulted  in  the  explosion. 

The  immediate  cause  was  the  trouble  between  Austria  and  Servia. 
Servia  has  played  the  foremost  part  in  the  Balkans,  as  Professor  Sloane 
in  his  remarkable  book,  ''The  Balkans,  a  Historical  Laboratory,"  has 
pictured.  A  strong  and  valorous  people,  dominated  mostly  by  its  clans, 
practically  without  industry,  a  peasant  nation,  continuously  engaged  for 
centuries  in  fights  for  national  existence  and  in  internal  strife  for  the  suprem- 
acy of  the  great  chieftains.  Expansive,  as  all  the  Slav  peoples,  Servia 
has  sought  for  many  years  to  enlarge  her  territory.  There  were  two 
possibilities:  either  at  the  expense  of  Turkey  or  at  the  expense  of  Austria- 
Hungary,  in  whose  confines  several  millions  of  Serbs  are  living.  "All 
Slavs  are  brethren" — that  is  the  doctrine.  All  Slavs  must  be  under  Slavish 
rulers,  and  all  territory  inhabited  by  Serbs  is  part  of  an  unalienable  in- 
heritance of  the  Servian  kingdom.  So,  a  "Greater  Servia"  has  been  the 
aim  of  a  people  who  had  not  many  cultural  goods  to  defend,  no  great 
wealth  to  effeminate  them,  frugal  and  warlike  as  they  were.  In  order  not 
to  go  back  too  deep  into  history,  I  would  refer  my  readers  to  the  Balkan 
Alliance,  consisting  of  two  treaties,  the  one  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria 
of  February  29,  1912,  and  the  second  between  Greece  and  Bulgaria  of 
May  16,  1912.  These  treaties  contain  secret  clauses  that  were  published 
in  1913  in  Le  Matin  of  Paris.  These  secret  clauses  provide  for  a  division 
of  the  Balkans  between  Servia  and  Bulgaria  on  a  north-southerly  line, 
leaving  the  western  part  to  Servia,  the  eastern  part  to  Bulgaria.  The 
open  part  of  the  treaty  provides  for  a  purely  defensive  alliance;  the  secret 
part  shows  the  aims  and  the  element  that  has  been  dominant  in  the  bringing 
about  of  that  alliance,  directed,  as  to  Servia,  against  Austria,  and  as  to 
Bulgaria,  against  Turkey.  This  dominant  factor  is  Russia.  Article 
First  of  the  secret  clauses  says: 

That  if  Servia  and  Bulgaria  convene  to  act,  it  is  to  be  communicated  to  Russia, 
and  if  Russia  does  not  oppose  itself,  the  action  will  proceed.  If  they  cannot  agree 
as  to  an  action,  they  will  apply  to  Russia,  whose  decision  will  be  obligatory  upon 
both  parties.  Should  Russia  not  give  any  opinion  at  all  and  the  two  parties  cannot 
concert,  that  party  that  will  undertake  an  action  must  proceed  alone,  the  other 
keeping  in  friendly  neutrality  supported  by  partial  mobilization. 


38  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR 

Article  Three  says: 

A  copy  of  this  treaty  and  of  its  secret  clauses  will  be  jointly  communicated  to 
the  Russian  Government,  which  will  be  asked  to  take  note  of  it,  and  to  give  proof 
of  its  good-will  regarding  the  ends  sought,  and  the  Emperor  of  Russia  will  be  asked 
to  kindly  accept  and  approve  for  his  person  and  his  Government  the  role  assigned 
to  them  in  the  treaty.  All  differences  that  should  result  from  the  interpretation 
or  execution  of  the  treaty  are  to  be  submitted  to  the  definite  decision  of  Russia. 

And  Article  Five  says: 

This  appendix  is  not  to  be  published  without  the  consent  of  Russia. 

Thus  it  will  be  seen  Russia  was  able  to  pull  the  strings,  and  she  did. 
When  Italy  seized  upon  Tripoli,  and  the  Turkish  fleet  was  engaged  with  the 
Italian  navy  that  took  possession  of  a  number  of  islands  in  the  ^Egean,  the 
war  was  started  against  Turkey,  and  it  looked  for  a  moment  as  if  she  were 
to  be  driven  out  of  Europe  altogether.  But  Bulgaria  aspired  for  more  of 
the  conquered  territory  than  Russia  was  willing  to  concede,  for  reasons  we 
shall  see  hereafter,  and  a  new  war  broke  out  between  Servia  and  Greece 
on  the  one  side,  and  Bulgaria  on  the  other.  Bulgaria  was  brought  very  near 
to  destruction;  then  the  Czar  of  Bulgaria  addressed  himself  for  help  to 
Austria.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Russia  saw  fit  to  publish  the  secret 
clause  of  the  treaty  showing  that  Bulgaria  had  conspired  with  her  and  with 
Servia  to  fight  Austria.  Peace  was  finally  concluded  in  Bucharest — a  peace 
that  was  not  to  the  satisfaction  of  Austria.  She  tried  to  engage  Germany 
in  her  attempt  to  annul  the  Bucharest  protocol — which  Germany  refused 
to  do,  although  thereby  greatly  grieving  her  ally,  in  the  interests  of  the 
peaceful  people  of  the  world.  So  Servia  attained  her  end  in  about  doubling 
her  size;  but  the  spirit  of  conquest  cannot  be  repressed  once  it  has  started 
and  has  been  successful.  The  Servian  aim  had  been  to  gain  free  access 
to  a  harbor  on  the  Adriatic.  Austria  had  opposed  herself,  the  Greater 
Servian  dream  remained  still  unfulfilled,  and  Servia  now  directed  her 
attention  to  the  Austrian  provinces  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  because 
the  Austrian  interests  in  the  western  part  of  the  Balkans  barred  Servia's 
way  to  the  sea.  Then  those  conspiracies  set  in,  sowing  discord  among 
Austrian  peoples,  inveigling  into  mutiny  Austrian  subjects,  swamping 
Bosnia  and  the  south  of  Hungary  with  Servian  literature;  it  ended  in  the 
murder  of  the  Crown  Prince  of  Austria  and  his  wife  on  June  28,  and  nobody 
who  knew  anything  at  all  of  the  doings  in  the  Balkans  could  have  the 
slightest  doubt  that  Servia  only  tackled  her  big  neighbor  because  of  the 
promise  of  Russia  to  stand  by  her,  as  was  evidenced  by  the  treaty  above 
cited.  'The  aims  of  Servia  are  commensurate  with  the  nature  of  her  people, 
with  the  state  of  her  culture,  with  the  ambitions  of  her  statesmen. 

But  why  did  Russia  countenance  all  that?  Among  all  the  Slav  peoples 
Russia  has  been  the  most  restive  for  ages.  She  has  added  to  her  dominions 
constantly  and  is  now  the  empire  of  the  greatest  territorial  extension.  She 
is  autocratic,  and  she  must  keep  the  minds  of  her  people  busy.  It  is  from 
her  soil  that  all  the  hordes  have  ever  penetrated  into  Europe,  from  the  times 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  39 

of  Ghengis-Khan  and  Timur-i-leng — Mongols,  Tartars,  and  Poles.  She 
has  spread  out  east  and  south,  her  efforts  always  alternating  in  the  two 
directions — an  enormous  empire  that  is  turning  now  its  efforts  toward 
the  building  up  of  an  industry.  Having  been  defeated  in  the  East  in  1904, 
unable  to  retrieve  her  defeat  by  Japan  in  consequence  of  the  British  alliance 
with  Japan,  and  being  handicapped  in  the  efforts  to  reach  the  Indian 
Ocean  by  the  British-Russian  compact  of  1907,  she  again  turned  her  eyes 
to  the  south.  World-commerce  and  world-power  are  no  longer  confined  to 
continents.  Any  considerable  export  trade  demands  access  to  the  sea,  a 
mercantile  marine,  and  a  certain  liberty  of  movement.  Look  how  she  is 
situated  in  that  respect  1  This  enormous  empire,  the  largest -on  earth,  has 
not  even  one  outlet  to  the  sea  accessible  at  all  times  of  the  year.  Her 
northern  harbor,  Archangel,  is  icebound  as  early  as  September.  It  is  con- 
nected with  its  industrial  center  only  by  one  single-track  line  of  more  than  a 
thousand  miles.  The  harbor  of  Kronstadt  is  equally  icebound  in  the  winter, 
"and  it  is,  moreover,  only  a  harbor  to  the  Baltic,  that  is  dominated  by 
Germany.  A  third  harbor,  Vladivostok,  on  the  far  Japan  Sea,  is  of  no 
account,  freezing  up  also  very  early  in  the  year.  Her  attempt  to  get  into 
the  Chinese  Sea  by  way  of  Port  Arthur  has  been  finally  frustrated,  by  Japan 
forcing  Russia  to  retire  from  it  in  1904,  when  equally  she  lost  her  chance  of 
reaching  out  by  way  of  Korea.  But  all  the  strong  Northern  peoples  have 
always  had  their  eyes  on  more  clement  climates,  and  there  has  been  from 
time  immemorial  a  constant  pressing  of  Gauls  and  Teutons,  of  Slavs  and 
Mohammedan  Indians,  toward  the  ocean  to  the  south.  But  here  again 
Russia  finds  herself  absolutely  barred.  All  attempts  to  get  free  access  to 
the  Mediterranean  have  invariably  come  to  naught.  The  Powers  inter- 
ested in  the  Mediterranean  did  not  want  another  strong  Power  to  com- 
pete with  them  there,  or  to  menace  their  domination.  So  Russia  in  her 
attempts  to  break  the  Turkish  rule  in  the  Dardanelles  has  always  been 
opposed  by  the  rest  of  Europe.  The  Crimean  War  was  waged  in  1854 
against  Russia  by  the  combined  forces  of  Turkey,  France,  and  England, 
and  ended  in  the  Paris  protocol,  re-establishing  the  control  of  Turkey  over 
the  Bosporus,  and  forbidding  any  men-of-war  to  pass  by  Constantinople. 
When,  by  the  help  of  Rumania,  Russia  was  victorious  in  1878  and  forced 
upon  Turkey  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  dictating  its  terms  under  the  very 
doors  of  Constantinople,  Europe  interceded,  and  Russia  was  thrown  back 
by  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  and  her  efforts  were  again  frustrated.  But  in 
1908  she  addressed  herself  to  Austria  for  a  revision  of  the  Paris  Treaty 
of  1856.  Austria,  while  amenable  to  Russian  demands,  made  her  assent 
contingent  upon  French  and  English  consent,  and  these  two  Powers  did 
not  see  their  way  to  satisfy  her. 

So  the  national  tendency  of  Russia  to  get  to  Constantinople,  and  the 
Servian  ambitions  to  get  an  outlet  to  the  Adriatic  strengthened  the  natural 
political  tie  between  the  countries.  Now  it  is  easily  understood  why  Bul- 
garia was  not  permitted  to  press  forward  to  Constantinople,  or  to  gain  a 


40  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR 

great  addition  to  her  power.  Once  on  the  Bosporus  a  "Greater  Bulgaria" 
would  prove  an  unsafe  factor  to  the  Russian  aims;  therefore,  Bulgaria  was 
first  called  back  and  then  defeated  with  Russian  assistance. 

What  was  Austria's  interest  in  this  game?  Her  trade  is  mostly  Oriental. 
Wherever  the  Russians  go,  the  open  door  is  closed.  The  looming  up  of  a 
big  Power  on  the  southerly  frontier  meant  the  tearing  from  her  of  the 
Slav  parts — a  very  great  danger  that  in  fact  necessitated,  as  every  one 
knows,  a  huge  addition  to  the  Austrian  and  German  armaments  in  1913.  She 
could  not  split  up  her  Slav  parts  without  falling  all  to  pieces.  There  are 
Rumanians  in  the  east  of  Hungary;  there  are  Serbs  on  the  Hungarian 
frontier  on  the  Danube;  there  are  a  great  many  of  the  same  population  in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina;  and  then,  also,  the  great  Bohemian  crown  land  for 
the  most  part  is  Slav.  She  had  a  large  interest  in  maintaining  her  treaty 
rights  with  Turkey.  She  knew  of  the  relentless  hatred  of  the  Serbs,  who 
could  not  enlarge  their  frontiers  to  the  West,  and  the  known  Russian 
enmity  that  barred  her  way  to  the  ^Egean  Sea.  Austria's  situation  became 
unbearable,  and  the  assassination  of  Serajevo  was  just  a  spark  that  fell 
into  the  powder-cask. 

But  could  Germany  forsake  Austria  in  her  struggle  for  life  that  she  had 
to  take  up?  In  the  first  place,  Germany  had  .been  the  ally  of  Austria  ever 
since  1879,  for  the  avowed  purpose  of  preventing  Russian  aggression.  Then 
Austria  is  not  only  peopled  with  Slav  and  Hungarians — she  is  also  a 
German  nation — more  than  twelve  million  of  her  people  (about  25  per  cent.) 
being  German  by  race,  by  language,  and  by  civilization.  The  partition  of 
Austria  would  have  left  that  great  part  of  the  real  kernel  and  backbone  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy  in  a  hopelessly  impotent  and  reduced  position,  sur- 
rounded on  two  sides  by  people  of  a  different  race,  inferior  cultural  attain- 
ments, and  an  easy  prey  to  either  of  the  contending  factors.  If  the  bonds 
of  nationality,  of  language  and  culture,  count  for  anything,  Germany  could 
not  do  that.  And  then,  for  her,  there  is  another  consideration  of  equal 
importance:  Germany  is  a  nation  of  fast-increasing  population.  She  is 
industrial  for  the  most  part.  She  can  keep  her  people  busy  at  home  only 
by  having  the  markets  of  the  world  open  to  German  goods.  The  closing  of 
the  Bosporus  by  Russia  would  have  excluded  her  enterprise  forever  from 
Western  Asia,  where  she  has  been  doing  so  much  cultural  work,  and  would 
have  left  the  enormous  Asiatic  Continent  to  be  further  divided  by  England 
and  Russia.  All  her  just  endeavors  to  peaceful  commercial  expansion 
would  have  been  thwarted.  On  the  other  hand,  the  breaking  up  of  Austria 
would  have  meant  a  complete  isolation  of  Germany,  writh  the  enormous  dan- 
ger of  an  array  of  the  Powers  against  her  as  seen  in  this  war.  So  when 
Austria  had  to  fight,  as  she  had,  Germany  had  to  join  with  her. 

We  now  come  to  the  situation  of  France.  It  is  said  that  she  is  fighting 
for  revenge,  and  revenge  is  generally  interpreted  as  retribution  for  the 
taking  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  But  that  is  only  the  outward  sign  of  the  decay 
of  French  power.  For  hundreds  of  years  France  had  been  the  foremost 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR  41 

Power  of  the  European  Continent.  She  was  dictating  its  politics,  she  dom- 
inated the  cabinets  of  Europe,  from  the  times  of  Richelieu  and  Louis  XIV. ; 
from  the  time  of  Mazarin  to  the  French  Revolution;  from  Napoleon  I. 
to  Talleyrand's  splendid  work  at  the  Vienna  Congress  and  as  Ambassador 
at  the  Court  of  St.  James's,  down  to  finally  Napoleon  III.,  the  French 
Court  was  always  the  focus  of  splendor,  might,  and  imperiousness.  France 
has  been,  as  she  styles  herself  always,  la  grande  nation,  and  it  was  a  rude 
awakening  and  a  terrible  disappointment  when  the  power  of  United  Ger- 
many definitely  removed  her  from  that  position.  Given  to  good  living  and 
comfort,  and  to  the  two-children  system,  she  continuously  lost  ground  as 
against  parsimonious,  frugal,  and  inventive  Germany.  The  well-known  ten- 
dency of  Germany  for  family  life  and  the  raising  of  children  under  the  home 
roof  made  the  difference  in  population  every  year  greater.  Thirty-eight 
millions  in  1780  in  France  and  a  like  number  in  Germany  changed  into 
thirty-nine  millions  in  the  former  and  into  nearly  seventy  millions  in  the 
latter  country.  So  she  felt  that  she  could  not  hold  her  own  single-handedly, 
and  she  had  to  seek  alliances  which  were  not  to  be  had  for  the  asking.  She 
found  an  ally  in  the  Russian  antagonism  toward  Germany  that  had  sprung 
up  ever  since  Bismarck  had  made  himself  the  "honest  broker"  of  Europe 
at  the  Berlin  Congress,  when  the  prize  of  her  war  against  Turkey  was 
definitely  wrested  from  her.  France  had  to  engage  to  finance  Russian  rail- 
ways, Russian  state  needs,  and  Russian  armament.  She  had  to  loan  to 
Russia  more  than  ten  billion  francs  of  her  savings  in  order  to  maintain  that 
friendship.  So  there  were  two  motives  that  caused  France  to  draw  nearer 
and  nearer  to  Russia  and  to  become  the  bonded  ally  to  a  Power  so  foreign 
to  French  culture  and  French  ideals.  The  first  motive  was  to  regain  her 
lost  position  in  Europe.  The  second  was  the  fear  of  losing  her  savings  in- 
vested in  Russia.  Had  she  stood  out,  Russia  would  not  have  hesitated  to 
cancel  all  her  indebtedness  to  France  by  a  single  stroke  of  her  autocratic 
pen.  It  was  this  sort  of  entanglement  that  brought  France  into  this  Euro- 
pean war. 

Let  us  come  to  England. 

It  has  been  maintained  that  her  jealousy  against  German  trade,  Ger- 
man sea  power,  German  industry,  and  German  expansion  had  been  guiding 
factors.  They  had  certainly  a  very  great  deal  to  do  with  the  public  feeling 
in  England,  and  it  is  public  sentiment  to  which  Great  Britain,  more  than 
any  other  nation,  thinks  she  must  listen.  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  a  dispatch, 
on  August  i  (reprinted  under  No.  123  of  the  English  "White  Book"),  to 
Sir  Edward  Goshen,  makes  clear  this  point.  He  says  that  the  German 
attitude  with  regard  to  Belgium  affected  feeling  in  England.  If  Germany 
could  give  the  same  assurance  as  France  had  given,  it  would  materially  con- 
tribute to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension  in  England.  If  Belgian  neutrality 
was  violated,  it  would  be  extremely  difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in 
that  country.  "He  [Count  Lichnowsky]  asked  me  whether  if  Germany 
would  promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality  we  would  engage  to  remain 


42  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

neutral.  I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that.  .  .  .  Our  attitude  would  be 
determined  largely  by  public  opinion."  He  did  not  think  that  they  could 
give  a  promise  of  neutrality  on  that  condition  alone.  The  German  Ambas- 
sador pressed  him  as  to  whether  he  could  not  formulate  conditions  on  which 
England  would  remain  neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of 
France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed,  but  Sir  Edwrard  Grey  said 
that  he  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any  promise  to  remain  neutral  on 
similar  terms,  and  that  England  must  keep  her  hands  free. 

It  is  clear  that  public  opinion  in  England,  while  being  strongly  influenced 
by  the  Belgian  case,  had  other  grudges  against  Germany.  That  is  why  Sir 
Edward  Grey  would  not  even  formulate  conditions  to  remain  neutral  if 
Belgian  neutrality  was  being  guaranteed.  I  wonder  why  this  significant 
despatch  is  always  disregarded  by  the  Americans  formulating  a  case  against 
Germany.  While  it  is  true  that  this  British-German  rivalry  certainly 
played  a  very  considerable  part  in  the  policy  of  the  British  Cabinet,  I  do 
not  think  that  it  was  decisive.  The  English  policy  for  ages  past,  adapted  to 
the  isolation  of  the  British  Isles,  has  been  the  maintenance  of  European 
equilibrium,  by  which  is  meant  that  England  saw  to  it  that  Europe  was 
arrayed  into  two  hostile  camps,  as  equally  matched  as  possible,  while  she 
kept  her  hands  free  in  order  to  throw  her  weight  into  the  balance  of  that 
party  that  served  her  aims  best.  Therefore,  when  France  had  to  go  to 
\var  as  soon  as  Russia  became  involved,  she  was  in  great  fear  that  this 
equilibrium  might  be  seriously  disturbed.  I  believe  Sir  Edward  Grey  wanted 
peace  under  existing  conditions;  the  equilibrium  was  there,  and  England 
had  nothing  to  complain  of.  But  if  war  was  to  be  declared,  France  being 
much  the  weaker,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  she  w7ould  be  thoroughly  crushed 
by  the  German  war  machine  and  the  equilibrium  would  have  gone  for  good. 
Even  if  France  was  not  despoiled  of  any  of  her  provinces  or  possessions,  yet 
she  would  have  been  materially  so  much  weakened  that  she  could  not  play 
any  further  part  in  the  European  concert.  So  England's  interest  was 
bound  up  with  France  remaining  a  comparatively  strong  Power.  And  so, 
with  eyes  always  on  that  point,  England  became  entangled  beyond  what 
she  ever  expected.  As  early  as  November  22,  1912,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
without  the  knowledge  of  the  Cabinet,  exchanged  letters  with  the  French 
Ambassador,  acknowledging  an  arrangement  whereby  the  entire  French 
fleet  was  sent  to  the  Mediterranean  to  protect  the  joint  interests  there 
w^hile  the  English  fleet  was  concentrated  in  the  North  Sea.  This  arrange- 
ment could  not  be  changed  when  the  war  broke  out.  Sir  Edward  Grey  said 
that  much  in  a  speech  on  August  3  in  the  House  of  Commons.  He  was 
bound  to  protect  the  French  coasts  and  had  to  see  to  it  that  the  French  were 
not  being  reduced.  It  will  now  be  understood  why  the  English  always  talk 
of  the  necessity  of  reducing  Germany  to  a  second-rate  Power  by  crushing 
out  her  military  force.  That  is  the  only  way  by  which  France  can  be 
strengthened  and  England  can  return  to  her  former  policy.  She  was  afraid 
of  German  expansion,  as  of  the  German  inroads  into  English  trade.  But 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE  WAR  43 

that  was  not  paramount.  Paramount  was  the  English  interest  of  re-estab- 
lishing a  state  of  things  such  as  had  been  the  case  before  1870.  She  knows 
that  her  next  big  struggle  will  be  with  Russia  over  her  Asiatic  possessions, 
and  must  keep  her  hands  free  for  that,  and  be  reassured  of  the  state  of 
Europe.  Therefore,  no  matter  what  happened  before  war  broke  out,  as 
soon  as  it  was  certain  to  come  she  had  to  be  a  party  to  it. 

I  stated  the  case  of  Germany  as  I  proceeded.  I  have  now  to  speak  of 
three  Powers  that  play  a  smaller  role  in  the  conflict:  First,  there  is  Japan. 
Next  to  Russia,  Japan  has  been  the  most  expansive  Power,  and  since  1894 
has  acquired  possession  and  control  of  three  times  what  she  had  before 
that  date.  She  is  now  out  for  the  coast  of  China,  pretending  to  fight  the 
Germans  in  Kiaochow,  while  at  the  same  time  taking  possession  of  all  the 
railways  from  Peking  south  to  the  valley  of  the  Yangtse.  She  means  to 
dominate  that  part  of  China,  just  as  she  dominates  the  southern  part  of 
Manchuria,  by  controlling  all  the  lines  of  communication,  fortifying  her 
position  along  those  railways  by  putting  in  garrisons  under  the  name  of 
"railway  guards,"  and  definitely  ousting  European  competition  that  can- 
not be  maintained  against  the  craft  and  frugality  of  the  yellow  man.  That 
is  a  side  issue  whose  bearing  upon  America  I  do  not  feel  called  upon  to 
detail. 

Then  there  is  Portugal.  Here  there  is  a  remarkable  double  play.  While 
England  is  apparently  assisting  the  Republic  of  Portugal  and  egging  her 
on  to  go  to  war,  by  telling  her  that  German  expansion  means  a  loss  of  Por- 
tuguese colonies,  she  is  harboring  at  the  same  time  in  her  confines  the  ex- 
King  of  Portugal;  is  the  center  of  the  royalist  revolutionary  movements 
against  Portugal,  and  she  feels  assured  that  whichever  way  this  struggle 
turns  she  will  have  all  the  advantage. 

Then  I  come  to  the  case  of  Belgium,  that  made  so  much  stir  in  the 
United  States.  She,  also,  is  not  to  be  exonerated  from  blame.  Belgium 
feels  much  safer  as  a  buffer  state  in  the  interests  of  England,  who,  she 
believed,  would  maintain  her  independence  and  integrity,  as  England  can- 
not permit  any  first-class  Power  to  control  the  entrance  to  the  North  Sea. 
Belgium  belongs  geographically  to  Germany.  So  by  playing  upon  Belgian 
fear  that  she,  whose  main  harbor,  Antwerp,  is  a  natural  outlet  to  the  growing 
German  industries,  would  become  a  German  vassal,  and  by  promising 
Belgium  British  help,  assisting  her  in  her  fortifications,  she  made  Belgium 
resist  the  two  overtures  of  the  German  Chancellor,  who  promised  integrity 
.  and  indemnity  in  case  Germany  marched  through  Belgium.  I  will  not 
dwell  here  on  the  treaty  relations  which  Mr.  Gladstone  himself  called  a 
most  complicated  affair,  and  which  he  thought  must  not  be  maintained 
if  they  were  against  English  interests  at  the  time  when  the  occasion  of 
acting  under  the  guarantee  arose.  It  was  Great  Britain's  interest  that  this 
neutrality  should  be  kept,  but  it  was  certainly  not  England's  reason  for  the 
war,  as  is  made  clear  by  the  dispatch  of  Sir  Edward  Grey  cited  above. 

The  German  Government  has  been  taxed  with  considering  treaties  as 


44  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR 

" scraps  of  paper."  That  is  certainly  not  the  German  record,  nor  the 
German  position  toward  treaties.  "But  this  treaty  was  a  scrap  of  paper; 
the  English  on  their  side  did  not  put  any  faith  in  it,  nor  were  they  prepared 
to  maintain  it  under  all  circumstances.  They  did  not  consider  it  enforceable 
in  1870,  and  replaced  it  by  new  arrangements  between  the  North  German 
Confederation  and  France.  The  Chancellor  regretted  very  much  that  he 
had  to  go  through  Belgium,  although  Belgium  had  broken  that  treaty  her- 
self in  spirit  and  in  letter.  The  American  doctrine  is  that  treaty  obligations 
must  not  and  cannot  be  kept  if  it  is  against  public  policy  (vide  unanimous 
judgment  rendered  in  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Treaty  cases  by  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court,  printed  in  Vol.  130  of  U.  S.  Reports,  page  600).  And 
I  must  say  that  it  is  one  thing  to  ask  a  private  individual  to  keep  an  obli- 
gation, even  when  suffering  great  loss  and  inconvenience,  and  another  if  a 
statesman  responsible  for  sixty-six  million  people  who  are  in  danger  of 
losing  their  liberty,  national  existence,  and  civil  rights  takes  upon  himself 
to  encounter  criticism  by  the  world  at  large.  Belgian  neutrality  was  an 
instrument  played  very  skilfully  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  as  a  moral  proposi- 
tion. In  fact,  it  was  a  proposition  of  public  interest  also  for  England,  and 
neutrality  had  to  be  protected  if  England  wanted  to  retain  a  dominant 
position  on  both  sides  of  the  Channel. 

Then  there  is  another  aspect  of  the  matter  that  Americans  generally 
overlook.  They  always  talk  of  Germany  and  Russia  and  the  other  countries 
as  doing  such  and  such  things.  They  talk  of  statesmen  having  acted  so  or 
otherwise.  They  forget  that  behind  these  statesmen,  behind  these  coun- 
tries, there  are  hundreds  of  millions  of  people  who  have  a  life  and  a  volition 
of  their  own.  They  forget  that  most  of  these  States  are  guided  and  con- 
ducted by  sets  of  people  who  do  not  appear  very  much  in  the  foreground. 
The  Servian  people  by  itself  has  probably  not  been  very  willing  to  go  to 
war  again  after  the  experience  of  1912.  There  was  a  Crown  Prince  who  was 
the  real  ruler  behind  the  throne,  and  the  military  and  clan  party  who,  as 
it  is  now  proven  beyond  any  possibility  of  refutation,  engineered  a  plot 
against  the  Crown  Prince  of  Austria,  spread  a  large  propaganda,  and  drove 
the  people  to  war  by  telling  them  that  Austria  wanted  to  exterminate  the 
Servian  people,  notwithstanding  the  explicit  guarantee  of  Austria  that  she 
would  not  take  any  Servian  territory.  The  same  is  the  case  in  Russia. 
The  Russian  people  are  very  illiterate  and  uncultivated.  Seventy  out  of 
one  hundred  Russians  do  not  know  how  to  read  and  write.  They  do  not 
read  papers.  They  follow  the  dictates  of  their  clergy,  the  call  of  their 
"white"  Czar,  and  implicitly  believe  what  they  are  told.  There  is  a  mili- 
tary clique  in  Russia  that  has  been  constantly  pressing  upon  the  peaceful 
Czar  that  now  was  the  time  to  get  all  the  things  they  had  wanted  for  so 
long.  The  Czar  refused,  and  closed  himself  up  for  four  days.  The  Minister 
of  War  was  not  in  the  councils  of  the  war  party,  so  it  happened  that  the 
Russian  mobilization  went  forward  without  the  Czar's  signature  and  after 
the  Minister  of  War  had  given  his  word  of  honor  that  no  mobilization  had 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  45 

been  ordered.  This  Grand-Ducal  party  finally  got  the  upper  hand,  as  re- 
ported by  the  Belgian  Minister  in  St.  Petersburg  on  July  30  to  his  home 
Government,  after  having  received  the  assurance  that  England  would 
second  France  in  case  of  a  conflict.  And  this  was  before  the  Belgian  incident 
ever  arose. 

Similar  conditions  obtained  in  Austria.  The  Archduke  Francis  Ferdi- 
nand had  always  cherished  the  plan  of  reconciling  the  Slav  portion  of  the 
Empire  by  making  out  of  the  dual  Monarchy  a  tripartite  arrangement. 
Hungary,  that  would  thereby  lose  most,  was  much  against  it.  So  when 
the  Archduke  was  out  of  the  way  and  the  Hungarian  Premier  pressed  for  a 
more  determined  policy,  the  old  Emperor  was  not  able  to  make  the  same 
strong  resistance. 

And  the  same  holds  good  also  in  respect  to  England.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
never  communicated  the  exchange  of  letters  with  the  French  Ambassador  in 
1912  to  his  colleagues.  But  when  this  matter  could  no  longer  be  kept  back, 
the  Cabinet  was  amazed.  Three  of  its  members  stepped  out  at  once,  de- 
claring that  they  would  not  have  anything  more  to  do  with  the  Govern- 
ment. They  were  Mr.  John  Burns,  Lord  Morley,  and  Mr.  Trevelyan,  who 
in  a  letter  to  his  constituents  in  Ellford  declared  that  they  had  always  been 
told  that  the  hands  of  England  were  entirely  free,  that  they  were  not 
obligated  to  France  in  any  way,  but  that  he  had  found  out,  to  his  disgust, 
that  England  was  so  hopelessly  entangled  that  she  had  to  go  to  war.  The 
leader  of  the  Socialist  party,  Ramsay  McDonald,  most  severely  criticized 
the  Administration  upon  the  same  grounds,  and  the  Liberal  member  of 
Parliament,  Mr.  Arthur  Ponsonby,  wrote  a  letter  most  severely  arraigning 
Sir  Edward  Grey  on  his  double  dealing.  But  there  were  some  hotheads,  like 
Winston  Churchill  and  Lloyd-George,  and  then  there  was  the  enormous 
danger  of  the  Irish  civil  struggle  that  loomed  up  on  the  horizon  and  whose 
consequences  could  absolutely  not  be  foreseen  in  a  time  of  European  con- 
flagration. The  Irish  leaders  were  induced,  by  the  passing  of  a  Home  Rule 
Bill  of  a  very  deceptive  kind,  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  Government,  upon 
the  ground  of  patriotism  and  national  danger. 

The  only  nation  that  is  absolutely  united  to  its  Government  is  Germany. 
She  knows,  and  it  will  be  apparent  to  any  thoughtful  reader  of  the  above 
recital,  that  all  the  nations  around  her  want  something  of  her — have  an 
interest  in  the  struggle,  and  are  willing  to  fight  under  all  circumstances. 
Russia  wants  Constantinople  and  the  weakening  of  the  Austrian  Monarchy; 
England  demands  the  reduction  of  Germany  to  a  subordinate  Power;  France, 
the  re-establishment  of  her  former  dominating  rule  of  Europe.  Surely,  no 
one  would  consider  Germany  so  insane  and  absolutely  bereft  of  common 
sense  that  she  should  have  desired  and  permitted  all  the  nations  in  whose 
way  she  had  been  to  fall  on  her,  thereby  catering  for  her  own  destruction? 
Will  it  be  believed  that  a  nation  that  has  been  constantly  striving  for  peace, 
the  only  one  of  all  European  nations  that  has  not  had  war  for  forty-four 
years,  has  never  expanded  except  peacefully,  never  acquired  territory  ex- 


4.6  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

cept  by  treaty,  knowing  that  a  combination  of  much  stronger  Powers 
threatened  her  from  all  sides,  would  go  wilfully  and  light-heartedly  to  fight 
nearly  the  whole  world?  And  what  had  she  to  gain  if  she  were  victorious? 
So  I  put  my  case,  not  on  doubtful  evidence,  or  on  the  teachings  of  people 
who  want  to  make  believe  to  the  American  public  that  diplomacy  is  the 
school  of  truthfulness  and  that  diplomatic  papers  are  a  clean  source  of  in- 
formation, but  I  put  my  case,  and  I  rest  it,  on  the  history  of  Europe,  on 
the  forces  that  have  been  at  work,  not  since  the  28th  of  July,  but  for  many 
years  past,  whose  self-interest  I  have  made  evident  and  whose  powers,  aims, 
and  ambitions  are  explained — an  explanation  which  the  average  American 
scholar  will  be  able  to  verify  every  day.  Germany  is  united  because  she 
knows  that  she  is  fighting  for  her  very  life  and  existence,  and  against  Powers 
who  wish  to  reduce  her  to  her  former  state  of  impotency  and  weakness  and 
to  undo  the  great  work  of  Bismarck,  to  crush,  under  Slav  dictation,  forces 
that  have  been  a  boon  to  the  civilization  and  advancement  of  the  world. 


THE  TIES  THAT  BIND  AMERICA  AND  GERMANY 

The   Great  Infusion   of   German  Blood   in  the   American   People,   the   Common 
Commercial  Interests  of  the  Two  Nations,  and  Their  Intellectual  Fraternity 

To  all  thinking  people  the  great  European  War  is  not  only  of  interest 
as  a  matter  of  contemporaneous  history,  as  a  touchstone  of  ethics  and 
civilization,  but  it  leads  them  of  necessity  to  the  consideration  as  to  what 
the  bearing  of  the  struggle  or  its  possible  outcome  may  mean  to  the  people 
of  the  United  States.  The  whole  net-work  of  international  relations  has 
been  exposed  by  the  various  warring  factions  trying  to  explain  to  themselves 
and  to  the  rest  of  the  world  the  reasons  that  have  brought  this  conflagration 
about.  The  undercurrents  of  international  diplomatic  action  have  been 
laid  bare,  and  matters  are  brought  to  the  public  attention  in  America  that 
seemed  until  now  very  foreign  to  the  actual  struggle.  Happily,  however, 
the  American  people  can  congratulate  themselves  that  they  are  not  directly 
concerned  in  the  war,  and  it  is  as  intelligible  as  it  is  wise  that  they  should 
try  to  avoid  to  be  drawn  into  the  difficulty  at  all.  Yet  as  in  a  physical  per- 
son the  ailing  of  one  limb  affects  the  well-being  of  the  whole  body,  so  any 
disturbance  of  a  considerable  part  of  the  European  Continent  must  needs 
affect  the  rest  of  the  world.  Modern  development  has  made  it  clear  that 
all  real  efficiency  rests  on  a  division  of  energies  and  functions  adapted  to  a 
particular  purpose  and  to  the  genius  of  the  parts  working  together  to 
reach  a  certain  specified  end.  As  in  the  work-shop  of  any  individual,  this 
holds  good  in  that  enormous  workshop  of  the  world.  It  applies  not  only  to 
the  production  and  exchange  of  commodities;  it  also  applies  to  the  ethical 
and  spiritual  field.  The  relations  of  the  various  peoples,  the  scientific  as 
well  as  the  commercial  intercourse  between  them,  is  now  being  very  seri- 
ously disturbed,  and  since  every  responsible  mind  feels  called  upon  to  inves- 
tigate this  disturbance,  it  cannot  fail  that  a  certain  revision  even  of  the 
filings  and  tendencies  must  occur.  So  there  has  been  everywhere  in  the 
United  States,  while  the  people  were  honestly  trying  to  come  to  a  fair 
judgment  and  preserve  full  neutrality,  such  a  revision  of  sentiment:  one 
party  favoring  more  the  success  of  the  Allies,  the  other  wishing  the  German 
cause  to  prevail.  To  deepen  the  sentiment,  and  to  justify  it,  people  dug 
into  history,  because  history  alone  gives  a  clue  to  the  logical  development 
of  present-day  situations.  So  I  propose  in  this  article  to  trace  the  history 
of  German- American  relations,  showing  the  bonds  that  so  firmly  hold 
together  sympathies  as  well  as  interest  between  the  two  countries. 

Next  to  Germany  itself,  no  country  on  earth — even  not  excepting 
Austria — has  so  much  German  blood  infused  into  it  as  the  United  States. 
While  in  Austria  there  are  just  about  twelve  million  people  speaking  German, 

47 


4S  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE  WAR 

there  had  no  fewer  than  five  and  a  half  million  Germans  immigrated  into  the 
United  States  between  1829  and  1912.  And  as  these  people  have  multiplied 
considerably  in  their  new  and  propitious  surroundings,  the  estimate  that  no 
less  than  a  quarter  of  the  white  population  of  the  United  States  are  either 
of  German  parentage  or  have  German  blood  in  their  veins  does  not  seem 
at  all  exaggerated.  Certainly,  the  German  immigration  in  the  nineteenth 
century  reaches  a  total  considerably  larger  than  that  of  any  foreign  element. 
As  against  about  five  million  immigrants  from  Germany,  there  are  three 
million  nine  hundred  thousand  from  Ireland,  three  million  from  England, 
Scotland,  and  Wales,  and  one  and  a  half  million  from  Norway,  Denmark, 
and  Sweden. 

America  a  Refuge  for  Political  Exiles 

Why  has  the  United  States  proved  so  attractive  especially  to  Germans? 
The  history  of  the  colonization  of  all  the  world  shows  two  reasons  that  cause 
people  to  emigrate  from  their  home  country.  It  is  not  an  easy  thing,  espe- 
cially for  the  more  sentimental  German,  to  give  up  his  home,  leave  behind 
relatives  and  friends,  part  from  the  graves  of  parents  and  ancestors,  and 
seek  a  new  home  in  a  far-away  and  unknown  country.  It  is  still  more  diffi- 
cult for  a  German,  for  while  the  English  and  Irish  have  at  least  the  advan- 
tage of  an  identity  of  language,  the  German  from  the  lower  walks  of  life  has 
no  great  facility  to  learn  an  idiom  quite  new  to  him.  But  the  two  reasons 
that  bring  about  emigration  have  been  stronger  in  Germany  than  in  other 
countries.  The  first  is,  political  and  social  pressure,  lack  of  opportunity  to 
develop  the  faculties  of  the  mind  and  to  take  a  part  in  the  development  of 
the  nation.  The  other  is  the  difficulties  arising  in  making  the  necessary 
living,  finding  the  necessary  room  for  expanding  and  keeping  together  the 
family.  In  a  word,  commercial,  industrial,  and  agricultural  stagnation. 
Both  these  reasons  have  been  very  potent  factors  in  bringing  over  such  an 
enormous  number  of  my  countrymen.  The  nation  had  got  a  big  impulse 
a  hundred  years  ago  when  the  crushed  Germany  rose  as  one  man  to  drive 
out  and  destroy  the  French  usurper;  the  greatest  hopes  were  entertained 
for  a  new  Germany  as  a  result  of  that  supreme  effort.  Thus  when  the 
diplomatists  got  together  in  1815  in  Vienna  and  rearranged  the  map  of 
Europe,  all  the  old  dynasties  returned  to  their  antiquated  and  autocratic 
tendencies,  the  dangers  of  the  French  Revolution  still  fresh  in  their  minds. 
The  Holy  Alliance  between  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia  was  formed;  Ger- 
man national  feeling  counted  for  nothing,  and  the  German  country  was  re- 
duced to  and  kept  in  an  impotent  state  in  the  form  of  a  loose  agglomeration 
directed  by  an  assembly  appointed  by  the  rulers  of  some  thirty  German 
States  without  any  popular  consultation.  But  the  men  \vho  shed  their 
blood  for  the  liberation  of  the  Fatherland,  who  had  for  years  worked  and 
prepared  for  it,  and  had  not  done  it  alone  in  order  to  fight  an  external  foe, 
but  also  in  order  to  increase  civic  rights  and  national  advancement,  did  not 
mean  to  be  put  down.  So  the  next  two  decades  saw  a  period  of  internal 
fight  between  the  more  liberal  upper  strata  and  the  organized  police  power: 


SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON   THE   WAR  49 

reformers  were  being  prosecuted  under  the  name  of  "  demagogues,"  tried  and 
cruelly  imprisoned,  and,  despondent  of  ever  attaining  their  ends,  they  sought 
a  new  home  in  that  country  that  was  peacefully,  but  effectively,  developing 
the  policy  of  the  freedom  of  men.  This  was  the  first  wave  of  intellectual 
Germany  that  was  carried  over  on  to  these  shores.  And  the  same  hap- 
pened in  1848,  when  a  new  effort  to  put  my  country  on  a  more  liberal  basis, 
after  a  short  and  partial  success,  was  again  mulcted  by  those  identical  Powers 
of  the  past,  a  furious  war  being  waged  on  all  the  participants  in  the  Revo- 
lution of  1848,  a  great  number  being  shot,  and  others  being  imprisoned.  So, 
again,  this  political  pressure  brought  another  intellectual  set,  thirsty  for 
civic  liberty  and  wishing  and  willing  to  take  an  active  share  in  the  framing 
of  their  own  destinies,  to  America.  So  it  happened  that  these  Germans  did 
not  only  come  in  quest  of  a  more  liberal  form  of  government,,  but  they  were 
already  imbued  with  democratic  ideals,  and  this  element  did  not  only  profit 
by  the  existence  of  liberal  institutions  in  the  United  States,  but  it  did  also 
greatly  help  and  further  the  development  of  these  same  institutions  to  a 
very  large  degree. 

While  political  pressure  mostly  affects  the  more  cultured  upper  classes, 
economic  pressure  invariably  brings  the  lower  classes  into  motion,  because 
everybody  tries  to  hold  on  as  long  as  he  possibly  can  to  his  old  surroundings, 
and  the  people  must,  so  to  say,  "be  pressed  out  of  the  country."  The  point 
of  least  resistance  will  always  be  found  with  the  people  of  small  means,  large 
families,  and  lesser  gifts. 

Emigration  Under  Economic  Pressure 

All  Europe  suffered  in  the  end  of  the  'forties  under  a  succession  of  crop 
failures.  Americans  know  how  these  failures  especially  affected  Ireland, 
almost  a  one-crop  country.  The  potato  crops  failed  entirely,  and  as  the 
dominating  nation,  the  English,  either  did  not  care,  or  could  not  alleviate 
the  distress,  Ireland  lost  about  half  its  population,  sending  it  to  foreign 
shores.  Very  much  the  same  happened  in  Germany.  Population  increased, 
crops  were  poor,  industrial  development  was  of  the  lowest  order,  so  people 
became  very  easily  unrooted.  But  on  the  other  side  of  the  water,  in  America, 
the  discovery  of  the  gold-bearing  sands  of  California  loomed  up  as  a  glowing 
spectre  on  the  western  horizon,  and  during  the  next  two  decades  a  continual 
stream  of  German  immigration  was  poured  into  the  United  States.  This 
stream  continued  even  after  the  excitement  over  the  discovery  of  gold 
abated.  While  the  economic  pressure  continued  in  Europe,  reports  came 
from  the  settlers  of  earlier  times  of  the-  splendid  opportunities  that  the 
liberal  land  policy  of  the  United  States  gave,  and  the  extent  of  this  move- 
ment may  be  gauged  from  the  fact  that  in  the  Civil  War  no  fewer  than  one 
hundred  and  seventy-seven  thousand  born  Germans  fought  on  the  side  of 
the  North — a  very  much  larger  percentage  than  that  contributed  by  all 
other  foreign  elements.  It  is  commonly  supposed  that  the  Irish  element 
gave  the  largest  proportion  to  the  Union  Army,  but  that  is  not  so.  As 


So  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR 

against  one  hundred  and  seventy-seven  thousand  German  Europeans,  there 
have  been  counted  one  hundred  and  forty-four  thousand  Irish.  And  Mr. 
Faust,  in  his  admirable  work  on  "The  German  Element  in  the  United 
States,"  states  that  no  fewer  than  five  hundred  thousand  people  of  German 
extraction  fought  for  the  preservation  of  the  Union. 

The  Panic  of  1873 

Soon  after  the  Civil  War,  Bismarck  brought  about  the  German  unifica- 
tion, which  put  at  once  a  different  aspect  on  the  German  problem.  The  war 
of  1870  gave  an  enormous  impetus,  both  politically  and  economically,  to 
the  German  people.  Up  to  that  time  we  felt  Prussian,  and  Bavarian,  and 
Saxon  in  our  immediate  relations  to  our  Government.  In  America  we  were 
called  fondly  "Dutchmen."  A  nation  of  Germany  exists  only  since  1870. 
But  the  tendency  to  develop,  to  build  up  economically  the  new  empire,  did 
not  take  into  account  that  the  wealth  necessary  for  the  carrying  on  of  the 
enormous  enterprises  started  was  insufficient  for  the  purpose.  The  payment 
of  the  billion  dollars  by  France  and  the  repayment  out  of  that  fund  of  all 
the  war  claims,  the  pouring  of  so  much  gold -into  the  commercial  arteries 
without  an  effective  distributing  organization,  led  to  the  "Krach"  of  1873. 
There  were  no  banks  of  sufficient  strength,  there  was  no  reserve  power,  to 
help  enterprises  that  got  stuck.  Curiously  enough,  at  that  time  Germany 
was  so  little  developed  economically  that  the  standard  share  in  which 
everybody  gambled  was  not  a  German,  but  an  Austrian,  security — the 
shares  of  an  Austrian  Credit  Institute.  As  a  consequence,  a  great  many  of 
the  newly  commenced  industries  had  to  be  dropped.  So  Germany  experi- 
enced an  enormous  reverse,  and  the  stream  of  emigration  had  to  go  on.  It 
took  about  five  years  to  overcome  this,  and  in  1879  a  change  in  the  policy 
of  Germany  took  place;  Bismarck  going  from  the  free- trade  tack  over  to 
the  one  of  a  moderate  protection.  The  influence  of  the  teachings  of  America 
in  that  direction  are  unmistakable.  The  American  theory  of  protecting 
infant  industries  by  a  comparatively  high  tariff  appealed  to  Germany,  then 
in  a  similar  state.  Germany  became  rapidly  industrialized.  It  meant  that 
the  people  could  be  kept  at  home,  employed  in  industry,  paid  good  wages. 
Although  in  the  early  'eighties  we  have  yet  some  such  figures  of  emigration 
from  Germany  as  280,000,  it  very  soon  ceased  to  be  of  any  account.  Since 
1894  it  has  practically  ceased.  In  1912  only  18,000  people  emigrated, 
while,  as  a  matter  of  comparison,  British  emigration  ran  as  high  in  the 
same  year  as  469,000. 

German  Emigration  Now  Stopped 

Germany  is  now  keeping  all  her  people  busy  at  home.  Although  the 
population  has  risen  from  thirty-nine  millions  in  1870  to  nearly  seventy  mil- 
lions in  1914,  she  is  even  now  short  of  hands  and  employing  constantly 
between  one  and  one-half  million  and  one  and  three-quarter  million  of 
foreigners  in  her  mines  and  her  agriculture.  Even  in  her  colonies  there 
are  not  more  than  twenty-three  thousand  Germans  living  at  this  time.  This 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  51 

change  in  the  industrial  situation  necessitated  the  establishment  of  a  number 
of  distributing  agencies.  The  growth  of  national  feeling  brought  now  to 
the  fore  high-class  Germans  who  established  themselves  in  foreign  countries, 
but  in  contradistinction  to  the  former  practice  these  men  retained  their 
nationality  and  stayed  distinctly  German.  To  distribute  the  enormous 
production,  the  establishing  of  a  merchant  marine  was  necessary.  Within 
forty  years,  German  trade  has  increased  500  per  cent,  while  the  English 
trade  has  only  increased  150  per  cent.  The  watchword  became  "  Efficiency." 
Efficiency  means,  to  do  everything  by  the  most  approved  methods  and  at 
the  least  cost,  which  could  only  be  done  by  Germans  becoming  independent 
in  shipping,  insurance,  and  finance:  all  of  which  is  now  being  done  by 
German  national  houses,  who  have  helped  enormously  to  increase  the 
wealth  of  the  United  States.  But  these  methods  were  not  of  Germany's 
invention.  They  could  be  found  in  the  United  States  and  were  adapted  to 
German  needs,  and  a  certain  kind  of  "  Americanization  "  of  German  business 
took  place.  On  the  other  hand,  the  German  leaning  to  thoroughness,  a 
fortunate  working  together  of  theoretical  and  applied  science,  a  thorough 
primary  and  technical  education,  helped  the  German  mind  to  develop  a 
number  of  specialties  such  as  she  must  export  in  order  to  maintain  her 
balance  of  trade.  Germany  is  not  a  rich  country:  we  are  nearly  independent 
from  the  rest  of  the  world  for  our  food  supply,  but  as  to  raw  material  (except 
coal,  which  we  have  in  unmeasured  extent)  we  are  dependent  upon  inter- 
national commerce.  Copper,  cotton,  and  oil  we  do  not  produce,  and  we 
have  been  among  the  best  customers  of  the  United  States  in  cotton,  and 
the  best  in  the  other  two  articles.  If  we  had  to  pay  for  them  in  cash,  we 
would  very  soon  have  come  to  the  end  of  our  gold  resources. 

Our  Friendly  Trade  Relations 

Since  America  is,  even  up  to  this  date,  not  a  creditor,  but  a  debtor  na- 
tion, she  can  not  lend  any  considerable  amount  for  any  length  of  time  to 
other  countries.  So  we  have  to  pay  in  produce,  chief  of  all,  in  our  chemi- 
cal products,  and  especially  potash,  of  which  we  have  a  sort  of  monopoly. 
Then,  the  tendency  of  keeping  our  people  at  home  and  having  them  work 
in  their  own  houses,  and  a  certain  tender  feeling  for  the  produce  of  our  own 
hands,  have  developed  an  enormous  toy  industry  that  stands,  strange  to  say, 
second  on  the  list  of  the  exports  to  the  United  States.  There  are,  further- 
more, scientific  apparatus,  lithographic  papers,  and  a  host  of  small  articles 
that  are  being  constantly  shipped,  and  while  none  of  the  single  items  making 
up  the*  German  import  of  the  United  States  is  more  than  nine  million  dollars 
a  year,  the  whole  of  it  amounts  to  about  one  hundred  and  sixty  millions.  We 
import  about  double  that  amount  from  the  United  States.  One  hundred  and 
ten  million  dollars'  worth  of  cotton,  seventy-five  million  dollars'  worth  of 
copper,  forty  millions'  worth  of  wheat,  twenty  millions'  of  mineral  oils.  So 
we  are  indebted  to  the  amount  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  million  dollars  every 
year  to  the  United  States.  How  do  we  pay  for  that?  There  comes  another 


52  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

interesting  phase  of  German-American  relations.  I  have  spoken  of  the 
social  pressure  exercised  in  the  first  part  of  the  last  century,  but  this  social 
pressure  did  not  only  affect  Germans  by  race,  but  it  was  most  strongly  felt 
by  the  very  enterprising  Jewish  element,  who  lacked  equality  of  rights,  and 
even  after  that  had  been  given  them  in  letter  it  was  very  often  not  kept  in 
spirit.  So  this  connection  of  social  pressure,  with  the  enormous  advantages 
of  the  new  country,  caused  a  Jewish  emigration,  that  formed  a  very  valuable 
instrument  for  placing  American  securities  in  Germany.  These  people 
enjoyed  the  confidence  of  their  compatriots  at  home,  and  wrhen  they  recom- 
mended in  1862-3  the  taking  of  the  bonds  of  the  North,  a  very  large  amount 
of  the  " seven  thirty"  bonds  were  sold  in  Germany.  When  the  Pacific  rail- 
roads were  constructed,  the  bonds  of  the  Central  Pacific,  of  the  California 
&  Oregon,  and  Oregon  &  California  found  a  large  market  in  Germany. 
When  Mr.  Villard  (himself  a  German  by  birth)  undertook  the  completion 
of  the  Northern  Pacific,  more  than  fifty  million  dollars  of  its  bonds  (a  very 
large  amount,  at  that  time)  went  to  Germany.  The  coupons  of  these  secur- 
ities helped  to  make  up  the  balance  of  trade,  but  most  of  it  comes  from 
profits  of  German  houses,  insurance  premiums,  the  freights  in  American 
produce  in  German  vessels,  the  remittances  of  Germans  living  in  the  United 
States  to  their  home  people,  and  other  items  of  that  character.  There  has 
been  a  constant  give  and  take  between  these  two  countries,  by  which  both 
of  them  fared  extremely  well.  There  has  never  been  any  clash  of  interest 
between  the  two  peoples.  There  has  always  been  an  expansion  of  their 
mutual  relations.  There  is,  furthermore,  a  considerable  number  of  Ameri- 
can industries  established  in  Germany.  The  Westinghouse  Brake  Company 
has  a  factory  in  Hanover.  The  Standard  Oil  Company  has  a  great  organi- 
zation in  our  country.  So  has  the  Singer  Sewing  Machine  Company  and 
various  typewrriter  and  cash-register  concerns.  There  is  a  constant  inter- 
change between  the  great  German  and  American  electric  concerns  which, 
to  the  absolute  exclusion  of  England,  are  domineering  all  the  world. 

And  with  all  this  work  on  the  materialistic  side  of  life,  the  scientific  and 
ethical  sides  have  never  been  lost  sight  of.  German  and  American  sciences 
are  constantly  exchanging  their  newest  attainments,  and  a  great  many 
American  and  German  universities  are  having  exchange  professors.  Inter- 
national conferences  in  both  countries  have  always  the  largest  contingent 
from  Germany  and  America,  and  while  we  no  longer  send  our  intelligent 
people  abroad  for  good,  as  we  formerly  had  to  do,  we  have  surmounted  all  the 
difficulties  in  language,  of  the  difference  in  the  turn  of  mind,  and  now  freely 
enjoy,  and  ungrudgingly,  the  great  steps  forward  made  in  the  United  States. 

There  is  in  the  world  a  great  community  of  all  people  of  intellect — a 
great  flow  of  thought — and  a  solidarity  of  ethics,  that  goes  on  unhampered 
without  respect  to  what  happens  in  the  outer  world.  And  though  there 
may  be  differences  on  some  points,  we  always  feel  the  cordiality  of  the 
American  people  in  the  spiritual  life,  and  are  grateful  for  the  ties  in  our 
common  industrial  and  commercial  advancement. 


GERMANY'S   FOOD   SUPPLY 

Will  the  Germans  Have  an  Ample  Quantity  of  Bread  and  Meat  for  Armies  and 
Civil  Population  During  the  Next  Two  Years? 

(From  "The  Review  of  Reviews") 

[It  is  in  compliance  with  the  request  of  the  Editor  of  this  Review  that  Dr.  Dernburg 
presents  the  interesting  data  upon  Germany's  agriculture  that  will  be  found  in  the  present 
article.  Dr.  Dernburg  typifies  Germany's  efficient  men  of  affairs  who  have  built  up  the 
Empire's  financial  and  industrial  strength.  He  is  one  of  the  foremost  of  Berlin's  bankers, 
is  a  member  of  the  upper  house  of  the  Prussian  Parliament,  was  for  four  years  the  Em- 
peror's Minister  of  Colonies,  and  is  a  man  of  an  extraordinary  range  of  information, 
not  only  regarding  the  political,  industrial,  and  military  affairs  of  Germany,  but  also 
regarding  the  conflicts  and  rivalries  of  the  great  nations  for  foreign  trade  and  colonial 
empire. — EDITOR  REVIEW  OF  REVIEWS.] 

This  is  asking  a  very  broad  question  and  one  that  can  not  be  answered 
with  any  degree  of  correctness  unless  the  scope  of  the  inquiry  be  limited 
as  to  time.  I  shall,  therefore,  only  try  to  give  my  answer  for  a  space,  say, 
of  two  years.  But  this  answer  also  depends  greatly  upon  the  march  of 
events,  which  may  change  the  whole  picture.  I  assume  that  Germany  will 
hold  on  to  Belgium  and  to  the  western  part  of  Poland,  but  am  not  taking 
into  consideration  any  foodstuffs  that  might  be  gotten  from  France,  al- 
though it  is  just  as  likely  as  not  that  Germany  will  lay  her  hands  on  Havre. 

Supplies  from  Holland,  Denmark,  Switzerland,  Belgium 

There  is,  furthermore,  the  question  of  the  prisoners  of  war  and  the 
returning  refugees,  which  might  become  a  serious  problem,  if  the  prisoners 
of  war  in  Germany,  who  number  now  about  300,000,  should  by  Russian 
defeat  be  swollen  to,  say,  a  million.  This  is  quite  possible,  in  view  of  the 
fact  that  the  battle  at  Tannenberg  alone  resulted  in  90,000  prisoners. 
War  is  being  waged  on  Germany  by  all  her  neighbors,  except  the  three 
little  States  of  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Switzerland,  the  traffic  connection 
with  which  can  not  be  interrupted,  and  which  will  be  under  the  necessity  of 
doing  a  good  deal  of  trade  with  Germany. 

They  were  regularly  providing  Germany,  before  the  war,  with  meat, 
dairy  products,  fruit,  barley,  wheat,  all  of  which  they  will  continue  to  fur- 
nish, together  with  Sweden,  and  that  the  more  since  the  chief  customer  for 
some  of  these  products,  namely  England,  has  shut  herself  off  by  strewing 
the  North  Sea  with  mines. 

The  same  is  the  case  with  Belgium.  Danish  dairy  products  are  of  so 
high  a  quality  that  they  could  only  be  purchased  in  England  by  the  rich 
class,  so  the  ordinary  traffic  in  vegetables,  poultry,  and  butter  has  been 
done  always  between  Belgium  and  England.  This,  of  course,  will  all  be 

53 


54  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

available  for  Germany  as  soon  as  Belgian  agriculture  has  been  built  up 
again.  This,  by  the  way,  is  one  of  the  things  that  will  be  done  by  Germany 
as  soon  as  Belgium  has  been  liberated  entirely  from  her  invaders. 

From  Italy  and  Other  Neighbors 

Then  there  is,  of  course,  Italy,  Rumania,  Bulgaria.  And  it  does  not  look 
— in  spite  of  French  temptation  and  the  liberal  use  of  money  among  the 
Italian  mobs  by  the  French  Ambassador — as  if  Italy  would  swerve  from 
virtue.  She  is  growing  enormous  quantities  of  vegetables,  fruit,  wines, 
rice,  and  must  export  it  to  maintain  her  balance  of  payment.  Now,  while 
Germany  is  being  hampered  on  all  sides  and  practically  cut  off  from  the 
sea,  a  great  many  former  consumers  of  Italian  goods  are  also  cut  off,  and 
there  will  be  a  surplus  to  be  shipped  to  Germany,  because  it  can  not  go 
anywhere  else. 

So,  for  instance,  the  eastern  part  of  France  and  all  of  the  western  part 
of  Russia,  though  I  do  not  think  that  these  countries  will  cut  a  very  great 
figure.  Then  there  is  another  factor  that  is  very  potent  in  an  emergency 
of  the  present  kind.  No  blockade,  no  closing  of  frontiers,  no  arrangements 
between  authorities,  will  ever  prevent  the  trickling  through  of  considerable 
materials  to  the  best  payer.  But  that  I  leave  entirely  out  of  count.  My 
figures  are  made  up  without  regard  to  contraband,  without  regard  to 
Rumanian  wheat  and  maize,  or  anything  else  that  Bulgaria  may  be  able 
to  spare,  or  to  such  wheat  and  maize  as  may  come  from  Asia  Minor,  whence 
the  way  is  absolutely  open  to  Germany  without  regard  to  any  breadstuffs 
from  Italy,  as  I  consider  these  items  merely  as  offsets  against  such  food- 
stuffs as  Germany  may  be  called  upon  to  use  in  feeding  a  population  that  is 

not  her  own. 

By  Way  of  Antwerp 

This  population  will  certainly  be  the  first  to  suffer.  If  the  Allies  turn 
their  war  on  Germany  into  a  war  of  starvation,  they  must  be  prepared  for 
the  fact  that  whichever  Allies  are  in  our  hands  will  get  the  first  show.  Even 
if  England  should  continue  to  prescribe  to  the  United  States  what  amounts 
of  wheat,  cotton,  and  other  things  she  should  sell,  even  if  she  sends  the  stuff 
in  her  own  bottoms  to  neutral  countries,  she  can  not  prevent  any  shipping 
in  the  Baltic  nor  regulate  the  overland  traffic  of  home-grown  produce  of 
neutral  countries;  otherwise  she  would  place  herself  in  the  position  of  a 
general  distributer  of  food  for  half  of  the  world,  hampering  not  only  the 
trade  of  the  United  States,  but  also  mostly  that  of  the  small  nations,  which 
she  would  make  believe  to  be  so  dear  and  near  to  her  big  heart. 

Besides,  there  may  be  windfalls  for  Germany,  which  England  has  not 
counted  upon.  I  rather  suspect  that  Antwerp  will  prove  such  a  windfall, 
although  the  Allies  have  taken  care  to  destroy  a  lot  of  American  property 
in  the  oil  tanks,  so  as  to  prevent  their  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Germans. 
But  then,  there  will  be  some  beautiful  fishing  now  in  the  Scheldt  and  neigh- 
boring waters,  and  the  Dutch  sole  is  not  to  be  despised.  Of  course,  there 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  55 

will  be  some  delicacies  that  Germany  will  have  to  forego;  for  instance, 
there  may  be  some  difficulty  in  getting  enough  cocoa,  but  of  coffee  there 
are  enormous  amounts  stored  in  Hamburg,  and  there  will  be  no  deficiency. 

German  Rye  and  Wheat 

So  the  main  point  will  be,  how  is  Germany  to  provide  herself  with 
breadstuffs,  meat,  fresh  vegetables,  and  fruit,  the  first  two  as  necessities  for 
life,  the  last  as  indispensable  for  the  health  of  the  people?  Now,  taking 
the  average  year,  we  can  say,  counting  wheat  and  rye  together  (and  as 
information  for  the  Americans  I  must  add  that  rye-bread  is  the  bread  for 
Germany),  there  is  a  deficiency  of  a  million  to  a  million  and  a  quarter  of  tons 
that  Germany  does  not  raise  herself,  which  is  about  6  per  cent  of  the  total 
consumption.  This  will  probably  have  to  be  replaced  by  some  other  food- 
stuff, and  the  one  that  is  presenting  itself  is  the  potato,  the  average  crop 
of  which  is  about  fifty  million  tons,  but  this  year  we  have  as  much  as 
80,000,000  tons. 

Potatoes — in  Bread  Form 

In  the  last  years  the  art  of  preserving  the  potato  has  been  a  great  problem 
in  Germany.  For  a  long  time  the  military  authorities  had  offered  a  premium 
for  a  good  method  of  preserving  potatoes.  This  premium  has  now  been 
withdrawn,  as  the  question  can  be  considered  as  having  been  solved.  There 
are  various  methods  of  preserving  them.  In  the  first  place,  they  are  being 
cut  up  in  very  small  slices  and  dried,  the  same  way  as  all  the  California 
dried  vegetables  are  offered  in  these  markets.  Then  they  have  been  con- 
verted into  a  most  nutritious  flour,  which  has  heretofore  been  used  to 
make  cake  and  pastry,  and  this  will  now  be  added  to  the  bread  up  to  20 
per  cent. 

Now,  it  must  be  understood  that  80,000,000  tons  of  potatoes  means  just 
about  a  ton  and  a  quarter  per  head  of  the  German  population,  equivalent 
to  about  four  pounds  a  day  all  the  year  round  for  each  German,  women  and 
children  included.  This  potato  crop  has  heretofore  been  mostly  worked  into 
alcohol,  partly  for  consumption  in  industries,  partly  for  beverages.  But 
there  is  a  very  determined  war  being  conducted  in  Germany  against  alco- 
holic beverages,  and  no  soldier  has  been  permitted  even  a  drink  of  beer 
since  the  first  day  of  mobilization. 

Sugar  Lands  for  Alfalfa 

Then,  of  course,  the  food  needs  of  the  population  will  always  have  the 
precedence  over  any  use  of  alcohol  in  the  arts.  Thus  there  will  be  a  large 
surplus,  which  will  more  than  make  up  any  deficiency  in  wheat  or  rye. 
But  that  is  not  all  the  end  of  it.  Germany  has  been  raising  an  average  of 
2,500,000  tons  of  sugar,  whereof  about  half  is  being  exported. 

Now,  sugar  has  been  harvested  in  Germany  for  this  year,  and  can  not 
be  exported;  consequently  there  is  a  two-years'  supply  on  hand,  which  would 


56  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR 

mean  that  the  big  acreage  employed  in  the  raising  of  sugar-beets  is  available 
for  such  crops  as  might  be  short.  On  fields  which  grew  sugar-beets,  any- 
thing else  can  be  planted  and  will  give  big  harvests.  There  may  be  some 
shortage  of  fodder  for  animals,  because  a  great  deal  of  that  has  ordinarily 
been  imported.  Accordingly,  this  sugar  ground  will  probably  be  sowed 
to  alfalfa  and  other  good  haymaking  crops,  and  so  there  will  be  no  diffi- 
culty on  this  account  either.  One  can  say,  therefore,  no  shortage  of  bread- 
stuffs  ought  to  be  expected  under  these  conditions. 

Some  Beef,  Ample  Pork 

Americans  are  aware  that  the  importation  of  meat  into  Germany  has 
been  partly  prohibited,  partly  made  impossible  for  a  number  of  years,  in 
order  to  give  the  incentive  to  German  agriculture  to  raise  home  provisions. 
Ever  since  we  knew  that  beef  production  was  more  tfr  less  monopolized,  we 
have  been  working  intensely  to  become  independent.  So  at  the  last  counting 
there  were  no  fewer  than  20,000,000  beeves,  5,000,000  sheep,  3,000,000  goats, 
and  26,000,000  hogs  in  Germany.  By  the  way,  there  were  also  about 
5,000,000  horses. 

Beef  takes  about  three  years  to  ripen,  while  hogs  are  ready  within  the 
year  in  which  they  are  born.  This  means  that  Germany  is  able  to  produce 
every  year  about  8,000,000  beef  animals,  5,000,000  sheep  and  goats,  and 
26,000,000  hogs,  and  with  the  peasants  and  laborers  the  pork  is  preferred 
on  account  of  its  cheapness  and  nutritious  quality.  That  it  makes  a  very 
good  food  everybody  will  agree,  who  has  ever  tasted  Westphalian  ham  or 
Gottinger  sausages. 

Food  for  Animals 

Therefore,  provided  we  can  feed  the  animals,  there  will  always  be 
enough  meat, — and  I  do  think  we  can  manage  it.  There  are  enormous 
areas  in  Germany,  especially  in  the  northwestern  part,  that  can  be  turned 
into  hayfields  at  short  notice.  As  for  vegetables,  we  have  partly  to  rely 
on  southern  Germany,  Belgium,  and  Italy.  But  the  chief  purveyor  of 
late  years  has  been  Holland ;  and  she  being  cut  off  from  the  English  market, 
will  yield  the  desired  quantities.  So  the  situation  is  at  present  entirely 
satisfactory,  and  the  starving  out  of  Germany  will  prove  just  as  much  a 
piece  of  British  braggadocio  as,  for  instance,  Mr.  Churchill's  digging  out 
of  the  German  fleet  on  the  very  day  of  the  loss  of  three  British  cruisers. 

Labor  for  Agriculture 

But  what  about  the  future?  In  the  first  place,  the  question  will  be  that 
of  farm  labor.  There  are  66,000,000  Germans.  Of  these,  5,000,000  have 
been  called  to  arms.  This  leaves  61,000,000.  A  great  many  industries  have 
stopped,  and  all  their  hands  are  free.  The  German  love  for  home  and  the 
little  garden,  the  slice  of  field,  and  the  custom  of  keeping  at  least  one  hog, 
make  all  these  people  familiar  with  agriculture. 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  57 

.  But  then,  there  are  now  33  per  cent  of  the  German  population  engaged 
wholly  in  agriculture;  and  what  about  300,000  Russian  prisoners  and  as 
many  French  and  Belgian  prisoners?  These  may  be  employed  in  such 
crafts  as  they  understand,  according  to  The  Hague  protocol.  They  will 
be  made  to  work  for  their  keeping.  Besides,  moreover,  the  large  estates  in 
Germany  have  been  worked  for  years  past  by  machinery  run  by  electricity, 
all  of  which  has  been  driven  by  water-power. 

Will  War  Stimulate  Invention? 

So  we  finally  come  down  to  the  question  whether  we  have  decent  har- 
vests. Of  course,  a  complete  crop  failure  would  be  a  serious  matter  for 
Germany  in  times  of  war,  as  well  as  in  times  of  peace.  But  there  is  one  el- 
ement that  must  not  be  overlooked;  there  is  nothing  that  incites  so  much 
the  inventive  genius  as  an  emergency.  It  is  known  that  Germany  holds 
the  best  fertilizers  of  all  the  world  in  unmeasured  quantities  of  potash, 
and  it  is  known  also  that  the  necessary  nitrates  are  being  obtained  by 
resolving  the  air  into  its  component  parts  by  electricity.  The  war  will 
bring  out  any  number  of  devices — processes  that  have  been  too  expensive 
so  far  in  competition — which  will  be  taken  up  and  made  more  perfect. 
Products  will  be  turned  to  use  that  have  never  been  thought  of  before. 
Like  a  good  housewife  who  must  get  along  suddenly  upon  a  limited  stipend 
per  week,  because  some  hardship  has  befallen  her  husband,  so  a  nation, 
convinced  of  its  good  cause,  and  fairly  successful  in  arts  up  to  the  present, 
will  find  its  way  and  be  able  to  buck  up  against  the  humanitarian  English 
proposal  of  starving  it  out. 


WHEN   GERMANY  WINS 

(From  "  The  Independent  ") 

[We  have  heard  a  great  deal  about  what  England  and  France  are  fighting  for.  We 
have  heard  very  little — except  from  English  sources — about  what  Germany  is  fighting 
for.  Here  is  a  chance  to  read  the  other  side. 

Dr.  Dernburg  stands  for  what  we  Americans  most  admire  in  modern  Germany, 
its  industries,  its  commerce,  its  technical  schools,  and  its  efficient  organization.  When 
the  Kaiser  put  him  at  the  head  of  the  Colonial  Office  in  1907  it  was  a  great  shock  to  the 
Junkers,  who  thought  that  such  high  positions  were  the  natural  monopoly  of  those  of 
noble  lineage  and  resented  the  appointment  of  a  business  man,  and,  what  was  worse, 
a  b^lsiness  man  of  American  training,  as  successor  to  Prince  Hohenlohe-Langenburg. 
But  the  Kaiser  was  tired  of  the  bureaucratic  and  military  methods  of  administration 
in  the  colonies  and  wanted  to  have  them  developed  and  made  self-supporting  instead 
of  remaining  a  drain  on  the  Imperial  Treasury.  Herr  Dernburg  made  a  personal 
inspection  of  the  African  possessions  and  would  probably  have  made  them  in  time  as 
profitable  as  the  British  colonies,  if  he  had  been  able  to  carry  out  his  program  of  reforms. 
In  "The  Independent"  of  January  17,  1907,  will  be  found  an  account  of  what  his 
administration  meant  to  Germany. 

Herr  Dernburg  is  the  son  of  an  editor  of  the  Berlin  "Tageblatt"  and  was  born  in 
Darmstadt  fifty  years  ago.  After  graduating  from  the  Berlin  gymnasium  he  came  to 
New  York  City  in  order  to  learn  American  ways,  and  was  for  some  years  in  the  banking 
house  of  Ladenburg,  Thalmann  &  Co.  After  his  return  to  Germany  he  became  a  director 
of  the  Bank  of  Darmstadt.  He  is  now  in  this  country  on  an  important  mission.  As  a 
man  thoroughly  familiar  with  A  merican  history  and  politics  as  well  as  finance  he  under- 
stands our  point  of  view  and  can  interpret  to  us  the  point  of  view  of  his  own  country. 
Those  whose  enterprise  has  brought  their  country  into  the  front  rank  of  commercial 
nations  within  a  single  generation  are  better  representatives  of  the  real  Germany  than 
militarists  or  semi- Slavonic  theorists. — EDITOR  INDEPENDENT.] 

What  will  Germany  do  if  she  is  entirely  victorious?  This  question  has 
been  addressed  to  me  by  a  number  of  American  friends,  time  and  again. 
And  when  I  said  that  it  seemed  to  me  premature  to  make  any  such  fore- 
cast, I  was  met  with  the  reply  that  the  Allies  were  not  so  overcautious,  and 
had  very  freely  said  what  they  intended  to  do  to  Germany  and  Austria  if 
they  got  the  chance. 

The  most  lenient  of  these  programs  runs  about  like  this:  The  crushing 
of  German  militarism  (Mr.  Asquith);  the  destruction  of  the  German  fleet 
(Winston  Churchill);  the  reduction  of  Germany  to  a  subordinate  Power, 
the  breaking  up  of  the  Prussian  hegemony  (Lloyd-George).  Of  course, 
Belgium  is  to  be  restored  and  a  large  slice  of  German  and  Dutch  territory 
to  be  added  to  it;  Alsace-Lorraine  is  to  be  returned  to  France  with  a  big 
indemnity  in  land  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine;  the  Polish  provinces  of 
Germany  to  go  to  Russia;  Schleswig-Holstein  to  Denmark.  And  a  similar 
program  has  been  announced  as  regards  the  Austro-Hungarian  monarchy. 
Finally,  of  course,  Russia  is  to  conquer  Turkey  and  to  absorb  the  whole 
Ottoman  Empire.  In  short,  what  is  intended  is  to  reduce  Germany  to  the 
position  she  had  in  1806  after  the  victories  of  Napoleon  I.,  which  would 

58 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE  WAR  59 

strike  her  out  of  the  list  of  the  great  nations,  and  would  make  her  subordi- 
nate to  the  good  will  of  the  victors. 

That  such  a  program  can  never  be  carried  through,  even  partially,  as 
long  as  there  remain  a  hundred  thousand  Germans  capable  of  bearing 
arms,  needs  not  be  emphasized. 

But  that  (in  view  of  these  acknowledged  demands  of  the  Allies)  it  might 
be  of  some  interest  to  Americans  to  know  what  Germany  would  do  if  she 
was  in  the  position  in  which  the  Allies  love  to  mirror  themselves,  I  will 
concede. 

I  am  speaking  here  as  a  thinking  German,  who  knows  the  history  of  his 
country  and  who  wishes  her  to  profit  from  past  experience,  always  keeping 
in  mind  that  it  is  now  the  time  to  settle  the  European  question  for  a  hundred 
years  to  come,  and  to  take  care  of  the  probable  increase  of  our  population, 
to  secure  its  livelihood  and  prosperity.  While  France  has  remained  practi- 
cally stationary  in  her  population,  the  regular  annual  increase  of  the  Ger- 
man people  is  about  800,000  souls. 

American  readers  who  have  followed  Germany's  development  since  she 
became  a  united  empire  will  very  easily  be  able  to  check  my  views  by  com- 
paring them  with  the  known  ambitions  of  my  people,  and  drawing  the 
necessary  inferences  from  German  popular,  industrial,  and  commercial 
development. 

Territorial  Expansion  in  Europe 

While  there  may  be  some  minor  corrections  of  frontiers  for  military 
purposes,  by  occupying  such  frontier  territory  as  has  proven  a  weak  spot 
in  the  German  armor,  I  do  not  consider  it  wise,  nor,  I  believe,  do  the  leading 
people  of  my  country,  for  Germany  to  take  any  European  territory.  She 
is  now  holding  practically  .all  the  land  inhabited  by  the  German-speaking 
population  of  the  world,  with  the  exception  of  the  Baltic  provinces  of 
Russia.  Whether  these  could  be  added  to  the  German  Empire  would 
hinge  on  the  question  whether  they  could  be  defended.  A  look  at  the  map 
will  show  that  this  must  be  very  difficult.  The  lack  of  homogeneity  has 
been  a  great  source  of  trouble  to  all  the  European  nations.  England  has 
had  the.  Irish  trouble  (which  has  been  a  very  potent  factor  in  her  going 
to  war).  The  unrest  in  Lorraine,  and  that  of  about  thirty  thousand  Danes  in 
the  north  of  Schleswig,  and  the  now  past  differences  with  several  millions  of 
Poles,  have  given  my  country  considerable  trouble.  Italy  is  restive  because 
of  a  few  hundred  thousand  Italians  incorporated  into  Austria.  The  Polish 
question  is  constantly  occupying  the  Russian  mind;  so  is  the  Jewish  ques- 
tion, which  has  there  more  a  racial  than  a  religious  character.  The  ardent 
desire  of  the  Servians  to  redeem  their  brethren  in  Austria  has  given  cause 
for  the  present  war.  So  any  rearrangement  of  the  European  map  that 
would  not  follow  national  lines  pretty  definitely  would  be  only  a  source  of 
constant  friction  hereafter.  This  does  not  say  that  every  single  German  is 
to  be  returned  to  Germany,  nor  every  single  Frenchman  to  France.  The 


60  SEARCH-LIGHTS   ON  THE   WAR 

position  of  Europe  is,  and  will  remain,  such  that  the  various  States  must 
look  for  defensive  measures  against  their  neighbors,  and  such  strategic  con- 
siderations should  have  a  large  share  in  any  peace  settlement.  But  as  a 
general  rule,  I  would  not  coijsider  it  wise  for  my  country  to  attempt  any 
territorial  aggrandizement  in  Europe. 

The  Future  of  Belgium 

From  the  foregoing  it  would  follow  that  Belgium  would  not  be  made 
a  German  province.  As  events  have  shown,  her  natural  position  with 
respect  to  France  and  England — especially  as  a  bulwark  for  the  latter  on 
the  continental  side  of  the  Channel — has  made  Belgium  a  vassal  of  the 
two  countries.  As  Sir  Edward  Grey  says,  he  "expected"  Belgium  to  fight 
to  the  last  man.  And  fight  she  did,  practically  without  help  from  the  Allies. 
Belgium  was  so  entangled  with  England  by  the  various  military  "conversa- 
tions" or  arrangements,  such  as  those  evidenced  by  the  plan  of  Colonel 
Bernardiston,  that  she  could  not  accept  the  German  Chancellor's  offer  of 
integrity,  indemnity,  and  full  restoration,  tendered  twice — both  before  and 
after  the  fall  of  Liege.  By  accepting  these  offers,  Belgium  could  have  avoided 
all  the  misery  that  has  since  befallen  her.  It  is  her  own  doing  that  has 
placed  her  in  her  present  plight. 

Geographically,  Belgium  does  certainly  belong  to  the  German  Empire. 
She  commands  the  mouth  of  the  biggest  German  stream.  Antwerp  is  most 
essentially  a  German  port  and  the  main  outlet  of  the  trade  of  western  Ger- 
many. That  Antwerp  should  not  belong  to  Germany  is  as  much  an  anomaly 
as  if  New  Orleans  and  the  Mississippi  delta  had  been  excluded  from  the 
Louisiana  Purchase,  or  as  if  "New  York  had  remained  English  after  the 
War  of  Independence. 

These  considerations  will  probably  determine  the  German  attitude. 
While  no  attempt  is  likely  to  be  made  to  place  Belgium  within  the  German 
Empire  alongside  of  the  Kingdoms  of  Bavaria,  of  Wiirtemberg,  and  Saxony, 
because  of  her  non-German  population,  the  connection  between  Germany 
and  Belgium  must  be  strengthened  by  including  her  into  the  German 
customs  union,  as  has  been  the  case  with  Luxemburg  ever  since  1867;  and, 
furthermore,  the  harbors  of  Belgium  must  be  secured  by  some  practical 
means  against  British  or  French  invasion.  That  Belgian  neutrality  has 
been  an  impossibility,  the  past  has  shown,  and  so  her  state  of  neutrality 
will  probably  be  lost  for  all  time.  On  the  other  hand,  such  an  arrangement 
would  give  Germany  an  opportunity  to  build  up  Belgium  again  industrially, 
agriculturally,  and  commercially,  and  Germany  would  probably  have  to 
engage  to  provide  the  necessary  financial  aid. 

The  North  Sea  and  the  Channel 

England  has  now  bottled  up  the  North  Sea  by  its  command  of  the 
British  Channel.  It  will  be  necessary  in  future  to  reestablish  a  mare  liber um 
(a  free  sea).  There  are  various  means  by  which  this  could  be  accomplished. 


SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR  61 

The  English  theory,  that  the  sea  is  her  boundary,  and  that  all  the  sea  is 
her  territory  down  to  the  three-mile  limit  of  the  other  Powers,  can  not  be 
tolerated. 

The  neutralization  of  all  the  Channel  coasts — English,  Dutch,  Belgian, 
and  French — even  in  times  of  war,  must  be  necessarily  secured,  and  the 
American  and  German  doctrine  that  private  property  on  the  high  seas 
should  enjoy  the  same  freedom  from  seizure  as  private  property  does  on 
land,  should  be  guaranteed  by  all  the  nations.  The  importance  of  such  a 
stipulation  will  be  readily  recognized  at  a  time  like  the  present,  when 
England  makes  commercial  war  upon  the  United  States  on  the  pretence 
of  protecting  her  interests  against  the  nations  with  which  she  is  engaged 
in  a  struggle.  It  \vould  become  equally  necessary  to  neutralize  all  cables; 
their  cutting  has  hurt  the  United  States  even  more  than  Germany. 

The  Colonies 

It  must  be  demanded,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  all  of  the  colonial  pos- 
sessions, without  exception,  should  be  returned.  But  her  growing  popula- 
tion makes  it  absolutely  imperative  that  Germany  should  also  get  some 
territory  that  could  be  populated  by  whites.  At  the  present  time  she  has 
no  such  colonies.  In  all  the  German  possessions  over  the  sea,  in  spite  of 
efforts  that  have  lasted  for  over  thirty  years,  less  than  thirty  thousand 
white  people,  including  military,  have  been  settled.  So  she  must  endeavor 
to  get  some  such  territory  with  a  climate  fit  for  her  people.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  (which  Germany  has  always  recognized  in  letter  as  well  as  in 
spirit)  forbids  our  seeking  expansion  on  this  side  of  the  water,  either  in 
North  or  in  South  America.  So  we  will  have  to  turn  to  some  such  place 
like  Morocco — if  it  is  really  fit  for  the  purpose,  \vhich  I  am  unable  to  say 
at  this  present  time. 

Germany  and  Turkey 

Germany  has  been  for  about  thirty-five  years  the  associate  of  Turkey 
in  developing  Turkish  territory,  commerce,  and  industry.  She  has  acquired 
the  Oriental  railways  and  built  the  Anatolian  and  Bagdad  lines.  She  has 
established  harbors  and  shipping  companies,  and  engaged  in  mining  and  very 
extensive  irrigation  works.  She  must  demand  to  be  left  with  a  free  hand 
to"go  on  with  this  commercial  development  as  far  as  she  can  arrange  with  the 
sovereign  power  of  the  Porte  and  without  outside  interference.  This 
would  mean  a  recognized  sphere  of  influence  from  the  Persian  Gulf  to  the 
Dardanelles. 

The  Commerce  of  the  World 

Germany  stands,  and  has  always  stood,  for  the  "open  door  and  equal 
opportunity"  policy,  as  to  China  and  to  other  countries  as  well  as  to  the 
British  colonies,  and  it  must  be  strictly  maintained.  All  such  under- 
handed proceedings  as,  for  instance,  the  Japanese  have  resorted  to,  attempt- 
ing to  throttle  foreign  commerce  by  the  possession  of  the  railways  in  Man- 


62  SEARCH-LIGHTS  ON  THE   WAR 

churia,  must  be  done  away  with,  and  all  the  Powers  must  see  to  it  that  no 
more  parts  of  the  earth  are  closed  to  the  exclusive  advantage  of  any  one 
nation.  While  every  nation  must  have  an  undisputed  right  to  treat  foreign 
goods  and  foreign  immigrants  as  she  sees  fit  in  her  own  interests,  every 
nation  must  treat  all  other  nations  in  a  spirit  of  equality  and  without 
discrimination. 

The  Fate  of  the  Smaller  Nations 

Of  course,  it  is  incumbent  upon  Germany  to  see  that  such  as  have 
helped  her  in  her  struggle  shall  not  be  left  to  the  mercy  of  her  antagonists. 
The  right  of  the  peoples  to  frame  their  own  destinies  must  be  fully  recog- 
nized. If  the  Finnish  nation,  which  is  of  non-Slavic  descent,  choose  to 
join  their  Swedish  brethren,  we  will  have  to  stand  up  for  them.  If  Poland 
has  the  necessary  vitality,  she  should  have  a  chance  to  show  it.  If  the 
Boers  want  to  be  independent,  they  should  have  that  right.  And  if  Egypt 
wants  to  return  to  Turkey,  she  must  be  permitted  to  do  so.  All  this  must 
be  done  in  such  a  way  that  no  new  dangers  can  arise  to  the  dual  alliance. 

There  is  nothing  in  this  program  that  would  seriously  change  the  aspect 
6f  Europe.  There  is  no  wish  for  world-dominion  or  any  unduly  predominant 
Power  in  western  Europe  incommensurate  with  the  mass  of  122,000,000  of 
Germans  and  Austrians,  and  there  is  no  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  It 
is  simply  the  carrying  out  of  the  peaceful  aims  that  Germany  has  had  for 
the  last  forty-four  years — the  only  nation  of  Europe  that,  even  in  the  face 
of  intense  provocation,  has  never  let  herself  be  dragged  into  any  war,  or 
has  taken  by  force  a  foot  of  territory  against  the  will  of  the  owner. 

In  conclusion,  I  will  say  that  while  I  am  speaking  as  a  private  person 
and  can  not  voice  in  any  way  official  sentiment,  I  feel  sure  that  I  am  at 
one  with  the  best  German  element,  and  that  my  opinions  are  shared  by 
almost  everybody  in  my  country.  My  country  did  not  wish  this  war,  has 
done  its  utmost  to  ward  it  off,  and  is  not  like  England,  which,  on  her  own 
testimony,  stands  convicted  of  an  effort  to  destroy  an  unwelcome  com- 
petitor and  a  people  whose  chief  sins  are  diligence  and  thrift,  and  who  have 
never  harmed  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  only  thing  Germany  stands  com- 
mitted to  is  to  hold  and  maintain  its  "place  in  the  sun." 


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